Smith v. Municipal Court

• Decision Date: 01 June 1977
• Citation: 59 Cal.App.3d 935,139 Cal.Rptr. 121
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: Previously published at 59 Cal.App.3d 935 59 Cal.App.3d 935, 71 Cal.App.3d 151 William SMITH, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. MUNICIPAL COURT OF the WEST JUDICIAL DISTRICT, COUNTY OF CONTRA COSTA, Defendant and Respondent; PEOPLE of the State of California, Real Party in Interest and Respondent. Civ. 40089.

Page 121

139 Cal.Rptr. 121

Previously published at 59 Cal.App.3d 935

59 Cal.App.3d 935, 71 Cal.App.3d 151

William SMITH, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. MUNICIPAL COURT OF the WEST JUDICIAL DISTRICT, COUNTY OF CONTRA COSTA, Defendant and Respondent;

PEOPLE of the State of California, Real Party in Interest and Respondent.

Civ. 40089.

Court of Appeal, First District, Division 3, California.

June 1, 1977.

Patrick R. Murphy, Public Defender, County of Contra Costa, Mark L. Shaffer, Deputy Public Defender, Martinez, for plaintiff and appellant.

John B. Clausen, County Counsel, Contra Costa County, Arthur W. Walenta, Asst. County Counsel, Martinez, for defendant and respondent.

Evelle J. Younger, Atty. Gen. of Cal., Jack R. Winkler, Chief Asst. Atty. Gen., Crim. Div., Edward P. O'Brien, Asst. Atty. Gen., Derald E. Granberg, Stan M. Helfman, Deputy Attys. Gen., San Francisco, for real party in interest.

SCOTT, Acting Presiding Justice.

On March 26, 1976, Municipal Court Judge Thomas P. Curtin of the West Judicial District, County of Contra Costa approved a plea bargain reducing to misdemeanors felony charges against William Smith of violating Penal Code section 273d (wife and child abuse) and Penal Code section 245, subdivision (a) (assault with a deadly weapon). After appellant's guilty plea, Judge Curtin referred the matter to the probation department for a presentencing report, and continued the matter for sentencing to May 3, 1976. Pending sentencing, appellant was ordered not to have any contact with the victims of the crimes without their consent. On the date set for sentencing, appellant's request for a continuance was granted in order to give him an opportunity to present evidence at a sentencing hearing, which was set for May 21, 1976.

On May 13, 1976, appellant filed an affidavit of prejudice, seeking to disqualify Judge Curtin pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 170.6. On the date set for sentencing, Judge Curtin denied appellant's challenge as untimely. Appellant's petition for writ of mandate was denied. We agree that the attempt to disqualify Judge Curtin was untimely.

The tendering of a guilty plea pursuant to a plea bargain, followed by acceptance of the plea by the judge, is the functional equivalent of a trial under Code of Civil Procedure section 170.6. Therefore, to be timely, a motion to disqualify must be made before the plea bargain is approved by the judge. (People v. Barnfield (1975) 52 Cal.App.3d 210, 123 Cal.Rptr. 859.) Appellant attempts to distinguish Barnfield in that there the section 170.6 motion was made after sentence, while here the motion was made before sentence. However, a hearing on a probation report and sentence following the trial of the cause is a part and continuation of the original criminal action. It is not a separate proceeding or hearing within the meaning of Code of Civil Procedure section 170.6. (Solberg v. Superior Court (1977) 19 Cal.3d 182, 197--198, 137 Cal.Rptr. 460, 561 P.2d 1148; People v. Keller (1966) 245 Cal.App.2d 711, 713, 54 Cal.Rptr. 154; see also Jacobs v. Superior Court (1959) 53 Cal.2d 187, 190--191, 1 Cal.Rptr. 9, 347 P.2d 9; People v. Rojas (1963) 216 Cal.App.2d 819, 824, 31 Cal.Rptr. 417.) The same principle applies where a guilty plea entered upon a plea bargain is followed by a probation and sentence hearing, inasmuch as a guilty plea,...