Smith v. Moore, No. 98-SP-298.

• Decision Date: 20 April 2000
• Docket Number: No. 98-SP-298.
• Citation: 749 A.2d 132
• Parties: Wendell SMITH, Appellant, v. Margaret MOORE, et al., Appellees.
• Court: D.C. Court of Appeals

749 A.2d 132

Wendell SMITH, Appellant, v. Margaret MOORE, et al., Appellees.

No. 98-SP-298.

District of Columbia Court of Appeals.

Argued November 18, 1999.

Decided April 20, 2000.

Robert C. Haubart, Public Defender Service, with whom Vincent Wilkins, Jr., Public Defender Service, was on the brief, for appellant.

Mary L. Wilson, Assistant Corporation Counsel, with whom John M. Ferren, Corporation Counsel at the time the brief was filed, and Charles L. Reischel, Deputy Corporation Counsel, were on the brief, for appellees.¹

Before TERRY and SCHWELB, Associate Judges, and GALLAGHER, Senior Judge.

SCHWELB, Associate Judge:

Wendell Smith appeals from the denial, without a hearing, of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Smith contends that the appellees, officials of the District of Columbia Department of Corrections (DOC), have unlawfully detained him in administrative segregation, that he has sufficiently alleged a denial of his liberty in violation of applicable DOC regulations, and that he is therefore entitled to an evidentiary hearing. We agree and reverse.

I.

In March 1997, Smith was a prisoner at the Occoquan, Virginia, facility operated by the DOC. Following a previous stint in "maximum security," Smith was housed in the general population.

On or about March 28, 1997, officials at Occoquan received an anonymous note from an inmate who identified himself only as "Informer." In this communication, which was addressed to Lieutenant Gregory A. King, Occoquan's Security Supervisor, "Informer" claimed to have overheard "Wendal Smith" telling "Ian Thorn" of Smith's alleged intention to escape from confinement with the help of an unidentified officer. Smith allegedly stated that he had uniforms ready, and that he hoped that a third inmate, "Rodney Shorter," who was "still in the Max," would come over before Smith escaped.² According to "Informer," Smith also threatened to harm a female correctional officer.

At the time Lieutenant King received "Informer's" note, there were two inmates at Occoquan named Wendell Smith. Both of them, as well as a third prisoner named Ian Thorne, were placed in "adjustment units" pending hearings before Occoquan's Housing Board, which "`determine[s] appropriate housing placement' to ensure prison safety and security." See Hatch v. District of Columbia, 337 U.S.App. D.C. 266, 268, 184 F.3d 846, 848 (1999) (quoting 28 DCMR § 522.1 (1987)). Officials strip-searched all three men and searched their cells and belongings, but found no evidence corroborating "Informer's" allegations.

On April 2, 1997, the Board convened appellant Smith's housing hearing. The DOC called no witnesses and, according to Smith, the Board relied solely on "Informer's" memorandum. Smith, who was not represented by counsel, admitted that he was acquainted with Ian Thorne and Rodney Short, but he claimed that he did not know the female correctional officer to whom "Informer" had referred in his note. Smith stated that the note was "a lie," that he was not planning to escape, and that "I think the note was dropped just to get me out of the unit." Following the hearing, the Housing Board found that

Inmate Smith poses a definite escape risk and threat to the safety of others. Per the [DOC Regulations], the Board therefore, recommend[s] that Inmate Smith 219106 be transferred to the Maximum Security Facility on Administrative Segregation.

With the assistance of an attorney from the Public Defender Service, Smith appealed to the Warden from the Housing Board's decision. The Warden denied Smith's administrative appeal on the following grounds:

Based on inmate Smith's previous behavior in the Occoquan Facility, and the incidents he has been involved in, the Administration of the Occoquan Facility has to take the letter submitted seriously alleging [that] inmate Smith was planning to escape and do bodily harm to correctional staff.

Smith subsequently filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging that the appellees were unlawfully detaining him in administrative segregation. The trial judge denied the petition without a hearing.³ As of October 26, 1998, the date that his appellate brief was filed, Smith had been in maximum security⁴ for approximately one and a half years.⁵

II.

