Smith v. Monsanto Co.
| Decision Date | 13 April 1998 |
| Docket Number | No. 4:94 CV 1440 DDN.,4:94 CV 1440 DDN. |
| Citation | 9 F.Supp.2d 1113 |
| Parties | Donna Beck SMITH, Plaintiff, v. MONSANTO COMPANY, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Missouri |
Lisa S. Van Amburg, Van Amburg and Chackes, St. Louis, MO, for Donna Beck Smith.
Clifford A. Godiner, Richard E. Jaudes, Aaron C. Baker, Thompson Coburn, St. Louis, MO, Ellen C. Wilcoxen, Thompson Coburn, St. Louis, MO, for Monsanto Company.
Robert J. Isaacson, Bearden and Mattern, St. Louis, MO, Larry M. Bauer, Stinson and Mag, St. Louis, MO, for Juanita Hinshaw.
This action came on for trial before the Court and a jury, the parties having consented to the exercise of authority by the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), the Court having rendered its rulings in the memorandum filed herewith, and the issues having been duly tried, and the jury having rendered its findings,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that, on the Count 2 claim of unlawful retaliation, plaintiff Donna Beck Smith have and recover from defendant Monsanto Company the sum of $300,000, plus nominal damages of $3.00, plus interest thereon and the costs of the action. All other claims of the plaintiff are dismissed with prejudice.
MEMORANDUMThis action is before the Court upon the post-trial motion of the defendant to set aside the jury verdict due to juror misconduct (Doc. No. 153) and for the entry of judgment by the Court. The parties have consented to the exercise of plenary authority by the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).
Plaintiff Donna Beck Smith brought this judicial action against defendant Monsanto Company seeking relief under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17, and under the Missouri Human Rights Law, Mo.Rev.Stat. §§ 213.010 et seq. Plaintiff alleged that while she was employed by defendant Monsanto as assistant treasurer, defendant engaged in employment actions adverse to plaintiff on account of her gender.
Three specific claims were submitted to the jury: Count 1 alleged that defendant discriminated against plaintiff on account of her gender by eliminating her job as assistant treasurer without assigning her to a different position which would have preserved or enhanced her previous salary, bonuses, stock options and eligibility for promotion. In response, defendant denied it acted unlawfully, but argued that it engaged in a reduction in force, that plaintiff's position was the most logical to eliminate, and that plaintiff was assigned to an appropriate position. Count 2 alleged that defendant retaliated against plaintiff for alleging discrimination, by imposing adverse terms and conditions of employment upon her. Count 3 alleged that defendant discriminated against plaintiff by constructively discharging her from employment, by making her working conditions intolerable on account of her gender.
Defendant denied these allegations and alleged that plaintiff voluntarily resigned to take employment with another employer, not because she found the working conditions with defendant intolerable.
With respect to plaintiff's Counts 1 and 3, as an affirmative defense defendant alleged that, had plaintiff been a male, it would nevertheless have dealt with plaintiff as it did.
Following the presentation of the trial evidence, the jury found in favor of defendant on Count 1. It answered the following special interrogatory, "No":
On the Count 1 claim of plaintiff of gender discrimination, has plaintiff proven by a preponderance of the evidence that the gender of plaintiff was a motivating factor in the decision of defendant Monsanto Company to eliminate plaintiff's position as Assistant Treasurer in 1992 without assigning plaintiff to another position which would have preserved or enhanced plaintiff's previous salary, bonuses, stock options and eligibility for promotion?
The jury found in favor of plaintiff on the Count 2 claim. Specifically it answered the following interrogatories thus:
3. On the Count 2 claim of plaintiff of retaliation for protected activity, has plaintiff proven by a preponderance of the evidence that:
(a) plaintiff Donna B. Smith had a good faith belief that she had been discriminated against on the basis of her gender in the terms and conditions of her employment which belief was expressed in:
(i) the December 2, 1992, letter of her attorney to defendant Monsanto (Plaintiff's Trial Exhibit 56)?
Answer: Yes.
(ii) the May 7, 1993, written complaint filed by plaintiff with the Missouri Commission on Human Rights (Plaintiff's Trial Exhibit 38)?
Answer: Yes.
