Smith v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co.
Decision Date | 03 March 1976 |
Docket Number | No. C-74-262-D.,C-74-262-D. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of North Carolina |
Parties | Susan Jacobs SMITH, Plaintiff, v. LIBERTY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant. |
E. K. Powe, J. G. Billings, and Charles R. Holton, Durham, N. C., for plaintiff.
James L. Newsom, E. C. Bryson, Jr., and James M. Tatum, Jr., Durham, N. C., for defendant.
The plaintiff Susan Jacobs Smith asserts that she was seriously injured in June, 1973, while working as an employee in a textile plant owned and operated by Collins and Aikman Corporation. She alleges the following:
She, therefore, seeks recovery of compensatory damages, the costs she has incurred in bringing this action, and such other relief as the Court may deem just and proper.
The defendant Liberty Mutual asserted six defenses in its answer to plaintiff Smith's complaint. One of the defenses (the third defense) challenged the plaintiff's interpretation of the North Carolina Workmen's Compensation Act. The plaintiff moved, in timely fashion, to have the Court strike that defense, and the defendant, in turn, moved for summary judgment in its favor on the basis that the defense in question barred the plaintiff from recovery as a matter of law. Briefs were filed to support the contentions of the parties, and a hearing was held in order to permit counsel to further state their positions on the matter.
The question at issue is relatively simple to set forth but, for all its simplicity, is difficult to resolve. Under the provisions of the North Carolina Workmen's Compensation Act, is a workmen's compensation insurance carrier to be considered as an "employer" or a "third party" for the purpose of deciding whether recovery can be had under common law against the carrier by an injured worker?
This question in a similar context first appeared in the 1960 New Hampshire case of Smith v. American Employers' Insurance Co., 102 N.H. 530, 163 A.2d 564 (1960).1 Although this issue has been the focus of opinions in many jurisdictions during the intervening decade and a half, the present case is one of first impression here in North Carolina. Since the provisions of workmen's compensation statutes vary considerably from state to state, it is necessary to consider the specific terms of the North Carolina act. Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 58 S.Ct. 817, 82 L.Ed. 1188 (1938).
The North Carolina Workmen's Compensation Act is set forth in Chapter 97 of the state's General Statutes. Like similar statutes in sister states, North Carolina's act is designed to provide for the clear and certain resolution of claims of employees against their employers when an employee is injured in the course of employment. The act serves to provide ready compensation for injured employees and to limit the possible liability faced by employers. Barnhardt v. Yellow Cab Company, 266 N.C. 419, 146 S.E.2d 479 (1966). The act is designed to replace common law rights of action by injured employees against their employers. Branham v. Denny Roll and Panel Co., 223 N.C. 233, 25 S.E.2d 865 (1943). The courts of North Carolina have consistently held that the provisions of the act must be liberally construed to achieve its purpose to provide compensation for injured employees or their dependents, and, to that end, the courts have insisted that its benefits should not be denied by a technical or narrow construction of the language of the statute. Hollman v. City of Raleigh, 273 N.C. 240, 159 S.E.2d 874 (1968); Keller v. Electric Wiring Co., 259 N.C. 222, 130 S.E.2d 342 (1963); West v. J. P. Stevens Co., 12 N.C.App. 456, 183 S.E.2d 876 (1971).
There are various sections of Chapter 97 which the parties assert are relevant and material to the question under consideration. They are as follows in the order of their appearance in the statute and as worded at the time of the events under consideration:
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