Smith v. Montana Power Co., 86-296

• Citation: 44 St.Rep. 124,731 P.2d 924,225 Mont. 166
• Decision Date: 16 January 1987
• Docket Number: No. 86-296,86-296
• Parties: , 106 Lab.Cas. P 55,689 John S. SMITH, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. The MONTANA POWER COMPANY, a Montana corporation, Defendant and Respondent.
• Court: Montana Supreme Court

Page 924

731 P.2d 924

225 Mont. 166, 106 Lab.Cas. P 55,689

John S. SMITH, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. The MONTANA POWER COMPANY, a Montana corporation, Defendant

and Respondent.

No. 86-296.

Supreme Court of Montana.

Submitted Nov. 25, 1986.

Decided Jan. 16, 1987.

Patrick T. Fleming (argued), Butte, for defendant and respondent.

WEBER, Justice.

Appellant John Smith instituted a wrongful termination action against the Montana Power Company (MPC), specifically pleading negligence and breach of good faith and fair dealing. The District Court for the Second Judicial District, Silver Bow County, granted the summary judgment motion of MPC on the ground that Mr. Smith's claims were preempted by federal law. We affirm.

The issue is whether the District Court erred when it held that Mr. Smith's negligence and good faith claims were preempted by federal law.

In December 1981, John Smith was hired by MPC as an instrument and control journeyman at Colstrip I and II. Mr. Smith was a member of the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers Local No. 44 which had a collective bargaining agreement with MPC during all times relevant to this case. In September 1982, Mr. Smith was discharged by MPC. Mr. Smith maintains in his brief that he attempted to file a grievance in accordance with the collective bargaining agreement, but MPC refused to discuss the case with his union representative. The District Court found, however, that "[t]he affidavits submitted by Defendant also disclose that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his remedies under the collective bargaining agreement."

Mr. Smith filed an amended complaint in April 1986, alleging MPC had violated its duty of good faith and fair dealing and had negligently investigated the allegations which led to his termination. MPC filed a motion for summary judgment on the grounds: (1) that John Smith did not exhaust the grievance procedure set forth in the collective bargaining agreement; (2) that state law is preempted by federal law in this case and thus the state tort claims must be dismissed; and (3) that the applicable federal statute of limitations expired prior to the filing of the complaint. The District Court granted MPC's motion for summary judgment stating that the state tort claims were preempted by the federal labor law governing collective bargaining agreements.

Did the District Court err when it granted summary judgment and held that Mr. Smith's negligence and good faith claims were preempted by federal law?

A summary judgment motion shall be granted if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Rule 56(c), M.R.Civ.P. There is no dispute that there was a collective bargaining agreement in effect between MPC and Mr. Smith when Mr. Smith was discharged. There is also no dispute that Mr. Smith filed this lawsuit in the District Court for the Second Judicial District alleging two state tort law violations on the part of MPC. We agree with the District Court that Mr. Smith has failed to set forth any material facts precluding summary judgment.

Our analysis must then shift to whether MPC is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The District Court based its dismissal decision primarily on the United States Supreme Court case of Allis-Chalmers v. Lueck (1985), 471 U.S. 202, 105 S.Ct. 1904, 85 L.Ed.2d 206. In Allis-Chalmers, Roderick Lueck brought a state tort claim against his employer and its insurer which administered an insurance plan included in a collective bargaining agreement, seeking recovery for alleged bad faith in the handling of his back injury claim. The collective bargaining agreement established a grievance procedure which culminated in final and binding arbitration. Mr. Lueck did not attempt to grieve his dispute, but filed suit in state court. The Wisconsin Supreme Court held Mr. Lueck's tort claim was not preempted by national labor laws. The United States Supreme Court reversed stating We do hold that when resolution of a state-law claim is substantially dependent upon analysis of the terms of an agreement made between the parties in a labor contract, that claim must either be treated as a Sec. 301 claim (cite omitted) or dismissed as pre-empted by federal labor-contract law.

Allis-Chalmers, 471 U.S. at 220, 105 S.Ct. at 1916, 85 L.Ed.2d at 221. Allis-Chalmers reasoned that unless federal law governed claims which involve a collective bargaining agreement, varying interpretations could result and the congressional goal of a unified body of labor-contract law would be subverted. In addition, federal preemption of these state-tort claims was held necessary to preserve the central role of arbitration in the resolution of labor disputes.

Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act provides:

Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization representing employees in an industry affecting commerce ... may be brought in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties ...

29 U.S.C. Sec. 185(a). Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills (1957), 353 U.S. 448, 77 S.Ct. 912, 1 L.Ed.2d 972, interpreted Sec. 301 to be a congressional mandate to develop a unified federal common law to address labor contract disputes. Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co. (1962), 369 U.S. 95, 82 S.Ct. 571, 7 L.Ed.2d 593, then addressed the preemption of Sec. 301 and concluded "that in enacting Sec. 301 Congress intended doctrines of federal labor law uniformly to prevail over inconsistent local rules." Lucas Flour, 369 U.S. at 104, 82 S.Ct. at 577, 7 L.Ed.2d at 600.

Although Mr. Smith did not mention the collective bargaining agreement in his amended complaint, the fact remains that the...