Smith v. Lewis
| Decision Date | 26 April 2018 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION 15-0625-WS-B |
| Parties | THADDEUS D. SMITH, SR., Plaintiff, v. DEMETRIA LEWIS, in her official capacity of the Pardon Unit with Board of Pardons and Paroles, Defendant. |
| Court | United States District Courts. 11th Circuit. United States District Court of Southern District of Alabama |
This matter comes before the Court on Defendant's Motion to Dismiss as Moot (doc. 25). Plaintiff, Thaddeus D. Smith, Sr., who is proceeding pro se, was given a full and fair opportunity to be heard on the Motion, and was cautioned about the potential consequences of failing to respond in a timely manner.1 Plaintiff's Response (doc. 33) was filed a week after the deadline; however, the Court in its discretion has reviewed and considered it in full. The Motion is now ripe for disposition.
In his Amended Complaint (doc. 12), Smith brings an equal protection claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against defendant, Demetria Lewis, in her official capacity as an employee of the Alabama Board of Pardons and Paroles (the "Board"). The gravamen of Smith's claims is that the Board denied his application for restoration of voting rights pursuant to Alabama Code § 15-22-36.1 and denied his application for a pardon pursuant to Alabama Code § 15-22-36(a), all because of his race (African-American). The Amended Complaint specifies that Smith seeksrelief in the form of "a full pardon[ ] and voting rights restored," as well as "any other relief that may be appropriate." (Doc. 12, at 4.) Notably, the Amended Complaint does not seek money damages or other compensatory relief; rather, the remedy demanded by Smith is confined to prospective injunctive relief (i.e., restoration of voting rights and a full pardon).2
In its current, second Motion to Dismiss, defendant argues that Smith's Amended Complaint is now moot. Insofar as Smith is requesting that this Court order the Board to restore his voting rights pursuant to Alabama Code § 15-22-36.1, the Board shows that it has already taken that action voluntarily. Indeed, Exhibit A to the Motion purports to be a letter from the Board's Executive Director to Smith and enclosing an executed "Certificate of Restoration of Voter Registration Rights" in Smith's favor dated February 20, 2018. (Doc. 25-1.) In light of this development, the Amended Complaint is plainly moot to the extent that Smith seeks a court order prospectively enjoining the Board to grant such a Certificate in Smith's favor. There is simply nothing further for this Court to do on this aspect of the Amended Complaint.3
As noted, Smith's Amended Complaint also requests the remedy of a full pardon. Alabama law is clear that the decision to grant or deny a pardon application is entrusted to the Board's discretion.4 In its Motion to Dismiss, defendant affirmatively represents that Smith's "pardon application is currently being processed by the Board." (Doc. 25, ¶ 4.) Defendant's position is that "[t]his relief is the most Plaintiff could hope for as a result of this lawsuit" and that this Court lacks authority to compel the Board to exercise its discretion on Smith's pardon application in a particular manner. (Id. at 6.) Despite being given an opportunity to do so, Smith does not dispute the veracity of defendant's statement that the Board is currently processing his pardon application, and does not quarrel with the legal premise of the Board's argument. The Court has no information and no allegation before it that the Board will process Smith's pardon application at this time in an arbitrary, capricious or racially biased manner. Of course, Smith cannot maintain a viable § 1983 action against the Board based on mere speculation or abstracthypothesis that the Board may someday process his pardon application in a manner that trammels his civil rights.5
For all of these reasons, the Court concurs with defendant's assessment that, given the Board's issuance of a certificate restoring Smith's voter registration rights and the Board's acceptance and ongoing processing of Smith's application for a full pardon, "there is nothing further for this Court to do." (Doc. 28, at 3.) Defendant has already done everything that Smith was petitioning this Court to order defendant to do and that the Court would have been empowered to enjoin the Board to do under Alabama law. Simply put, the Board has now taken the very steps that Smith was suing to compel the Board to take. As such, the Amended Complaint is moot because the prospective injunctive relief sought by Smith has been voluntarily provided by the Board. The Motion to Dismiss as Moot (doc. 25) is granted, and this action is dismissed without prejudice.
DONE and ORDERED this 26th day of April, 2018.
1. In particular, the Court entered a briefing schedule on March 23, 2018, fixing a deadline of April 13, 2018 for Smith to respond. That Order also included the following guidance to Smith in bold text: (Doc. 27.)
2. Smith now suggests that he may actually want monetary relief because he requested $2 million in damages in his original complaint. (Doc. 33, at 2.) This argument is frivolous. The original complaint is of no legal effect because it was superseded by Smith's Amended Complaint, which lacks any demand for monetary relief. See, e.g., Pintando v. Miami-Dade Housing Agency, 501 F.3d 1241, 1243 (11th Cir. 2007) () (citations and internal marks omitted). Besides, any request for money damages against this defendant in her official capacity would plainly be barred by the Eleventh Amendment, as a matter of law. See, e.g., Summit Medical Associates, P.C. v. Pryor, 180 F.3d 1326, 1337 (11th Cir. 1999) (); Cross v. State of Alabama, State Dep't of Mental Health & Mental Retardation, 49 F.3d 1490, 1503 (11th Cir. 1995) (...
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