Smith v. McKinney

• Decision Date: 31 March 2015
• Docket Number: No. C 11-3010-MWB,C 11-3010-MWB
• Parties: LEE ANDREW SMITH, Petitioner, v. JAMES MCKINNEY, Respondent.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Iowa

LEE ANDREW SMITH, Petitioner, v. JAMES MCKINNEY, Respondent.

No. C 11-3010-MWB

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF IOWA CENTRAL DIVISION

March 31, 2015

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER REGARDING OBJECTIONS TO MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S RECOMMENDED DISPOSITION OF STATE PRISONER'S HABEAS PETITION

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND .............................................. 3

A. Factual Background ............................................................... 3

B. Procedural Background ........................................................... 5

1. State proceedings ........................................................... 5

a. Direct Appeal ....................................................... 8

b. Postconviction Relief Proceedings .............................. 9

i. Iowa District Court Decision ............................ 9

ii. Iowa Appellate Court Decision ........................ 10

2. Federal Proceedings ..................................................... 15

a. Smith's § 2254 Petitions ........................................ 15

b. The Report And Recommendation ............................ 18

II. LEGAL ANALYSIS ...................................................................... 23

A. Review Of A Report And Recommendation .................................. 23

B. Federal Habeas Relief ........................................................... 26

1. "Exhausted" and "adjudicated" claims .............................. 28

a. The "Exhaustion" and "adjudication" requirements ...................................................... 28

b. Limitations on relief on "exhausted" claims ............... 29

2. The § 2254(d)(1) standards ............................................. 31a. The "contrary to" clause ....................................... 31

b. The "unreasonable application" clause ..................... 31

c. The effect of § 2254(d)(1) deficiencies in the state court decision .............................................. 33

3. The § 2254(d)(2) standard .............................................. 34

4. De novo review of issues not reached by the state court ........................................................................ 35

C. "Clearly Established Federal Law" Regarding Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel ........................................................... 35

1. The Strickland Standard ................................................ 36

2. Strickland's "deficient performance" prong ........................ 37

3. Strickland's "prejudice" prong ........................................ 39

4. Smith's Objections ....................................................... 40

5. Analysis .................................................................... 41

III. CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY ............................................... 54

IV. CONCLUSION ............................................................................ 55

Petitioner Lee Andrew Smith's (Smith) Petition For Writ of Habeas Corpus Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 is before me pursuant to a Report and Recommendation (R&R) of United States Magistrate Judge Leonard T. Strand recommending that the petition be denied. Judge Strand's R&R was filed on November 7, 2014 (docket no. 88). Smith filed objections to the R&R on November 14, 2014 (docket no. 89). The Respondent, James McKinney, the warden of Fort Dodge Correctional Facility, did not file any objections to the R&R. In this Memorandum Opinion and Order, I must conduct a de novo review of those parts of Judge Strand's R&R to which the respondent has objected. In doing so, I consider whether to accept, reject, or modify Judge Strand's R&R.

I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background

Absent rebuttal by clear and convincing evidence, I must presume that any factual determinations made by a state court in a state prisoner's criminal and postconviction relief cases were correct. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); see Bell v. Norris, 586 F.3d 624, 630 (8th Cir. 2009) (a federal court must deem factual findings by the state court to be presumptively correct, subject to disturbance only if proven to be incorrect by clear and convincing evidence). The Iowa Court of Appeals summarized the facts underlying Smith's conviction, as follows:

In April 2006, Smith entered his ex-girlfriend's home, armed with a knife, and physically and sexually assaulted her. On April 16, 2006, the State charged Smith with first-degree burglary in violation of Iowa Code sections 713.1 and 713.3 (2005) (Count I), third-degree sexual abuse, enhanced as a habitual offender, in violation of sections 709.1, 709.4, 902.8, and 902.9(2) (Count II), and domestic abuse assault causing bodily injury, enhanced as a habitual offender, in violation of sections 708.2A(4), 902.8, and 902.9(2) (Count III).

Before trial, the State offered Smith a plea deal that would have resulted in a twenty-five year prison sentence. The State also indicated that if Smith did not take the deal, it might file a first-degree kidnapping charge against him. Smith's trial attorney, Andrea Dryer, informed Smith of the State's offer and the possibility of a first-degree kidnapping charge, but also told Smith she did not believe the State would have a strong kidnapping case.

