Smith v. Ohio, Dept. of Rehabilitation and Corr.
| Decision Date | 26 August 2004 |
| Docket Number | No. 1:02 CV 690.,1:02 CV 690. |
| Parties | Scott M. SMITH, Petitioner, v. State of OHIO, DEPARTMENT OF REHABILITATION AND CORRECTION, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Ohio |
Scott M. Smith, Pro Se, USP Terre Haute, Terra Haute, IN, for Plaintiff.
Stuart A. Cole, Office of the Attorney General, State of Ohio, Corrections Litigation Section, Columbus, OH, for Defendant.
Before this Court is Scott M. Smith's petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed 15 April 2002, pursuant 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (Docket # 1). The case was referred to United States Magistrate Judge Patricia A. Hemann for a Report and Recommendation ("R & R"). (Docket # 28). Magistrate Judge Hemann considered the petition, return of writ (Docket # 14), and traverse (Docket # 25). On 7 August 2003, Magistrate Judge Hemann filed her R & R, recommending that the petition be dismissed. (Docket # 30). Petitioner then filed his objections to the R & R, a correction to his traverse, and supplemental authority. (Docket # 33, # 34, # 35, and # 36).
Though this Court differs with the Magistrate Judge's finding that Mr. Smith's petition was untimely, it nonetheless denies Mr. Smith's petition for a writ of habeas corpus on other grounds as set forth below.
In considering the Magistrate Judge's recommendation to dismiss the petition as untimely, this Court must review a somewhat complicated procedural history. On 28 April 1999, the Lorain County Grand Jury indicted Mr. Smith on five counts.1 A jury found Mr. Smith guilty on all five counts, and Mr. Smith was sentenced on 27 May 1999.2 Because all sentences were ordered to be served consecutively to a federal sentence which Mr. Smith was currently serving, Mr. Smith will serve 13 years' imprisonment in state custody after he is released from federal custody.
Mr. Smith filed a timely appeal to the Ohio Ninth District Court of Appeals, seeking a review of his conviction. On 28 June 2000, the Ohio Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court. Mr. Smith did not, however, file a timely appeal to the Ohio Supreme Court. When Mr. Smith's appeal was denied by the appellate court, he had until 14 August 2000 to appeal that decision to the Ohio Supreme Court. 2(A) and R. XIV § 3(A).3 On 5 March 2001, Mr. Smith filed a pro se motion for a delayed appeal to the Ohio Supreme Court. The Ohio Supreme Court denied Mr. Smith's motion on 11 April 2001.
In addition to filing a delayed appeal to the Ohio Supreme Court, Mr. Smith also filed, on 13 February 2001, a pro se delayed application to reopen his appeal pursuant to Ohio App. R. 26(B) ("26(B) application").4 On 17 May 2001, the Court of Appeals denied Mr. Smith's delayed 26(B) application, holding that it was untimely and that Mr. Smith had not set forth good cause for the delay. On 16 June 2001, Mr. Smith timely appealed the Court of Appeals' denial of his 26(B) application to the Ohio Supreme Court. The Ohio Supreme Court, on 26 September 2001, dismissed Mr. Smith's appeal as not involving any substantial constitutional question.
Mr. Smith filed a pro se petition for a federal writ of habeas corpus on 15 April 2002, in which he asserts four grounds for relief:
Ground 1: The judgment of several convictions were unconstitutional, based on Double Jeopardy.
Ground 2: The trial court erred when it overruled petitioner's motion for acquittal pursuant to Ohio Criminal Rule 29 ("insufficiency of evidence").
Ground 3: The appellate court erred in the denial of petitioner's motion for delayed application to reopen pursuant to Ohio Rule of Appellate Procedure 26(B).
Ground 4: The Supreme Court of Ohio abused its discretion in its denial of petitioner's motion for delayed appeal.
