Smith v. McQueen

• Decision Date: 28 March 1936
• Docket Number: 6 Div. 946
• Parties: SMITH et al. v. McQUEEN.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

166 So. 788

232 Ala. 90

SMITH et al. v. McQUEEN.

6 Div. 946

Supreme Court of Alabama

March 28, 1936

Appeal from Circuit Court, Tuscaloosa County; Henry B. Foster Judge.

Petition of R.A. Smith and others for mandamus to John D. McQueen, as Chairman of the State Executive Committee of the Democratic Party of Alabama. From a judgment denying the writ petitioners appeal.

Affirmed.

George Pegram, of Linden, and Horace L. Flurry, of Montgomery, for appellants.

Tom B Ward and J. Monroe Ward, both of Tuscaloosa, T.E. Buntin, of Dothan, Henry McDaniel, of Demopolis, and E.W. Pettus, of Selma, for appellee.

GARDNER Justice.

Petitioners seek by mandamus to require the respondent chairman of the state executive committee of the Democratic Party to certify their names as candidates in the party primary of May 5, 1936, for election as delegates and alternate delegates to the national convention of said party to be held in June, 1936, at Philadelphia.

It is of course universally recognized that the extraordinary remedy of mandamus is only to be granted when there is a clear specific legal right shown, for the enforcement of which there is no other adequate remedy. Ex parte Three Minute Cereal Co. (Ala.Sup.) 165 So. 584. Do petitioners show such a clear legal right? We think the answer is in the negative and that the discussion may be confined within a narrow scope.

It is to be observed, in the first instance, that the subject-matter of this petition concerns a factional controversy within a political party, and that the courts, with rare unanimity, express a reluctance to assume jurisdiction of questions of a purely political nature. The following from the text of 20 Corpus Juris, 137, is well supported by the cited authorities: "Except to the extent that jurisdiction is conferred by statute or that the subject has been regulated by statute, the courts have no power to interfere with the judgment of the constituted authorities of established political parties in matters involving party government and discipline, or to determine disputes within a political party as to the regularity of the election of its executive officers. As elections belong to the political branch of government, the courts will not be astute in seeking to find ground for interference, but will seek rather to maintain the integrity and independence of the several departments of the government by leaving questions as to party policy, the regularity of conventions, the nomination of candidates, and the constitution, powers, and proceedings of committees, to be determined by the tribunals of the party." To like effect see 9 R.C.L. p. 1070; 20 A.L.R. pp. 1036, 1037.

This general principle was recognized by this court in Lett v. Dennis, 221 Ala. 432, 129 So. 33, 35, where it was observed that political parties are not governmental agencies, but voluntary organizations with the objects "intimate to those who compose them." They have grown in importance and influence, and under our Republican form of government have become, in a sense, a part of our great political system. For many years these organizations were unrestrained in any manner, and suits arose calling for legislative action. While they are still voluntary organizations, yet they are affected with a public interest, and, the authorities generally agree, are subject to regulation by legislative enactment. Our Constitution (section 190), while demanding regulatory statutes as to primary elections, expressly provides against any compulsory primary; and our present statute (Gen.Acts 1931, p. 73) represents a response to such constitutional mandate.

The first inquiry is, therefore, To what extent is the subject matter of this petition affected by the provisions of the above cited statute? For the purpose in hand, it may be conceded, without decision on the question (though perhaps a matter of some doubt), that delegates to a national convention are party officers within the meaning of the statute. So assuming, section 1 of this act stipulates, first, that all political parties are presumed to have accepted and come under the provisions of the primary election law, and a method is provided whereby such party may declare its election not to come within its influence. And the concluding sentence of the section, which is of controlling influence here, is as follows: "The State Executive Committee of a political party may determine from time to time what party officers shall be elected in the primary; provided, candidates for all party offices shall be elected under the provisions of this Act unless the method of their election is otherwise directed by the State Executive Committee of the party holding the election."

The petition discloses that the state executive committee has certified the candidates for primary election in May, 1936, to the secretary of state, and omitted therefrom any delegate or alternate to the national convention, but has itself elected such delegates and alternates to represent the party in such convention. The argument is that, as the Legislature has seen fit to enact a law governing such primary election, the party is governed by such law (citing Gilmore v. Waples, 108 Tex. 167, 188 S.W. 1037), and that, in the manner of selection of the delegation to the convention, the committee has acted in violation thereof.

But we cannot agree that a violation of the statute has been made to appear. The lawmakers were careful, in the above-quoted language of the statute, to grant to the state executive committee a wide discretion as to the selection of party officers. It "may determine from time to time what party officers shall be elected in the primary." The proviso is merely to the effect that, if no other method is stipulated, the election shall be in the primary. And this wide discretion left in the state executive committee is in harmony with other provisions of the act vesting large authority in such committee.

It is the court of final appeal in all party contests (section 51, p. 93), and may establish additional rules of procedure (section 52, p. 94).

By section 11 of the act (page 76) the committee is given authority to prescribe the political or other qualifications of the members of the party, and determine who shall be entitled and qualified to vote therein and to become candidates. But we need pursue the thought no further. Suffice it to say the act abounds in illustrations of confidence and trust...