(b) following the receipt by defendant of either (i) the December 2, 1992, letter of her attorney to defendant (Plaintiff's Trial Exhibit 56) or (ii) the May 7, 1993, written complaint filed by plaintiff with the Missouri Commission on Human Rights (Plaintiff's Trial Exhibit 38), and because of its receipt of either said document, defendant
Answer: Yes.
Answer: Yes.
Answer: Yes.
Answer: No.
The jury found in favor of the defendant on the Count 3 claim of constructive discharge. Specifically, it found that plaintiff failed to prove that after March 1994, defendant made plaintiff's working conditions intolerable to a reasonable person. See Jury's Answer to Special Interrogatory No. 4, filed July 25, 1997. Further, on this claim it found that defendant proved that it would have treated plaintiff the same way it did, if she had been a male. Id. at Special Interrogatory No. 5.
The jury further found that plaintiff suffered damages of (a) $275,000.00 in lost wages and bonuses; (b) $500,000.00 in emotional pain and mental suffering; and (c) $60,000.00 in lost stock options.
Defendant has moved to set aside the jury's findings because of juror misconduct. Specifically, defendant alleges that juror Mary Roth, during the jury selection process, in answering the written questionnaire submitted to the jury, knowingly misstated under oath that her husband had not ever filed a lawsuit. See Jury Questionnaire submitted to Juror Mary Roth, Question No. 15, filed under seal November 24, 1997. Following the trial of this action, defendant learned and alleged that the husband of juror Roth, Thomas Roth, was a plaintiff in a 1994 lawsuit, Wurm v. Conway, Cause No. 934-320, filed in the Circuit of the City of St. Louis. This action assertedly involved the promotion practices of the St. Louis Metropolitan Police Department, including alleged violations of the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution of the United States.
A hearing was held on this motion on December 2, 1997. From the evidence adduced during this hearing, the Court makes the following findings of fact and conclusions of law:
FACTS
1. Thomas Roth is the husband of juror Mary Roth and in 1993 was a sergeant with the St. Louis Metropolitan Police Department.
2. During 1993 St. Louis Metropolitan Police Department personnel were involved in allegations of racial discrimination in the granting of promotions. Thomas Roth had taken the promotion test but had not received a promotion. The Roths discussed his failure to receive the promotion.
3. During 1994 a class action was commenced in the Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis against the St. Louis Metropolitan Police Department alleging racial discrimination in the awarding of promotions. Thomas Roth was named as a party plaintiff in that lawsuit. Neither Thomas Roth nor juror Mary Roth were specifically made aware that Thomas Roth was named as a plaintiff in that lawsuit.
4. When juror Mary Roth answered the jury questionnaire during the jury selection procedure in this action, she did not remember the lawsuit in which her husband was named a plaintiff.
5. Following the trial of this action and after the jury's findings were filed, juror Mary Roth was among a few of the jurors who personally congratulated the plaintiff on prevailing at trial.
Defendant argues that the failure of juror Mary Roth to state that her husband had filed a lawsuit was willful and untruthful, thereby exhibiting a bias in favor of the plaintiff which was undisclosed to the parties.
The motion to set aside the jury verdict for juror misconduct will be denied. The Court has found that juror Mary Roth answered the questionnaire's question, about whether a family member had filed a lawsuit, consistent with the best of her recollection. Because she did not remember, if she ever specifically knew, that her husband had been named as a plaintiff in the state court employment lawsuit, her answer to the written voir dire question, although inaccurate, was honest and did not demonstrate impermissible bias in favor of the plaintiff. McDonough Power Equipment, Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548, 556, 104 S.Ct. 845, 78 L.Ed.2d 663 (1984); United States v. Williams, 77 F.3d 1098, 1100 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 117 S.Ct. 392, 136 L.Ed.2d 308 (1996).
Following the filing of the jury's findings in this action, the Court ordered the parties to file memoranda as to the proper judgment to be entered. Also, on August 25, 1997, the Court conducted a hearing on plaintiff's entitlement to equitable relief by reason of the jury's findings.
In light of the arguments of the parties at this juncture of the action, the Court must be guided by several relevant legal principles. First, the Court must apply the law to the facts found by the jury, crediting the substantial evidence in the entire record before the jury that supports the consistency of its findings....
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