Smith v. Mahally

• Decision Date: 12 May 2020
• Docket Number: Case No. 1:17-cv-00257 (Erie)
• Parties: DONALD SMITH, Petitioner v. SUPT. LAWRENCE MAHALLY, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA, JOSH SHAPIRO, DISTRICT ATTORNEY OF VENANGO COUNTY
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Pennsylvania

DONALD SMITH, Petitioner v. SUPT. LAWRENCE MAHALLY, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA,JOSH SHAPIRO, DISTRICT ATTORNEY OF VENANGO COUNTY

Case No. 1:17-cv-00257 (Erie)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

May 12, 2020

RICHARD A. LANZILLO UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER ON PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS RELIEF

ECF NO. 4

Donald Smith (Smith), proceeding pro se, has filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (the Petition).¹ ECF No. 4. He challenges his conviction for kidnapping, criminal conspiracy to commit simple assault, simple assault, possession of a weapon, terroristic threats, and possession of drug paraphernalia. For the reasons that follow, the Petition will be dismissed because none of the proposed grounds merits the grant of federal habeas relief.² Furthermore, because jurists of reason would not find this disposition of the petition debatable, a certificate of appealability will also be denied.

I. Factual Background

Somewhat unusually, neither the trial court nor Smith's Brief to the Pennsylvania Superior Court relate the background facts underlying Smith's criminal case. As the Superior Court noted on direct appeal, "the underlying facts resulting in the charges in this case are not set forth in the trial court's Opinion of February 12, 2010, or in the Brief for Appellant. In addition, the Commonwealth has not filed a brief in connection with this appeal." See ECF No. 12-1, p.40 n.1. Addressing Smith's appeal in his Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA) proceedings, the Pennsylvania Superior Court recounted the factual history of the case as follows:

Appellant and a co-defendant, Shane Carey, confronted the complainant, Ian Jordan, about money Jordan owed Appellant. Appellant and co-defendant then drove Jordan in Carey's car, verbally threatened him, and physically struck him. When the car came to a stop sign, Jordan fled into a nearby cornfield. Appellant and Carey chased Jordan on foot, and Carey tackled him. Appellant and Carey proceeded to assault Jordan in the field. Afterwards, Appellant and Carey returned to the car and left the scene. Jordan walked back to the roadway and received assistance from a passing motorist, who called 911. Jordan did not immediately report the incident. Jordan reported the encounter to the police later in the day and stated he was "pistol-whipped." He later stated that Appellant held a knife to his throat when they were in the car. Officers then obtained a warrant to search Appellant's residence. The warrant listed Appellant's business address, but a detective testified at trial that he telephoned the magisterial district magistrate with the correct address for Appellant's residence. During the search, officers discovered a small amount of marijuana, paraphernalia related to the use of marijuana, a white powder on a plate, and a black, flip-type, locking blade knife. A detective testified at trial that the knife was capable of being opened with a motion of the wrist. Officers obtained a second search warrant for drug evidence and recovered a prescription bottle of dihydrocodone and one tablet of hydromorphone. Appellant was taken into custody and denied involvement in an altercation with Jordan during a videotaped interrogation. The videotape of Appellant's interrogation was played at trial. Subsequently, Appellant and Jordan were confined at the same jail. Jordan asserted that Appellant, both personally and through other inmates, threatened him and offered him money not to testify.

Id. at pp. 204-206.

II. Procedural History

A. Proceedings in State Court

The Pennsylvania Superior Court also summarized the procedural history of the case in the state courts:

Appellant was charged as follows. As to the initial incident involving Appellant, Carey, and Jordan, Appellant was charged with kidnapping, conspiracy, aggravated assault, simple assault, coercion, possession of an instrument of crime, recklessly endangering another person, and terroristic threats. As to the contraband discovered during the search of his residence, Appellant was charged with possession with intent to use drug paraphernalia and possession of a small amount of marijuana. Appellant was also charged with intimidation of a witness for the alleged interactions at the prison. The charges were consolidated for the purposes of trial.

