Smith v. Kopynec

Decision Date07 June 2013
Docket NumberNo. 2012 CA 1472.,2012 CA 1472.
Citation119 So.3d 835
PartiesNaomi SMITH v. Michael KOPYNEC, John Oleh Kopynec, Elizabeth Kopynec, and XYZ Insurance Company.
CourtCourt of Appeal of Louisiana — District of US


C. Chadwick Boykin, Baton Rouge, LA, for PlaintiffAppellant Naomi Smith.

Brad J. Brumfield, Baton Rouge, LA, for DefendantAppellee John Oleh Kopynec, Elizabeth Kopynec, and America First Insurance Company.

C. James Rothkamn, Jr., Baton Rouge, LA, for Defendant Michael Kopynec.



[1 Cir. 2]Plaintiff filed suit seeking to recover damages after she and her pet schnauzer were attacked, for a second time, by a pit bull. The second attack resulted in the killing of the pet schnauzer and the plaintiff sustaining injuries. The defendant landowners and their insurer filed a successful motion for summary judgment, and the trial court dismissed the plaintiff's claims against landowners with prejudice. Plaintiff now appeals. For the following reasons, we affirm.


On or about October 3, 2010, Naomi Smith was walking her pet schnauzer near her home located at 2425 East Contour Drive in East Baton Rouge Parish. During this walk, a pit bull named Boondock, who was owned by Michael Kopynec, escaped from the premises located at 2436 East Contour Drive and attacked Naomi and her pet. Animal Control was called and removed the pit bull. Michael subsequently reclaimed Boondock and brought him back to 2436 East Contour Drive, which was where Michael resided and maintained the pit bull. The property, however, was owned by Michael's parents, John and Elizabeth 1 Kopynec. Thereafter, on October 9, 2010, Naomi and her pet schnauzer were again out walking when Boondock attacked her and her pet schnauzer a second time. During this second attack, the pet schnauzer was killed, and Naomi was injured.

On October 4, 2011, Naomi filed a petition for damages, naming Michael, as the owner of Boondock, John and Elizabeth, as the owners of the property where the pit bull was being maintained, and America First Insurance Company, as their insurer, as defendants. In response to Naomi's petition for damages, John and Elizabeth filed a peremptory exception raising the objection of no cause of [1 Cir. 3]action. Naomi amended her petition. Thereafter, John, Elizabeth, and America First moved for summary judgment, alleging that Naomi could not prove that John and Elizabeth knew or should have known of the presence of the dog on their property on October 9, 2010. Following a hearing, the trial court granted the motion for summary judgment to dismiss all claims against John and Elizabeth with prejudice and to dismiss the claims against America First with prejudice insofar as the insurer's policy provided coverage for John and Elizabeth. This devolutive appeal followed.


A motion for summary judgment should be granted only if the pleadings, depositions,answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to material fact and that the mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. La. C.C.P. art. 966(B). On a motion for summary judgment, the burden of proof is on the mover. If the moving party will not bear the burden of proof at trial on the matter, that party's burden on a motion for summary judgment is to point out an absence of factual support for one or more essential elements of the adverse party's claim, action, or defense. Thereafter, if the adverse party fails to produce factual support sufficient to establish that he will be able to satisfy his evidentiary burden at trial, there is no genuine issue of material fact, and the mover is entitled to summary judgment. La.C.C.P. art. 966(C)(2); Robles v. ExxonMobile, 02–0854, p. 4 (La.App. 1st Cir.3/28/03), 844 So.2d 339, 341. An appellate court's review of a summary judgment is de novo, using the same criteria that govern the trial court's consideration of whether summary judgment is appropriate. R.G. Claitor's Realty v. Rigell, 06–1629, p. 4 (La.App. 1st Cir.5/4/07), 961 So.2d 469, 471–72, writ denied,07–0214 (La.9/21/07), 964 So.2d 340.

[1 Cir. 4]In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the trial court's role is not to evaluate the weight of the evidence or to determine the truth of the matter, but instead to determine whether there is a genuine issue of triable fact. Guardia v. Lakeview Regional Medical Center, 08–1369, p. 3 (La.App. 1st Cir.5/8/09), 13 So.3d 625, 628. A trial court cannot make credibility decisions on a motion for summary judgment. Monterrey Center. LLC v. Education Partners, Inc., 08–0734, p. 10 (La.App. 1st Cir.12/23/08), 5 So.3d 225, 232. Despite the legislative mandate that summary judgments are now favored, factual inferences reasonably drawn from the evidence must be construed in favor of the party opposing the motion, and all doubt must be resolved in the opponent's favor. Willis v. Medders, 00–2507, p. 2 (La.12/8/00), 775 So.2d 1049, 1050. Because it is the applicable substantive law that determines materiality, whether a particular fact in dispute is “material” for summary judgment purposes can be seen only in light of the substantive law applicable to the case. Guardia, 08–1369 at p. 4, 13 So.3d at 628.