Federal habeas corpus law permits federal courts to entertain petitions on behalf of a person "on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). This Court's consideration of the merits of Mr. Smith's petition is governed primarily by 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), as amended by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"). AEDPA was enacted "to reduce delays in the execution of state and federal criminal sentences, particularly in capital cases, and `to further the principles of comity, finality, and federalism.'" Woodford, 538 U.S. at 206, 123 S.Ct. 1398 (citing Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 436, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000)). In advancing such goals, Section 2254(d) places new constraints on "the power of a federal habeas court to grant a state prisoner's application for a writ of habeas corpus with respect to claims adjudicated on the merits in state court." Williams, 529 U.S. at 412, 120 S.Ct. 1495. Section 2254(d) provides:
An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim —
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.
This legal standard establishes a multi-faceted analysis involving a consideration of both the state court's statement or application of federal law and its finding of facts.
With respect to Section 2254(d)(1), "clearly established federal law" refers to the holdings, as opposed to dicta, of the Supreme Court's decisions as of the time of the relevant state-court decision. Williams, 529 U.S. at 412, 120 S.Ct. 1495; Barnes v. Elo, 231 F.3d 1025, 1028 (6th Cir.2000).5 The "contrary to" and "unreasonable application" clauses of the Section 2254(d)(1) are independent tests and must be analyzed separately. Williams, 529 U.S. at 412-13, 120 S.Ct. 1495; Hill v. Hofbauer, 337 F.3d 706, 711 (6th Cir.2003). A state court decision is "contrary to" federal law only "if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts." Id. at 412-13, 120 S.Ct. 1495.
Even if the state court identifies the "correct governing legal principle," a federal habeas court may still grant the petition if the state court makes an "unreasonable application" of "that principle to the facts of the particular state prisoner's case." Id. at 413, 120 S.Ct. 1495. A state court decision also involves an unreasonable application if it unreasonably extends a legal principle from United States Supreme Court precedent to a new context where it should not apply or unreasonably refuses to extend that principle to a new context where it should apply. Id. at 407, 120 S.Ct. 1495; Hill, 337 F.3d at 711. In order for a state court's application of clearly established federal law to be unreasonable, the state court's decision must be more than incorrect or erroneous, it must be objectively unreasonable. Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 123 S.Ct. 2527, 2535, 156 L.Ed.2d 471 (2003); Williams, 529 U.S. at 411, 120 S.Ct. 1495; see also Simpson v. Jones, 238 F.3d 399, 405 (6th Cir.2000).
As to the "unreasonable determination of the facts" clause in Section 2254(d)(2), the United States Supreme Court recently had the opportunity to apply the "fact" of Section 2254(d)(2) in Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 123 S.Ct. 2527, 156 L.Ed.2d 471 (2003). In that case, the Court noted that a "clear factual error" such as making factual findings regarding the contents of social service records contrary to "clear and convincing evidence" presented by the defendant constitutes an "unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented." Id. at 2539.
Federal habeas petitioners face several threshold hurdles in their pursuit of relief under Section 2254. Specifically, they must exhaust their state remedies and satisfy or be excused from the one-year statute of limitations. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244(d)(1) and 2254(b) and (c). Moreover, under certain conditions, petitioners may procedurally default their grounds for relief. Maupin v. Smith, 785 F.2d 135, 138 (6th Cir.1986). Also, alleged errors involving a state court's interpretation of its own procedural rules are not cognizable in federal habeas corpus review. Simpson v. Jones, 238 F.3d 399, 406-407 (6th Cir.2000).
In this case, the State concedes that Mr. Smith has exhausted available state court remedies but argues that his petition is time-barred, that Mr. Smith has procedurally defaulted his first, second, and third grounds for relief, and that Mr. Smith's third and fourth grounds for relief are not cognizable in federal habeas corpus review. Thus, before reaching the merits of Mr. Smith's petition, this Court must first consider the State's statute of limitations, procedural default, and failure to state a cognizable claim arguments.
As the Magistrate Judge concluded that Mr. Smith's petition was time-barred, the Court begins its analysis with a consideration of that issue. The statute of limitations set forth in Section 2244(d)(1) is an affirmative defense, not a jurisdictional prerequisite. Scott v. Collins, 286 F.3d 923, 927 (6th Cir.2002). The party asserting the statute as a defense bears the burden of demonstrating that the statute has...
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