Smith v. Kentucky

• Decision Date: 03 June 2022
• Docket Number: 21-6183
• Citation: 36 F.4th 671
• Parties: Stephanie Logsdon SMITH; Bridgett Dennis; Estate of Cammie Musinski, by Alayna Musinski, Administrator, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Commonwealth of KENTUCKY, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit

36 F.4th 671

Stephanie Logsdon SMITH; Bridgett Dennis; Estate of Cammie Musinski, by Alayna Musinski, Administrator, Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.Commonwealth of KENTUCKY, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 21-6183

United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.

Decided and Filed: June 3, 2022

ON BRIEF: Jeffrey A. Sexton, JEFFREY A. SEXTON, ATTORNEY AT LAW, Louisville, Kentucky, for Appellant. Brett R. Nolan, Courtney E. Albini, OFFICE OF THE KENTUCKY ATTORNEY GENERAL, Frankfort, Kentucky, for Appellee.

Before: CLAY, ROGERS, and KETHLEDGE, Circuit Judges.

CLAY, Circuit Judge.

Plaintiffs appeal the district court's dismissal of their civil rights action for violations of the Thirteenth Amendment arising from the alleged sexual abuse of Plaintiffs by a state probation officer. The district court granted Defendant's motion to dismiss on the basis that the Thirteenth Amendment neither provides a private cause of action for damages nor abrogates state sovereign immunity. We AFFIRM for the reasons set forth below.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background

Plaintiffs were allegedly sexually abused on multiple occasions by Officer Ronald Tyler, a Kentucky probation and parole officer. They claim that Tyler raped and sexually assaulted them between 2017 and 2019, while Plaintiffs served sentences for various state convictions. Additionally, Tyler allegedly made "direct and indirect threats of retaliation, force, bodily harm and injury, incarceration, and cruel and unusual punishment against Plaintiffs ...." (Compl., R. 1, Page ID # 4.)

In August 2018, one of Tyler's victims filed a sexual harassment complaint against him. However, Tyler's supervisor, Johnathan Hall, concealed the complaint. The state of Kentucky terminated Hall, in part due to this concealment. Subsequently, the state charged Tyler with rape in the first degree, sodomy in the first degree, four counts of sexual abuse in the first degree, tampering with physical evidence, official misconduct in the first degree, and harassment.¹

Plaintiffs Smith and Dennis claim that they continue to experience depression, anxiety, and other emotional and mental health adversities due to Defendant's alleged actions. Plaintiffs also claim that decedent Plaintiff Musinski's death was "caused by a relapse

into drug dependency triggered by the depression, anxiety and other emotional and mental health issues caused by the actions and inactions of Tyler, Hall, and the Defendants." (Compl., R. 1, Page ID # 14.)

B. Procedural History

Plaintiffs filed their civil rights action against Governor Andrew G. Beshear and the Commonwealth of Kentucky in May 2021. Initially, Plaintiffs brought their claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Thirteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. They argued that Defendants "directly violated Plaintiffs’ right[s] ... to be free from involuntary sexual servitude guaranteed by U.S. Const. amend. XIII by and through the acts of the Defendants’ employee Tyler while the Plaintiffs were under Tyler's supervision and while the Plaintiffs were incarcerated and in the care and custody of the Defendants." (Id. at Page ID # 16.) They also claimed that Defendants violated Plaintiffs’ Thirteenth Amendment rights to be free from "unwanted sexual physical contact," "unwanted intrusion upon Plaintiffs’ person(s) for the sexual gratification of Defendants’ employee," "sexual physical assault," and "unwanted sexual contact." (Id. at Page ID # 16–17.)

Defendants subsequently filed a motion to dismiss. They alleged that Plaintiffs’ complaint was barred by the Eleventh Amendment and the applicable statute of limitations. Plaintiffs then amended their complaint and disavowed their reliance on 42 U.S.C. § 1983. They contended that their action arose out of the Thirteenth Amendment exclusively, disclaimed their arguments against Governor Beshear, and asserted that jurisdiction was properly conferred by 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

The Commonwealth of Kentucky then filed a second motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. It argued that Plaintiffs failed to state a cognizable claim for relief, and Defendant also reiterated its argument that Plaintiffs’ claims were otherwise barred by the Eleventh Amendment and the applicable statute of limitations. Plaintiffs responded, and Defendant replied.

The district court granted Defendant's second motion to dismiss on the basis that the Thirteenth Amendment neither provides a cause of action for damages nor abrogates state sovereign immunity against private damages actions. Plaintiffs timely appealed. Before this Court, they argue that no state or federal law prohibits them from filing suit "directly against the Commonwealth of Kentucky under Section 1 of U.S. Const amend. XIII for its failure to properly train and supervise its employee to not make personal sex slaves of his probationers and parolees." (Appellants’ Br. 9.) Plaintiffs assert that "though perhaps novel in the eyes of some," this argument is not "foreclosed[ ] by controlling precedent." (Id. )

II. DISCUSSION

Plaintiffs contend that the district court erred when it granted Defendant's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim for relief under the Thirteenth Amendment. However, because the Thirteenth Amendment neither provides a cause of action for damages, nor abrogates Kentucky's sovereign immunity, and Kentucky did not otherwise waive its sovereign immunity, the district court appropriately dismissed Plaintiffs’ claims.

A. Standard of Review

The Court reviews a district court's order granting a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim de novo . See Beydoun v. Sessions , 871 F.3d 459, 464 (6th Cir. 2017) (quoting Kottmyer v. Maas , 436 F.3d 684, 688 (6th Cir. 2006) (citing Marks v. Newcourt Credit Grp., Inc. , 342 F.3d 444, 451 (6th Cir. 2003) )). The Court may affirm the district court's dismissal "on any basis presented by the record." Id. at 466.

B. Private Cause of Action for Damages

Plaintiffs first argue that "suits attacking compulsory labor, i.e. , indentured servitude, arise directly under prohibition of § 1 [of the Thirteenth Amendment], which is ‘undoubtedly self-executing without any ancillary legislation ....’ " (Appellants’ Br. 28 (emphasis added) (quoting The Civil Rights Cases , 109 U.S. 3, 28, 3 S.Ct. 18, 27 L.Ed. 835 (1883) ).) Accordingly, they contend that the Thirteenth Amendment "must provide a direct private right of action," and they "ask this Court to interpret § 1 of U.S. Const. amend. XIII ... to adopt a construction which supports the intent of an implied private right of action against a State for said State's violation ...." ( Id. at 28, 31, 3 S.Ct. 18.)

But "[t]he Supreme Court has never recognized a cause of action arising directly under the Constitution in a case where § 1983 was available as a remedy," and "it is unnecessary and needlessly redundant to imply a cause of action arising directly under the Constitution where Congress has already provided a statutory remedy of equal effectiveness through which the plaintiff could have vindicated her constitutional rights." Thomas v. Shipka , 818 F.2d 496, 500 (6th Cir. 1987) (citing Graves v. Wayne Cnty. , 577 F. Supp. 1008, 1013 (E.D. Mich. 1984) (quoting Small v. Inhabitants of the City of Belfast , 547 F. Supp. 761, 764 (D. Me. 1982) )), vacated and remanded on other grounds , 488 U.S. 1036, 109 S.Ct. 859, 102 L.Ed.2d 984 (1989) ; see also Arpin v. Santa Clara Valley Transp. Agency , 261 F.3d 912, 925 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Azul-Pacifico Inc. v. City of Los Angeles , 973 F.2d 704, 705 (9th Cir. 1992) (concluding that a plaintiff "complaining of a violation of a constitutional right must utilize 42 U.S.C. § 1983" where § 1983 "was available ... but plaintiff failed to file its complaint within the applicable limitations period")); see also Hernandez v. Mesa , ––– U.S. ––––, 140 S. Ct. 735, 742, 206 L.Ed.2d 29 (2020) (noting that the finding that "a damages remedy is implied by a provision that makes no reference to that remedy may upset the careful balance of interests struck by the lawmakers," particularly where there is no clear manifestation of congressional intent to do so); Ziglar v. Abbasi , ––– U.S. ––––, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1856, 198 L.Ed.2d 290 (2017). Unlike cases where federal courts have recognized implied rights to sue for damages, see, e.g. , Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents , 403 U.S. 388, 397, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971) (recognizing an implicit right to sue federal officials for violation of the Fourth Amendment), Plaintiffs here had, and simply missed, the opportunity to avail themselves of a statute through which to properly bring their lawsuit, see 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ; see also Bivens , 403 U.S. at 389, 396, 91 S.Ct. 1999.

This conclusion bears the weight of binding authority. Indeed, the Thirteenth Amendment is distinct from other amendments from which courts have recognized an implied cause of action for damages. Compare U.S. Const. amend. XIII with U.S. Const. amends. IV, V, VIII ; Bivens , 403 U.S. at 397, 91 S.Ct. 1999 ; Davis v. Passman , 442 U.S. 228, 230, 99 S.Ct. 2264, 60 L.Ed.2d 846 (1979) (recognizing the plaintiff's implicit right to sue a federal official for alleged violations of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment); Carlson v. Green , 446 U.S. 14, 18–19, 100 S.Ct. 1468, 64 L.Ed.2d 15 (1980) (recognizing the plaintiff's implicit right to sue federal officials for alleged violations of the Eighth Amendment). Unlike the Fourth, Fifth, and Eighth Amendments, the Thirteenth Amendment explicitly gives Congress the "power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation." U.S. Const. amend. XIII § 2. And Congress has done so. See, e.g. , 18 U.S.C. §§ 1581, 1584 ; see also United States v. Roof , 10 F.4th 314, 394–95 (4th Cir. 2021) (concluding that "the HCPA [ 18 U.S.C. § 249 ] is appropriate legislation under § 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment"); see also 42 U.S.C. § 1983. As the district court more specifically pointed out, "Congress has used its...