On appeal, Naomi essentially argues that the trial court erred in finding that “absent any knowledge [that] the dog had been returned to the premises, [John and Elizabeth] had no duty to take any further action at that time.”

It is undisputed that John and Elizabeth did not own Boondock. As non-owners, the strict liability of an animal owner under La. C.C. art. 2321 cannot be imputed to them. Bradford v. Coody, 08–1059, p. 5 (La.App. 1st Cir.12/23/08), 6 So.3d 815, 817. A landowner, however, can be held liable for vices or defects in his property pursuant to La. C.C. arts. 2317 and 2317.1. According to La. C.C. art. 2317, [w]e are responsible, not only for the damage occasioned by our own act, but for ... the things which we have in our custody.” Moreover, the custodian of a thing is answerable for damage occasioned by its ruin, vice, or defect, only upon a showing that he knew or, in the exercise of reasonable care, should have known of [1 Cir. 5]the ruin, vice, or defect which caused the damage, that the damage could have been prevented by the exercise of reasonable care, and that he failed to exercise such reasonable care. La. C.C. art. 2317.1.

The 1996 amendment enacting La. C.C. art. 2317.1, effective April 16, 1996, abolished the concept of strict liability that governed the prior interpretation of La. C.C. art. 2317. Thus, a more appropriate term for liability under La. C.C. arts. 2317 and 2317.1 might now be “custodial liability,” but such liability is nevertheless predicated upon a finding of negligence. Two essential elements of such negligence, under the duty-risk analysis of delictual liability, are the existence of a legal duty of the alleged tortfeasor toward the injured person, and the breach of such duty by the alleged tortfeasor. Jackson v. Brumfield, 09–2142, p. 3 (La.App. 1st Cir.6/11/10), 40 So.3d 1242, 1243.

A landowner may also be found liable under La. C.C. arts. 2315 and 2316 for general negligence for injuries caused by a tenant's animal. 2See Bradford, 08–1059 at p. 5, 6 So.3d at 817. In either case, it has been held that to impose liability on a landowner for injuries caused by a tenant's animal, the landowner must have knowledge of the animal's vicious propensities. Turnbow v. Wye Electric, Inc., 38,948. p. 3 (La.App.2d Cir.9/22/04), 883 So.2d 469, 472;Murillo v. Hernandez, 00–1065, p. 6 (La.App. 5th Cir.10/31/00), 772 So.2d 868, 871. Additionally, it has been held that the landowner must have knowledge of the animal's presence on his property. Windham v. Murray, 06–1275, p. 7 (La.App. 4th Cir.5/30/07), 960 So.2d 328, 333. This knowledge gives rise to a duty of care that is owed by the landowner. See Bradford, 08–1059 at p. 5, 6 So.3d at 817;[1 Cir. 6]Windham, 06–1275 at p. 7, 960 So.2d at 333.

Duty is a question of law. Simply put, the inquiry is whether a plaintiff...

To continue reading

Request your trial
13 cases
  • Guidry v. Our Lady of the Lake Nurse Anesthesia Program Through Our Lady of the Lake Coll.
    • United States
    • Court of Appeal of Louisiana — District of US
    • January 29, 2015
    ... ... Smith v. Kopynec, 121472, p. 4 (La.App. 1st Cir.6/7/13), 119 So.3d 835, 837.Breach of Contract It is generally held across the jurisdictions of the United ... ...
  • Herrington v. Ashley, CASE NO. 2:17-CV-00643
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Western District of Louisiana
    • August 20, 2020
    ... ... Hernandez, 772 So.2d 868 (La. Ct. App. 5th Cir. 2000); Windham v. Murray, 960 So.2d 328 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 2007); Smith v. Kopynec, 119 So.3d 835 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 2013); Coburn v. Dixon, 190 So.3d 816 (2016). Accordingly, the court accepts the decisions as ... ...
  • Dutruch v. Se. La. Water & Sewer Co.
    • United States
    • Court of Appeal of Louisiana — District of US
    • July 3, 2014
    ... ... Smith v. Kopynec, 12-1472, p. 4 (La. App. 1st Cir. 6/7/13), 119 So. 3d 835, 837. Interpretation of a contract is usually a legal question which can be ... ...
  • Jones v. La. Med. Ctr. & Heart Hosp.
    • United States
    • Court of Appeal of Louisiana — District of US
    • December 30, 2020
    ... ... Smith v. Our Lady of the Lake Hospital, Inc., 93-2512 (La. 7/5/94), 639 So.2d 730, 750; Bourg v. Safeway Insurance Company of Louisiana, 2019-0270 (La ... Smith v. Kopynec, 2012-1472 (La. App. 1st Cir. 6/7/13), 119 So.3d 835, 839. However, when reasonable minds must inevitably conclude that the mover is entitled to ... ...
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT