Smith v. Montgomery County, Md., Civ. No. Y-82-1323.

• Decision Date: 30 April 1985
• Docket Number: Civ. No. Y-82-1323.
• Citation: 607 F. Supp. 1303
• Parties: Vivian Anderson SMITH, et al. v. MONTGOMERY COUNTY, MARYLAND, et al.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Maryland

607 F. Supp. 1303

Vivian Anderson SMITH, et al. v. MONTGOMERY COUNTY, MARYLAND, et al.

Civ. No. Y-82-1323.

United States District Court, D. Maryland.

April 30, 1985.

Robert H. Symonds, Lanham, Md., Clausen Ely, Jr., Ellen J. Flannery, Arthur B. Spitzer and Elizabeth Symonds, Washington, D.C., for plaintiffs.

Carole A. Jeffries, Suzanne Levin, Silver Spring, Md., Robert G. Tobin and Jennifer Evans, Rockville, Md., for defendants.

MEMORANDUM

JOSEPH H. YOUNG, District Judge.

I. BACKGROUND

This case involves the constitutionality of the policy of conducting indiscriminate strip searches, with or without probable cause, of all persons detained at the Montgomery County, Maryland Detention Center. The plaintiff, Vivian Smith, originally brought this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on behalf of herself and purportedly as a representative of two classes of similarly situated persons alleging that the County Detention Center's policy of across the board strip searches violates the Fourth Amendment. Plaintiff and the class she currently represents¹ initially sought declaratory and injunctive relief and damages against defendants Paul McGuckian, County Attorney for Montgomery County; Charles Gilchrist, County Executive of Montgomery County; Gary Blake, Director of the Department of Correction and Rehabilitation of Montgomery County, Denise Dodson, a guard at the Center who conducted a strip search of the plaintiff; and Montgomery County. All individual defendants are being sued in both their individual and official capacities.

This case initially was assigned to Judge Jones, formerly of this District. In a Memorandum and Order dated September 17, 1982, Judge Jones summarized the relevant facts as follows:

Vivian Smith was arrested² at her home at about 10:00 p.m. on November 12, 1981 for contempt of court, in failing to appear in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County on October 28, 1981 in connection with a child support action originating in Essex County, New Jersey.³ She was taken to the Rockville District police station, where she was photographed and an arrest report was filed. She was then taken, at about 11:40 p.m., to the Montgomery County Detention Center (MCDC), where she remained overnight. The next day she was transported to the Circuit Court for Montgomery County and, after some delay, appeared before a judge, who dismissed the charge against her.

Upon arriving at the detention center, plaintiff was taken to the women's receiving and discharge area, an open room approximately 15 feet by 20 feet containing a shower, desk, and one cell normally used as a holding cell. She was ordered to, and did, remove all her clothing. She then had to move her arms, open her mouth, bend over and squat, while a female correctional officer conducted a visual inspection of her body, including her oral, vaginal and anal cavities. This search took place in the presence of another female detainee, who was in the cell in the room. No weapon or contraband was found. Ms. Smith then showered and was placed in the holding cell with the other female detainee overnight.

Smith v. Montgomery County, 547 F.Supp. 592, 593-94 (D.Md.1982) (Jones, J., hereinafter "Smith I").

In the same Memorandum and Order, Judge Jones granted plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction which stated:

That defendants are enjoined during the pendency of this litigation, from permitting, promulgating a policy permitting, and enforcing the present policy permitting, a visual strip search of a temporary detainee at the Montgomery County Detention Center, as defined herein, except upon probable cause to believe such detainee has weapons or contraband concealed on his or her person. Defendants are likewise enjoined from permitting, promulgating a policy permitting, and enforcing the present policy to the extent that it permits the conducting of visual searches other than in private.

Smith I, 547 F.Supp. at 599.

Thereafter, plaintiff filed a motion for partial summary judgment seeking a declaration that the Center's strip search policy is unconstitutional and an order permanently enjoining defendants from strip searching short-term detainees absent probable cause to believe that they are concealing weapons or contraband and from strip searching short-term detainees other than in private. This motion for partial summary judgment was denied by this Court in a subsequent Memorandum Opinion and Order, Smith v. Montgomery County, 573 F.Supp. 604, 614 (D.Md.1983) (Young, J.) (hereinafter "Smith II"), because the plaintiff lacked standing to receive either declaratory, id., at 607-609 (citing Golden v. Zwickler, 394 U.S. 103, 89 S.Ct. 956, 22 L.Ed.2d 113 (1969), or injunctive relief. Smith II, 573 F.Supp. 607-609 (citing Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 103 S.Ct. 1660, 1665, 75 L.Ed.2d 675 (1983); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 96 S.Ct. 598, 46 L.Ed.2d 561 (1976); O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 94 S.Ct. 669, 38 L.Ed.2d 674 (1974)). Accordingly, this Court dissolved the preliminary injunction against the defendants and declared plaintiff's motion for compliance with the preliminary injunction moot. Smith II, 573 F.Supp. at 609.