Smith declined the plea offer, and the case proceeded to trial on June 27, 2006. During the victim's testimony, Smith leaned over to Dryer and whispered loudly that he "wanted this to stop" and didn't want the victim to "go through this anymore." Smith then repeated himself, speaking loudly enough that Dryer believed some of the jurors had heard.

Dryer told the trial judge that she and her client needed a break. A recess was called, after which the State and Smith negotiated a plea bargain. Pursuant to the plea agreement, Smith pled guilty to all three counts, and the State recommended a sentence of twenty-five years on Count I, fifteen years on Count II, and fifteen years on Count III, with the sentences on Counts II and III to run concurrent to each other but consecutive to the sentence on Count I.

During the required IOWA R. CRIM. P. 2.8(2)(b) colloquy, Smith stated he was forty-nine years of age, had a high school education, and understood the charges against him. He further indicated that he was pleading guilty in order to avoid a first-degree kidnapping charge and the lifetime prison sentence that would result if he were convicted thereon. The judge informed Smith that he would have to take a batterer's education class, register as a sex offender, and pay a civil penalty. Smith was not told he would be subject to mandatory lifetime supervision under Iowa Code section 903B.1 (Supp.2005). The district court accepted Smith's plea.

Smith requested immediate sentencing. The judge advised Smith that if he was sentenced immediately, he would waive his right to file a motion in arrest of judgment and could not challenge any defects in the plea proceedings. The colloquy indicates Smith understood he was waiving that right. The court then sentenced Smith to the forty-year sentence recommended by the prosecution, consisting of twenty-five years on Count I plus fifteen years each on Counts II and III, the sentences on the latter two counts running concurrently. The sentence imposed by the court did not include the mandatory section 903B.1 lifetime parole term.

Later, the district court entered an order finding that Smith's sentence did not comply with section 903B.1, set it aside, and scheduled a resentencing hearing for December 18, 2006. At that time, Smith asked to withdraw his guilty plea, and the hearing was continued to January 16, 2007. Five days before the scheduled resentencing hearing, Smith fileda motion in arrest of judgment and a formal application to withdraw his guilty plea. The district court then entered an order granting Smith a new trial, holding that: (1) the omission of the section 903B.1 lifetime parole term was an illegal sentence that could be corrected at any time; (2) Smith was not informed of the section 903B.1 sentence, causing his plea to be unknowing; and (3) the improper plea invalidated the entire agreement and not just the sexual assault plea. The State appealed. On appeal, the supreme court found Smith had waived his right to file a motion in arrest of judgment and remanded the case for resentencing, but stated that Smith could bring a postconviction relief action challenging his guilty plea following resentencing. State v. Smith, 753 N.W.2d 562, 565 (Iowa 2008).

After procedendo issued, the district court resentenced Smith as before to forty years' imprisonment, consisting of twenty-five years on the burglary charge, and fifteen years on the sexual abuse and domestic abuse assault charges to be served concurrently. The court added the lifetime parole term required by section 903B.1.

Smith v. State, 791 N.W.2d 712, 2010 WL 4867384, *1-*2 (Iowa Ct. App. 2010) (unpublished table decision). In further summarizing the procedural history below, I refer to the record, the applicable decisions of the Iowa district courts, Iowa Court of Appeals, and Iowa Supreme Court, Judge Strand's R&R, and the parties' briefs. In order to provide a complete picture of the procedural history, some of the facts discussed above are repeated below. I will also discuss additional facts where relevant.

B. Procedural Background

1. State proceedings

On April 13, 2006, the State charged Smith with first-degree burglary (Count I); sexual abuse in the third-degree as a habitual offender (Count II); and domestic abuseassault causing injury as a habitual offender (Count III).¹ Prior to the first and second days of trial, Smith rejected the State's offered plea bargains, which would have resulted in a twenty-five year prison term.² Tr. at 53. The parties proceeded to trial, and Smith was represented by Andrea Dryer (Dryer). Id. 55-56.

On June 27, 2006, Smith's trial commenced, and a jury was selected. The following morning, on June 28, 2006, the presentation of evidence began. The first...