Smith v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. of New York
| Decision Date | 05 October 1908 |
| Docket Number | 359 |
| Citation | 71 A. 11,222 Pa. 226 |
| Parties | Smith, Appellant, v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Company |
| Court | Pennsylvania Supreme Court |
Argued February 19, 1908
Appeal, No. 359, Jan. T., 1907, by plaintiff, from judgment of Superior Court, Oct. T., 1906, No. 227, affirming order of C.P. Schuylkill Co., Jan. T., 1906, No. 36, refusing to take off nonsuit in case of Esther A. Smith v. The Metropolitan Life Insurance Company of New York. Reversed.
Appeal from Superior Court.
The facts appear by the opinion of the Supreme Court, and by the report in 34 Pa.Super. 72.
Error assigned was the judgment of the Superior Court.
Judgment reversed and procedendo awarded.
James B. Reilly, with him George W. Ryon, for appellant. -- The wife's rights under the policy terminated with her death Thomeuf v. Knights of Birmingham, 12 Pa.Super. 195; Herr v. Reinoehl, 209 Pa. 483; Central Bank v. Hume, 128 U.S. 195 (9 S.Ct. Repr. 41); Olmsted v. Keyes, 85 N.Y. 593.
R. H. Koch, with him Guy E. Farquhar, for appellee. -- The following cases seem to us to clearly sustain the judgment of the court below: Waltz v. Mut. Aid Society, 5 Pa. C.C. Rep. 208; Anderson's Est., 85 Pa. 202; Brown's App., 125 Pa. 303; Entwistle v. Ins. Co., 202 Pa. 141; Glanz v. Gloeckler, 104 Ill. 573; Weston v. Richardson, 47 L.T. (N.S.) 514; Pence v. Makepeace, 65 Ind. 345; Allis v. Ware, 28 Minn. 166; Herr v. Reinoehl, 209 Pa. 483; Watt v. Gideon, 22 Pa. C.C. Rep. 499; Jones v. Jones, 23 Pa. C.C. Rep. 254.
Before MITCHELL, C.J., FELL, MESTREZAT, POTTER and ELKIN, JJ.
Gordon took out five separate policies of insurance on his own life. No beneficiary or person to whom the insurance should be paid on the death of the insured was named in any of the policies, but in the applications for three of them, in answer to the printed question as to whom the money should be payable to, the name of his wife was written. In the other two there was not even this designation of a beneficiary, but it was conceded at the trial that the insurance was intended for her benefit and that the policies were handed to her by the insured. The trial court, therefore, treated all the policies as alike in her favor as beneficiary, and for the purposes of this case no question on this point need be considered.
The wife died first, and subsequently the husband by written order, on a blank "change of designation" furnished by the company, appointed his daughter, the plaintiff, as the beneficiary. She brought suit, and on the trial was nonsuited on the ground that the interest in the policies had vested in the wife, and at her death passed to her administrator as part of her estate.
In support of this result reliance is had principally on the cases of Anderson's Estate, 85 Pa. 202; Brown's Appeal, 125 Pa. 303, and Entwistle v. Ins. Co., 202 Pa. 141. The facts, however, in these cases were so different that none of them can be regarded as a controlling authority for the present. In Anderson's Estate the policy was payable to the wife, "her executors, administrators or assigns." The insured (husband) having died insolvent the money was claimed by his creditors, but it was held that it was an asset of the wife.
In Brown's Appeal the policy was payable to the wife, and in case of her death before that of the insured then to her children. The wife and the husband jointly executed an assignment, and after the wife's death it was held on interpleader that the children had title under the original contract, and it could not be divested by the assignment.
In Entwistle v. Insurance Company the insurance was payable to the wife, and if she died before the husband then to the children, but if the husband survived both wife and children then to his legal representatives. By the terms of the policy its value was convertible into cash at the option of the holder after fifteen years. Husband and wife sought to exercise the option, but it was held that the children had a beneficial interest which brought them within the term "holders," and could not be divested without their sanction.
In all the foregoing cases the contingency presented by the state of facts was one expressly provided for in the policy, and it is beyond question that where such is the case the terms of the policy, which is the substantial contract of the parties, must govern. But where, as in this case, a state of facts exists for which the policy makes no express provision, a very different question is presented.
In Brown's Appeal it was said that the death of the wife in the lifetime of her husband "extinguished her interest in the policy," and in Entwistle v. Insurance Company These expressions, of course, and the decisions in which they were used were based, as already said, on the language of the policies, but the same result would follow upon general principles. Where all the conditions of fact expressly provided for in any contract have failed and the contract is silent as to anything further, regard must be had to the fundamental intent and effect of the contract. The contract of life insurance contemplates a payment by the insurer upon the death of the insured. That is the certain primary intent, and does not admit of doubt. The secondary question, to whom is the payment due, is contingent on the circumstances.
The naming of a beneficiary to whom payment is to be made is a gift of a benefit in future, but is contingent on the circumstances. Thus it carries with it no obligation to the beneficiary that the donor will keep the policy alive by continuing to pay the premiums. That is contingent on his doing so voluntarily. And the nature of the thing given would seem to imply that the beneficiary must survive the insured. Thus in the present case the gift is equivalent to a provision that when the husband dies, having kept the policy alive, the wife shall be entitled to the money. But the intent is to provide for her, not for any other, and if she has died first, the expressed intent is incapable of...
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