The procedures governing the placement of prisoners in administrative segregation are set forth in regulations promulgated by the DOC, 28 DCMR §§ 500-531 (1987), in conformity with the Lorton Regulations Approval Act of 1982 (LRAA), 29 D.C.Reg. 3484 (1982). The regulation primarily relied upon by Smith provides:

Before a resident is placed in any cell of the maximum security facility, or in a control cell of the central facility, or a control center at Youth Center II, there shall be a finding made that:

(a) There is a clear and present threat to the safety of the resident;

(b) The resident poses a clear and present threat to the safety of others; or

(c) The resident poses a definite escape risk.

28 DCMR § 521.4. An inmate facing possible administrative segregation also has a number of procedural rights. Specifically, he is entitled to a hearing before the Housing Board, at which he has the right to counsel, § 524.3, and to written notice of the charges, §§ 523.1 et seq., 525.1. The DOC is required to present its "evidence." § 525.1. The inmate also has a limited right to call witnesses. § 525.3. The Housing Board is required to ensure that the inmate is given a hearing which "to the greatest extent possible will allow for a full and fair determination of whether the resident poses a definite escape risk or poses danger to others, or whether the health or safety of the resident is threatened." § 522.3.

The foregoing regulations were adopted in order to settle a long-pending class action by District of Columbia prisoners challenging, inter alia, procedures at Lorton in cases in which the DOC sought to place an inmate in administrative segregation. Their purpose was to "achieve disciplinary due process for Lorton residents," and "[a]ll parties in the [class action] agree[d] that the subject regulations obtain[ed] that goal." Council of the District of Columbia, Committee on the Judiciary, Report on Bill 4-351, Lorton Regulations Act of 1982, at 3 (1982) (hereinafter Judiciary Committee Report) (providing a section by section analysis of the LRAA and explaining its background and purpose).⁶ The Lorton regulations have the force of law, and they are binding on the District's correctional officials. See Abdullah, supra n.3, 668 A.2d at 805 (citations omitted).⁷ We have held that a claim of the kind that Smith presents here is cognizable in habeas corpus. Id. at 808-10. In this case, the Housing Board found, without elaboration,⁸ that Smith poses a "definite risk and threat to the safety of others." Smith alleges that the Board's finding was based solely on the anonymous note from "Informer." He asserts that Occoquan officials do not know "Informer's" identity and that there is nothing in the record from which a trier of fact could base a finding that "Informer" was reliable.

In light of the DOC regulations, Smith could lawfully be placed in administrative segregation if he represented a "clear and present threat to the safety of others," § 521.4(b), or if he was shown to be a "definite" escape risk. § 521.4(c). Smith alleged in his habeas corpus petition that this standard could not be satisfied by "uncorroborated accusations from a wholly anonymous source who is nowhere shown to be identified and proven reliable in the past."

III.

A petition for a writ of habeas corpus "should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it is beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Abdullah, supra, 668 A.2d at 804 (citations omitted). "The allegations in the petition must be taken as true and construed in the light most favorable to the petitioner." Id.

Section 521.4, on which Smith relies, provides that a prisoner may be placed in maximum security only if a "finding is made," presumably by the Housing Board, that there is a clear and present threat to the safety of the resident or of others, or that the resident poses a definite escape risk. In the instant case, the Housing Board made such a finding, in the sense that it recited the words of the regulation. But the LRAA and the Lorton Regulations, as we have noted, were adopted in order to achieve "disciplinary due process" for Lorton residents. See Judiciary Committee Report, supra, at 3. They were designed to implement, in disciplinary proceedings in the District's correctional facilities, at least those procedural rights of prisoners that were viewed by the courts as consistent with due process.⁹ This legislative purpose would be undermined by a holding that § 521.4 may be satisfied by resort to conclusory words, without any examination by the court of the record relied upon to support the recitation.

We have no doubt that, at the time when the Lorton Regulations were promulgated, the courts would not have treated as dispositive a conclusory finding by correctional officials that the prisoner was dangerous or an escape risk. On the contrary, in cases comparable to this one, the courts examined the record of the disciplinary proceeding to determine if there was a reasonable basis for such a finding.

The applicability of the Due Process Clause to disciplinary proceedings in prisons had been discussed in some detail by the Supreme Court in Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974). The "major thrust" of Wolff was to prevent "arbitrary determinations." Kyle v. Hanberry, 677 F.2d 1386, 1390 (11th Cir.1982) (quoting Gomes v. Travisono, 510 F.2d 537, 540 (1st Cir.1974)). But reliance on uncorroborated allegations of an unknown informant may make a determination arbitrary, for "[n]ot all prison inmates who inform on other inmates are telling the truth; some are...