Smith v. Logan

• Decision Date: 05 November 2004
• Docket Number: No. 3:04CV581.,3:04CV581.
• Parties: Cora SMITH, Plaintiff. v. Bernard LOGAN, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Virginia

363 F.Supp.2d 804

Cora SMITH, Plaintiff. v. Bernard LOGAN, Defendant.

No. 3:04CV581.

United States District Court, E.D. Virginia, Richmond Division.

November 5, 2004.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Lisa Kim Newstein Lawrence, Barbara Allyn Queen, Todd Michael Gaynor, Lawrence & Associates, Richmond, VA, for Cora Smith, plaintiff.

Robert Francis Holland, McGuireWoods LLP, Richmond, James Patrick McElligott, Jr., McGuireWoods LLP, Norfolk, VA, for Bernard Logan, defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

SPENCER, District Judge.

THIS MATTER comes before the Court on Plaintiff, Cora Smith's Motion to Remand filed on September 17, 2004, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) and Defendant, Bernard Smith's Motion to Dismiss filed on August 20, 2004. For the reasons stated below, Plaintiff's Motion to Remand is DENIED and Defendant's Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED.

I.

Plaintiff worked as a customer service associate for Verizon from July 15, 1967, until July 14, 2002. Plaintiff would have been employed with Verizon for thirty-five years on July 15, 2002. Defendant was the manager/supervisor for Plaintiff's workgroup. Plaintiff is a member of the collective bargaining unit represented by CWA local union.

Plaintiff went on short term disability on July 6, 2001, and intended to come back to work on July 15, 2002. While out on leave, Plaintiff discovered that Verizon was planning on conducting a workforce adjustment which would offer an Enhanced Income Security Plan ("ISP" or "Plan" or "EISP") to all employees who voluntarily retired prematurely. All ISP benefits are offered pursuant to the provisions in the collective bargaining agreement.

Under company policy, each workgroup's budget would be affected by the number of employees who accepted the ISP offer. Each workgroup's supervisor's individual work bonus is linked to and affected by their management of their respective budgets. Since Plaintiff worked for Verizon for over thirty years, she would have been able to collect an ISP income offer of $66,000, the largest in her workgroup. Plaintiff asserts that because she stood to collect a large ISP offer, Defendant's bonus would be significantly decreased.

Plaintiff contacted two of Verizon's human resources representatives, Lisa Adams and Jackie Scott, to determine how she could work until her thirty-fifth work anniversary and still take part in the ISP offer. Plaintiff alleges that Adams and Scott advised her to use her excused absences and a floating holiday to cover the time from when her disability leave ended on July 14, 2002, until the ISP offer began on July 17, 2002. Plaintiff further alleges that Adam and Scott later conferred with Defendant and determined that Plaintiff could not use her excused absences and floating holiday to bridge the gap. Plaintiff claims that Adam and Scott told her that Defendant suggested she use her accrued vacation time to bridge the gap. Plaintiff did not return to work on July 15, 2002, because of this advice. However, Verizon's Collective Bargaining Agreement ("CBA") forbids the use of accrued vacation to extend a disability leave of absence. (See CBA Art. 31 §§ 6,7).

On July 17, 2002, Verizon announced that enrollment in the ISP would be available from July 17, 2002, until August 15, 2002. An employee accepted for the ISP offer would have to continue employment until August 24, 2002. Plaintiff sent her ISP election documents to the Verizon Claims Review Committee on July 22, 2002. Plaintiff's application was denied because the offer was only available to employees who were employed on July 17, 2002, and the Verizon records indicated that her employment was self-terminated on July 14, 2002.

On July 15, 2004, Plaintiff filed a two count Motion for Judgment against Defendant in the Circuit Court for the City of Richmond claiming that Defendant tortiously interfered with her business expectancy or contractual relations. Plaintiff seeks $66,000 for lost prospective profits, punitive damages, and compensatory damages. On August 13, 2004, Defendant removed this action to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia based on federal question jurisdiction. Judge Richard L. Williams recused himself from this case on October 5, 2004. On October 6, 2004, the case was reassigned to Judge James R. Spencer after Judge Robert E. Payne recused himself. Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss on August 20, 2004. Plaintiff filed a Motion to Remand on September 17, 2004. Oral argument was held in this matter on October 26, 2004.

II.

