Smith v. Jones

• Decision Date: 13 January 2015
• Docket Number: Case No.: 3:14cv195/MCR/EMT
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Florida
• Parties: KAYLE SMITH, Petitioner, v. JULIE L. JONES, Respondent.

KAYLE SMITH, Petitioner, v. JULIE L. JONES,¹ Respondent.

Case No.: 3:14cv195/MCR/EMT

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA PENSACOLA DIVISION

January 13, 2015

ORDER and REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

This cause is before the court on Petitioner's petition for writ of habeas corpus filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (doc. 1). Respondent filed a motion to dismiss the petition as untimely, with relevant portions of the state court record (doc. 18). Petitioner filed a response in opposition to the motion (doc. 26).

The case was referred to the undersigned for the issuance of all preliminary orders and any recommendations to the district court regarding dispositive matters. See N.D. Fla. Loc. R. 72.2; see also 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). After careful consideration of all issues raised by Petitioner, it is the opinion of the undersigned that no evidentiary hearing is required for the disposition of this matter, Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases 8(a). It is further the opinion of the undersigned that the pleadings and attachments before the court show that all but one of Petitioner's claims should be dismissed.

I. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The procedural background of this case is established by the state court record (doc. 18).² Petitioner was indicted in the Circuit Court in and for Escambia County, Florida, Case No. 87-94, on one count of first degree premeditated murder and one count of burglary of an occupied dwelling withan assault while armed (see Ex. J at 19-20). By amended indictment returned February 3, 1987, Petitioner was charged with one count of first degree premeditated or felony murder and one count of armed burglary (Ex. B at 162). The victim was Petitioner's mother. Petitioner pleaded guilty to first degree felony murder and armed burglary (see doc. 18 at 1 n.2).³ On December 31, 1987, the court adjudicated Petitioner guilty and sentenced him to life imprisonment on the murder count without the possibility of parole for twenty-five (25) years, and a consecutive term of life imprisonment on the armed burglary count (Ex. B at 170-202, Ex. C). Petitioner filed a motion for modification of sentence, pursuant to Rule 3.800(b) of the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure (Ex. C at 211-12). The court denied the motion (id. at 213-26). Petitioner appealed the judgment to the Florida First District Court of Appeal ("First DCA"), Case No. 88-351 (Ex. D). The appellate court affirmed the judgment per curiam on November 1, 1998, and the mandate issued November 17, 1988 (Ex. G). Smith v. State, 534 So. 2d 403 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988). On October 24, 1989, the state circuit court modified the judgment as to the burglary count to fifty (50) years of imprisonment, to run concurrently with the life sentence imposed on the murder count (see Ex. J at 30). Petitioner did not appeal the order; therefore, it became thirty days later, on November 24, 1989. See Hampton v. State, 837 So. 2d 611 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003) (absent direct appeal, the judgment and sentence became final 30 days after rendition); Davis v. State, 693 So. 2d 700 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997) (same); Gust v. State, 535 So. 2d 642 (Fla.1st DCA 1988) (same).

No earlier than October 1, 2004, Petitioner filed a motion to correct illegal sentence, pursuant to Rule 3.800(a) of the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure (Ex. H).⁴ On April 4, 2005, the state circuit court dismissed the motion with prejudice (Ex. I). The court determined that one of Petitioner's claims was waived by entry of his guilty plea (id.). The court determined that the other two claimswere cognizable in a Rule 3.850, not a Rule 3.800 motion, but even if the claims were presented in a Rule 3.850 motion, the motion would be untimely (id.).

On February 23, 2011, Petitioner filed a motion for post-conviction relief, pursuant to Rule 3.850 of the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure (Ex. J at 1-12). The state circuit court summarily denied the motion in an order rendered April 1, 2011 (id. at 13-17). Petitioner appealed the decision to the First DCA, Case No. 1D11-2278 (Ex. K). On August 2, 2011, the First DCA affirmed per curiam without written opinion (Ex. M). Smith v. State, 67 So. 3d 206 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011) (Table). The mandate issued August 30, 2011 (id.).