While this Court refused to grant plaintiffs permanent injunctive relief, it did, nonetheless, concur with Judge Jones' determination that Logan v. Shealy,⁴ 660 F.2d 1007 (4th Cir.1981), is controlling on the merits of this case and consequently that the strip search policy at the Montgomery County Detention Center is unconstitutional. Smith II, 573 F.Supp. at 609-10. The Court noted, in certain terms, that:

when squarely faced with the issue of the constitutionality of the Center's indiscriminate strip search policy and failure to conduct strip searches in private ..., the Court holds that, based on Logan, the Center's indiscriminate strip search policy and failure to conduct strip searches in private is unconstitutional.

Defendants subsequently have moved, pursuant to Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure⁵ for this Court to reconsider its determination that the Montgomery County Detention Center's across the board strip search policy is unconstitutional in light of Hudson v. Palmer, ___ U.S. ___, 104 S.Ct. 3194, 82 L.Ed.2d 393 (1984) and Block v. Rutherford, ___ U.S. ___, 104 S.Ct. 3227, 82 L.Ed.2d 438 (1984), two recently decided Supreme Court cases. Defendants also seek summary judgment in their favor and an award of costs based on Hudson. However, the Court finds that Hudson does not require the reversal or modification of its prior holding that the detention center's strip search policy is unconstitutional and, thus, defendants' request for relief from this holding and summary judgment in their favor will be denied.

II. DISCUSSION

Defendants contend specifically that this Court's prior holding is erroneous because "in two recent cases, the Supreme Court of the United States examined the parameters of the Fourth Amendment rights of persons incarcerated in the nation's prisons and held that none exist."⁶ In the Court's view, this is neither a correct characterization of the Supreme Court's recent decisions nor is it a correct statement of prior Fourth Amendment law.

A.

In Hudson, the Supreme Court dealt directly with the question of whether a "shakedown" search of an inmate's cell violated the Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable searches and seizures. The Court held that it did not and "that the Fourth Amendment has no applicability to a prison cell." 104 S.Ct. at 3205 (emphasis added). This holding comports with the Supreme Court's prior indication that a prisoner may not have had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his cell, Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 556-57, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 1883-84, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979), but it does not follow therefrom that the prisoner is unprotected from unreasonable invasions of his or her personal privacy.⁷ In Wolfish, the Supreme Court expressly permitted irregular and unannounced shakedown searches. The Court acknowledged the plausibility of the argument that "a person confined in a detention facility has no reasonable expectation of privacy with respect to his room or cell ..." 441 U.S. at 556-57, 99 S.Ct. at 1883 (emphasis added). Clearly, this proposition recognized by the Court in Wolfish and the holding in Hudson applies to the search of a prisoner's papers, effects, and property located in the cell and not to the most intimate searches of the inmate's person. Id.; see Hudson, 104 S.Ct. at 3200-3201 and n. 8; 104 S.Ct. at 3216 n. 31 (Stevens, J., dissenting opinion joined by Brennan, Marshall, and Blackman, JJ.). Hudson does not evicerate the requirement articulated by the Supreme Court in Wolfish that personal body searches of inmates be reasonable under the circumstances and therefore provides no basis for defendants' conclusion that the Fourth Amendment is ineffective in preventing unreasonable searches of a prisoner's person. Id. 104 S.Ct. at 3216 n. 31.

Although the Supreme Court held that the Fourth Amendment protections do not extend to a prisoner's property, it did not hold that prisoners have no constitutional rights. The Court explicitly acknowledged that prisoners retain a variety of express rights guaranteed under the Constitution, including the right of due process, Hudson, 104 S.Ct. at 3198 (citing Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 2974, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974)) and the Eighth Amendment guarantee that they not be subject to "cruel and unusual punishments." 104 S.Ct. at 3198. More significantly, the Court also reaffirmed the principles it announced in Wolfish where, inter alia, it applied a balancing test to determine whether strip searches of inmates and pre-trial detainees were unreasonable in light of the circumstances and therefore violative of the Fourth Amendment.⁸ Thus, defendants have incorrectly characterized Hudson as holding that inmates and pre-trial detainees⁹ — or temporary detainees as in this case...