Smith v. Metropolitan Sanitary Dist. of Greater Chicago

• Decision Date: 19 October 1979
• Docket Number: No. 50975,50975
• Citation: 33 Ill.Dec. 135,77 Ill.2d 313,396 N.E.2d 524
• Parties: , 33 Ill.Dec. 135 John W. SMITH, Appellee, v. METROPOLITAN SANITARY DISTRICT OF GREATER CHICAGO et al. Appeal of W. E. O'NEIL CONSTRUCTION COMPANY.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Page 524

396 N.E.2d 524

77 Ill.2d 313, 33 Ill.Dec. 135

John W. SMITH, Appellee, v. METROPOLITAN SANITARY DISTRICT OF GREATER CHICAGO et al. Appeal of W. E. O'NEIL CONSTRUCTION COMPANY.

No. 50975.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Oct. 19, 1979.

Rehearing Denied Nov. 30, 1979.

Schaffenegger, Watson & Peterson, Ltd., Chicago (Jack L. Watson, Chicago, of counsel), for appellant W. E. O'Neil Const. Co., for appellant.

Cooney & Stenn, Chicago (William J. Harte, Chicago, of counsel), for appellee.

GOLDENHERSH, Chief Justice:

Plaintiff, John W. Smith, appealed from the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County entered in favor of defendant, W. E. O'Neil Construction Company, upon allowance of its motion for summary judgment. The circuit court made the requisite findings (58 Ill.2d R. 304(a)), the appellate court reversed and remanded (61 Ill.App.3d 103, 18 Ill.Dec. 452, 377 N.E.2d 1088), and we allowed defendant's petition for leave to appeal.

The relevant facts are adequately stated in the opinion of the appellate court and need not be repeated here. Defendant and S. J. Groves & Sons Company, a Minnesota corporation, entered into a joint venture which undertook to construct the Salt Water Creek Reclamation Plant of the Metropolitan Sanitary District of Greater Chicago. The joint venture agreement, Inter alia, provided: "Each of the Joint Venturers may supply equipment for the project by mutual consent and shall pay therefore (Sic ) at the rate of Sixty Five Per Cent (65%) of the latest A.E.D. rental rates as revised annually." Plaintiff, while employed by the joint venture, was struck by a truck leased by defendant to the joint venture and suffered injuries which resulted in the amputation of both his legs.

Plaintiff filed an application for adjustment of claim against the joint venture before the Illinois Industrial Commission, and instituted this action in the circuit court of Cook County against defendant and other parties not involved in this appeal. Plaintiff's cause of action against defendant was pleaded in three counts. Count I alleged violations of the Structural Work Act (Ill.Rev.Stat.1973, ch. 48, par. 60 Et seq.), count II charged defendant with negligence, and count III pleaded an action in strict liability by reason of defendant's having leased to the joint venture the vehicle which was allegedly defective and caused plaintiff's injuries. In its motion for summary judgment, defendant contended that plaintiff's cause of action against it was barred under the provisions of section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act "for the reason that the plaintiff is an employee of this defendant, within the meaning of said Workmen's Compensation Act, as a matter of law." The circuit court allowed defendant's motion for summary judgment and plaintiff appealed. Holding that section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act did not bar plaintiff's action because at the time of the injury he was employed by the joint venture and not by defendant, the appellate court reversed.

Section 5(a) of the Workmen's Compensation Act in pertinent part provided:

"(a) No common law or statutory right to recover damages from the employer, his insurer, his broker, any service organization retained by the employer, his insurer or his broker to provide safety service, advice or recommendations for the employer or the agents or employees of any of them for injury or death sustained by any employee while engaged in the line of his duty as such employee, other than the compensation herein provided, is available to any employee who is covered by the provisions of this Act, to any one wholly or partially dependent upon him, the legal representatives of his estate, or any one otherwise entitled to recover damages for such injury." Ill.Rev.Stat.1973, ch. 48, par. 138.5.

Defendant contends that as a member of the joint venture it was liable for the payment of benefits awarded under the Workmen's Compensation Act to an employee of the joint venture, and that the provisions of section 5(a) which extended the "exclusive remedy" protection to directors and officers of corporate employers "would extend the same protection to the individual members of a joint venture." It argues, too, that defendant was entitled to the protection of the "exclusive remedy" provision of the Act for the reason that in addition to being a member of the joint venture it was also acting as its agent. It is plaintiff's position that even if section 5(a) confers upon defendant immunity to this action by reason of its being a member of the joint venture, as the lessor of the truck, it occupied a second status to which the immunity did not apply.

In Harmon v. Martin (1947), 395 Ill. 595, 71 N.E.2d 74, the court said:

"A joint adventure is not regarded as identical with a partnership, although, generally speaking, it may be said that practically the only distinction between the two is that the former relates to a single specific enterprise or transaction, while the latter relates to a general business of a particular kind." (395 Ill. 595, 612, 71 N.E.2d 74, 83)

Ordinarily, a joint venture is an association of two or more persons to carry out a single enterprise for profit (Ditis v. Ahlvin Construction Co. (1951), 408 Ill. 416, 426, 97 N.E.2d 244), and the rights and liabilities of its members are tested by the same legal principles which govern partnerships. Section 9 of the Uniform Partnership Act (Ill.Rev.Stat.1973, ch. 1061/2, par. 9) provides in pertinent part that "(e)very partner is an agent of the partnership for the purpose of its business," and it would appear that the members of a joint venture would occupy the same relationship with the joint venture. Insofar as the actions upon which counts I and II were based, defendant's duty to plaintiff, and any liability resulting from the breach thereof, would, as the agent of the joint venture, be coextensive with that of its principal, the joint venture. We hold, therefore, that as to the causes of action pleaded in counts I and II defendant, by reason of its status as a member of the joint venture, was entitled to the protection of section 5(a).

We consider next plaintiff's contention that defendant as lessor of the truck which caused plaintiff's injuries occupied a second capacity and in this role was not immune from suit under section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act. This theory, known as the "dual capacity doctrine," has been defined in the following terms: "(A)n employer normally shielded from tort liability by the exclusive remedy principle may become liable in tort to his own...