On August 15, 2011, Petitioner filed a second Rule 3.850 motion (Ex. N at 1-6). The state circuit court summarily denied the motion on September 1, 2011 (id. at 26-29). Petitioner appealed the decision to the First DCA, Case No. 1D12-126 (Ex. N at 75). On March 26, 2012, the First DCA affirmed per curiam without written opinion (Ex. O). Smith v. State, 88 So. 3d 938 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012) (Table). The mandate issued June 14, 2012 (Ex. Q).

On June 25, 2012, Petitioner filed a habeas petition in the Supreme Court of Florida, Case No. SC13-223 (Ex. R). On April 19, 2013, the state supreme court dismissed the petition as unauthorized (Ex. S). Smith v. State, 116 So. 3d 385 (Fla. 2013) (Table).

Petitioner filed the instant habeas action on April 10, 2014 (doc. 1 at 23).⁵ He raises the following grounds for relief:

Ground One: "The indictment was subjected to an unauthorized amendment which under Florida Rules of Procedure voided the charging instrument, therefore violating the constitutional provision which requires an indictment for capital crimes."

Ground Two: "Denial of due process in postconviction proceedings for failure to comply with rule 3.850(c) d) [sic] which requires the court to produce the document that 'conclusively demonstrates' that I am not entitled to relief. Instead, Judge Geeker used a copy of the Amended Indictment to conclusively show that the indictment was not amended."

Ground Three: "I asked for a lawyer and later a friend of the family and detective Marsha Smith induced me to relent by stating if I wanted her to help me I had to tell her what happened. I broke down and after confessing Det. Enterkin restarted the tape and proceeded to go over it again."

Ground Four: "I was mentally incompetent due to traumatic stress, the amount of psychotropic/anti-psychotic medication, and pled guilty in the hopes that the court would fry me. I was on suicide watch for that very attitude and subsequently Baker Acted after conviction."

Ground Five: "I am actually innocent of the crime as charged. I was not spatially present at the time of the offense. Petitioner's guilty plea was irrational and involuntarily induced due to a mental imbalance and feelings of guilt that were out of proportion to the reality of the situation. Co-defendant's confession (initial) supports this reality."

Ground Nine: "Trial counsel was ineffective."

Ground Ten: "The State, the court, and defense attorney failed to honor Petitioner's right to be present during re-judication [sic] and re-sentence [sic], thus denying Petitioner the opportunity to withdraw the plea if such conviction and sentence was reached in an unlawful or illegal manner, or allow Petitioner to voice objection and/or present mitigating circumstances that may have modified Petitioner's sentence or cast doubt on evidence used at conviction."

Ground Eleven: "The cumulative effect of these errors and more cast considerable doubt that Petitioner was afforded a fair judicial process. Petitioner asserts that from the beginning and throughout the process, the State, the court, and defense counsel took advantage of the fact that Petitioner suffered from acute post-traumatic stress/ delusions of guilt, and was 'forced' to take very high doses of anti-psychotic medication to quiet auditory/visual hallucinations, and reduce suicidal tendencies, and took 'shortcuts' in the judicial process."

Ground Twelve: "Parole board's arbitrary addition of 120 months for offense severity constructively amends and extends the legislative intent of sentencing statute, subjecting the Petitioner to a more onerous sentence than originally imposed."

Ground Thirteen: "Petitioner re-butted the State's presumption of in-personam jurisdiction, and the State merely quarrelled [sic] with Petitioner's rebutter [sic] without producing the required evidence to show Petitioner's liability to its corporate bylaw (statutes) which violates Petitioner's right to due process of law."

(doc. 1 at 5-23).⁶

II. ANALYSIS

Pursuant to the requirements set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2244, as amended by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214, which became effective on April 24, 1996, a one-year period of limitation applies to the filing of a habeas petition by a person in custody pursuant to a state court judgment. The limitation period runs from the latest of:

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.

Section 2244(d)(1).

Respondent argues that Petitioner's § 2254 petition should be considered as a whole, and the limitations period calculated from the finality date of the judgment of conviction, pursuant to § 2244(d)(1)(A) (see doc. 18 at 3-4). Respondent argues the judgment became final prior to the effective date of the AEDPA; therefore, Petitioner had one year from that date, or until April 24, 1997, to file his § 2254 petition (id.). See Guenther v. Holt, 173 F.3d 1328, 1331 (11th Cir. 1999) ("For prisoners whose convictions became final prior to the effective date of the AEDPA, the one-year stat...