Smith v. Montgomery Area Transit Sys. (Mats)

• Decision Date: 07 January 2022
• Docket Number: 2:20-cv-779-WKW-JTA
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Alabama
• Parties: PETER J. SMITH, Plaintiff, v. MONTGOMERY AREA TRANSIT SYSTEM (MATS), INC., et al., Defendants.

PETER J. SMITH, Plaintiff,
v.
MONTGOMERY AREA TRANSIT SYSTEM (MATS), INC., et al., Defendants.

No. 2:20-cv-779-WKW-JTA

United States District Court, M.D. Alabama, Northern Division

January 7, 2022

RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE

JERUSHA T. ADAMS UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

This matter is before the court for screening prior to service of process pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). This action was referred to the undersigned for consideration and disposition or recommendation on all pretrial matters as may be appropriate pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636. (Doc. No. 3.)

For the reasons stated herein, the undersigned finds that this action is due to be dismissed prior to service of process pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Title 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) requires a federal court to dismiss an action if it (1) is frivolous or malicious, (2) fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or (3) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. The purpose of Section 1915(e)(2) is “to discourage the filing of, and waste of judicial and private resources upon, baseless lawsuits that paying litigants generally do not initiate because of the costs of bringing suit and because of the threat of sanctions for bringing vexatious suits

1

under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989). A dismissal pursuant to Section 1915(e)(2) may be made sua sponte by the court prior to the issuance of process, so as to spare prospective defendants the inconvenience and expense of answering frivolous complaints. Id. at 324.

A complaint is frivolous where it “lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” Id. at 325. In other words, a complaint is frivolous when it “has little or no chance of success” - for example, when it appears from the face of the complaint that the factual allegations are “clearly baseless” or that the legal theories are “indisputably meritless.” Carroll v. Gross, 984 F.2d 392, 393 (11th Cir. 1993) (internal quotations omitted). A claim is frivolous as a matter of law where, inter alia, the defendants are immune from suit or the claim seeks to enforce a legal right that clearly does not exist. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327. “Failure to state a claim under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is governed by the same standard as dismissal for failure to state a claim under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6).” Wilkerson v. H & S, Inc., 366 Fed.Appx. 49, 51 (11th Cir. 2010) (citing Mitchell v. Farcass, 112 F.3d 1483, 1490 (11th Cir. 1997)); Douglas v. Yates, 535 F.3d 1316, 1320 (11th Cir. 2008).

To avoid dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, the allegations in the complaint must “state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). That is, “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level . . . on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true

2

(even if doubtful in fact).” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. While Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure does not require detailed factual allegations, “it demands more than an unadorned, the defendant unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. A complaint is insufficient if it “offers ‘labels and conclusions' or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action,' ” or if it “tenders ‘naked assertions' devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.' ” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 557). In short, the complaint must provide a “ ‘plain statement' possess[ing] enough heft to ‘sho[w] that the pleader is entitled to relief.' ” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557 (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2)).

Finally, a plaintiff's pro se status must be considered when evaluating the sufficiency of a complaint. “A document filed pro se is ‘to be liberally construed,' and ‘a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.' ” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)). Yet any leniency cannot serve as a substitute for pleading a proper cause of action. See Odion v. Google Inc., 628 Fed.Appx. 635, 637 (11th Cir. 2015) (recognizing that although courts must show leniency to pro se litigants, “this leniency does not give a court license to serve as de facto counsel for a party, or to rewrite an otherwise deficient pleading in order to sustain an action”). “While the pleadings of pro se litigants are liberally construed, they must still comply with procedural rules governing the proper form of pleadings.” Hopkins v. St. Lucie Cty. Sch. Bd., 399 Fed.Appx. 563, 565 (11th Cir. 2010) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

3

II. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On September 29, 2020, Plaintiff Peter J. Smith (“Plaintiff”), proceeding pro se, filed a Complaint against Montgomery Area Transit System, Inc. (“MATS”); Kevin Miller, Administrator of MATS; and an unidentified male bus driver. (Doc. No. 1 at 1, ¶ 2.) Plaintiff appears to allege that his constitutional rights were violated when the unidentified bus driver “refused seating” to Plaintiff on the campus of Auburn University at Montgomery on April 15, 2020.^[1] (Id. at 2.) Plaintiff identifies himself as a “homeless U.S. Citizen” and “Black American male.” (Id. at 3.) Plaintiff requests “relief for 42 U.S.C. [sic] intentional infliction of emotional distress, pain and suffering, punitive damages and compensatory damages . . . .” (Id. at 4.) Plaintiff alleges “[t]he large hybrid buses in question were given to the City of Montgomery, Alabama by the Former President of the United States . . . Barrack [sic] Obama.” (Id.)

On March 2, 2021, after a thorough discussion regarding the deficiencies found within Plaintiff's Complaint, the court directed Plaintiff to file an amended complaint by March 17, 2021 that complied with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the specific requirements set forth in the order. (Doc. No. 5.) Plaintiff was specifically cautioned that his failure to comply with the court's directives could result in the dismissal of his case. (Id. at 6.) Plaintiff did not respond. On March 29, 2021, the court directed the plaintiff to show cause why his case should not be dismissed due to his failure to prosecute the action. (Doc. No. 6.) In response, Plaintiff listed numerous factual allegations in a muddled and

4

inarticulate fashion, including the unconstitutionality of discrimination in bus seating, “[v]iolation of 42 U.S.C. posted on every MATS bus[, ]” “race and gender discrimination[, ]” a “right to trial by jury if the amount in question is $20 or more[, ]” that “no public servant can violate the constitutional rights of another individual while under ‘color of law' . . . while serving in their official capacity[, ]” as well as allegations regarding an unlawful termination from his State of Alabama merit system position on October 8, 2004. (Doc. No. 7 at 1-6.) In his response, Plaintiff stated no factual reason as to why he failed to file an amended complaint by the court's March 2021 deadline nor did he seek leave to file an amended complaint.

III. JURISDICTION

This court has subject matter jurisdiction over this action based on federal question jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1331, as Plaintiff appears to allege claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.

IV. DISCUSSION

...