* * *

... [T]he jury found Appellant guilty of one count each of kidnapping, criminal conspiracy, possession of a weapon, terroristic threats, possession with intent to use drug paraphernalia, and simple assault. The jury acquitted Appellant of aggravated assault, criminal coercion, recklessly endangering another person, and intimidation of a witness. The trial court separately found Appellant guilty of possession of a small amount of marijuana. [Smith was] sentenced to an aggregate term of ten to twenty years' imprisonment and a consecutive five-year term of probation. The Court's sentence was based on the imposition of a mandatory "second strike" sentence for kidnapping. Appellant timely appealed and this Court affirmed. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied Appellant's petition for allowance of appeal on September 27, 2011. Trial counsel represented Appellant during his direct appeal.

Appellant filed a timely pro se PCRA petition, which the Court received on December 13, 2011. Appellant subsequently filed a supplemental pro se petition on December 13, 2012. The court appointed counsel, who did not amend Appellant's petition.

* * *

... [T]he PCRA court denied Appellant's petition and granted PCRA counsel's motion to withdraw. Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal .... The PCRA court ordered Appellant to file a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa. R. A. P. 1925(b), and Appellant complied.

Id. at pp. 206-211. The Superior Court affirmed the denial of PCRA relief. Id. at 246. Smith did not seek an allowance of appeal from the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.

B. Proceedings in Federal Court

Smith filed the instant petition on September 18, 2017. ECF No. 4. He also supplemented his petition with two additional claims on November 16, 2017. ECF No. 6. In the Petition, Smith raised numerous grounds for relief, all of which are based on the alleged ineffectiveness of his counsel:

Ground One: PCRA counsel ineffective for not arguing issues of merit against trial counsel and filing Turner/Finley letter;

Ground Two: Trial counsel ineffective for not objecting timely to Judge's charge to jury which was misleading and bias (sic);

Ground Three: Trial counsel ineffective for not using peremptory challenge on newspaper editer (sic) who sat on jury;

Ground Four: Trial counsel ineffective for not filing motion to suppress video that was shown to jury that showed Smith's record.

ECF No. 4, pp. 5-10. His two supplemental grounds for relief are also ineffective assistance of counsel claims:

Ground Five: Trial counsel ineffective for not objecting to testimony of a gun being involved, when a gun was never part of the case;

Ground Six: Trial counsel ineffective for not objecting to testimony of a prior assault on the victim.

ECF No. 6, p. 2.

After being granted an extension of time, Respondents filed their Answer to the Petition on January 8, 2018, contending that all of the Grounds for Relief are without merit. ECF No. 12.Respondents also filed the original state court record with this Court.³ Smith filed a Reply Brief. ECF No. 18. The Petition is now ready for disposition.

III. The Habeas Corpus Legal Standard

Habeas corpus is an "'extraordinary remedy' reserved for defendants who were 'grievously wronged' by the criminal proceedings." Dunn v. Colleran, 247 F.3d 450, 468 (3d Cir. 2001) (quoting Calderon v. Coleman, 525 U.S. 141, 146 (1998)). In enacting the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), Congress "significantly limited the federal court's power to grant a writ of habeas corpus." Tolbert v. Ferguson, 2019 WL 4677357 at *2 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 8, 2019). Under § 2254, a district court may entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus filed by a person in state custody "only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). Moreover, federal courts must give considerable deference to determinations made by state trial and appellate courts. See Renico v. Lett, 599 U.S. 766, 772 (2010). Thus, if a claim presented in a § 2254 petition has been adjudicated on the merits in state court proceedings, habeas relief cannot be granted unless:

the adjudication of the claim (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254 (d). It is the habeas petitioner's burden to show that the state court's decision was contrary to or an unreasonable application of United States Supreme Court precedent and/or an unreasonable determination of the facts. Moreno v. Ferguson, 2019 WL 4192459, at *3 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 4, 2019).

The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has emphasized the heavy burden habeas petitioners bear, noting that "even 'clear error'" by the state courts "will not suffice." Orie v. Sec. Pa. Dept. of Corrections, 940 F. 3d 845, 850 (3d Cir. 2019). Rather, the state court must be wrong "beyond any possibility for fair-minded disagreement." Id. (citations and some internal quotations omitted). Moreover, the factual determinations of the state courts are presumed correct. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1) ("In a proceeding instituted by an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court, a determination of a factual issue made by a State court...