Because the Court must first decide whether or not it has proper subject matter jurisdiction over this case before it can make substantive determinations, Plaintiff's Motion to Remand will be addressed first. A court must remand a case back to state court "if at any time before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction." 18 U.S.C. § 1447. The party who is seeking removal bears the burden of establishing jurisdiction. See McNutt v. General Motors Acceptance Corp. of Ind., 298 U.S. 178, 189, 56 S.Ct. 780, 80 L.Ed. 1135 (1936). The district court will have subject matter jurisdiction over a civil action if there is complete diversity of citizenship or a federal question exists. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332.

A district court has federal question jurisdiction if the civil action arises "under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 1331. "[A] cause of action arises under federal law when the plaintiff's well-pleaded complaint raises issues of federal law." Metropolitan Life Ins. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 63, 107 S.Ct. 1542, 95 L.Ed.2d 55 (1987) (citing Gully v. First Nat'l Bank, 299 U.S. 109, 112-113, 57 S.Ct. 96, 81 L.Ed. 70 (1936)). A federal defense, such as preemption, may not form the basis for removal. Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392, 107 S.Ct. 2425, 96 L.Ed.2d 318 (1987). However, if a state law cause of action has been completely preempted by federal law, any claim based on the completely preempted state law is considered a federal claim arising under federal law. Id. at 393, 107 S.Ct. 2425.

III.

Plaintiff alleges that remand is proper because her complaint seeks damages arising under Virginia tort law, not under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act ("ERISA") or the Labor Management Relations Act ("LMRA").

A. Whether Plaintiff's State Law Claims are Completely Preempted by ERISA

State law causes of action may either be "completely preempted" or "conflict preempted" by ERISA. Pursuant to section 502(a) of ERISA (" § 502(a)"), a participant or beneficiary can bring a civil action to recover benefits due under an employment benefit plan. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a). Causes of action that fall within the scope of the civil enforcement provisions of § 502(a) are completely preempted and thus can be removed to federal court. Aetna Health, Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 124 S.Ct. 2488, 2496, 159 L.Ed.2d 312 (2004) (quoting Metropolitan Life, 481 U.S. at 65-66, 107 S.Ct. 1542). Section 514 of ERISA (" § 514") determines the scope of state laws conflicting with ERISA. "Conflict preemption" or "ordinary preemption" under § 514 does not provide a basis of federal removal, but "provides a defense to a state law claim that may be asserted in state court." Sonoco Products Co. v. Physicians Health Plan, Inc., 338 F.3d 366, 371 (4th Cir.2003).

Plaintiff argues that her claims do not fall within the scope of § 502(a)'s civil enforcement provisions; therefore, removal was improper because her claims are not preempted. The Supreme Court has held that a state law claim will be completely preempted by ERISA if the person could have brought the claim under § 502(a)(1)(B) and there is "no independent legal duty that is implicated by the defendant's actions." Aetna Health, Inc., 124 S.Ct. at 2496. Under the Fourth Circuit's articulation of the test for complete preemption under § 502(a), the plaintiff must have (1) standing, (2) the claim must fall within the scope of an ERISA provision that can be enforced through § 502(a), and (3) the claim must not be capable of resolution without interpretation of the contract governed by federal law. Sonoco Products Co., 338 F.3d at 372 (applying test articulated in Jass v. Prudential Health Care Plan, Inc., 88 F.3d 1482, 1487 (7th Cir.1996)).

Plaintiff argues that she does not have standing to bring an ERISA claim because she is not a plan participant or beneficiary. Plaintiff states that she is not a "participant or beneficiary" because she was not allowed to join the Plan after her retirement became effective on July 14, 2002, three days before eligibility for the Plan began. Furthermore, Plaintiff asserts that she would not likely prevail in a suit for benefits against Verizon because the company no longer employs her.

A participant is defined as "any employee or former employee of an employer ... who is or may become eligible to receive a benefit of any type from an employee benefit plan which covers employees of such employer." 29 U.S.C. § 1002(7) (emphasis added). Therefore, the issue of whether Plaintiff has standing as a "participant" within the meaning of § 502(a) turns on whether she "may have become eligible" for an ERISA benefit. An employee "may become eligible" for benefits if they have a "colorable claim that (1) he or she will prevail in a suit for benefits, or that (2) eligibility requirements will be fulfilled in the future." Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 117, 109 S.Ct. 948, 103 L.Ed.2d 80 (1989). A claim will be colorable if it is "arguable and nonfrivolous." Davis v. Featherstone, 97 F.3d 734, 737-38 (4th Cir.1996). Plaintiff has presented a "colorable" claim for benefits which is arguable and non-frivolous.

Since the Court finds that Plaintiff does have standing under § 502(a), the next inquiry is whether Plaintiff is seeking to enforce an ERISA benefit. At issue in this case is whether Plaintiff is seeking...