Smith v. Ozmint

• Decision Date: 31 July 2009
• Docket Number: No. 07-6558.,07-6558.
• Citation: 578 F.3d 246
• Parties: Kevin SMITH, a/k/a Bar-None Royal Blackness, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Jon OZMINT; Gary D. Maynard; Robert Ward; Gary A. Boyd; Gene Noles; James Sligh; Debra Wise; Alvin Graber; Lester Hinson, Jr.; Ms. Hill, OFC; Doris Curenton; Mary Stewart; Dean Day; Marcia Fuller; T.W. Thomas; Laurie Bessinger; Bernard McKie; Associate Warden Stevenson; Samuel Latta; James Christensen; Willie Mason; Harold Scott; Sergeant Shivers; E. Jennings; E. Reardon; J. Kircher; S. Brown; M. Hayes; Rolland Moody; S. Horsely; Joel Moore; Kenneth Jones; Nurse R. Murphy; John Doe; Jane Doe; Richard P. Stroker; Mary Davenport Anderson; Leon Lott, Jr.; Daniel E. Johnson; David Wilson; Carlton Medley; David Mildred; James Robinson, Defendants-Appellees. Akeem Muhammad, Amicus Supporting Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit

578 F.3d 246

Kevin SMITH, a/k/a Bar-None Royal Blackness, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Jon OZMINT; Gary D. Maynard; Robert Ward; Gary A. Boyd; Gene Noles; James Sligh; Debra Wise; Alvin Graber; Lester Hinson, Jr.; Ms. Hill, OFC; Doris Curenton; Mary Stewart; Dean Day; Marcia Fuller; T.W. Thomas; Laurie Bessinger; Bernard McKie; Associate Warden Stevenson; Samuel Latta; James Christensen; Willie Mason; Harold Scott; Sergeant Shivers; E. Jennings; E. Reardon; J. Kircher; S. Brown; M. Hayes; Rolland Moody; S. Horsely; Joel Moore; Kenneth Jones; Nurse R. Murphy; John Doe; Jane Doe; Richard P. Stroker; Mary Davenport Anderson; Leon Lott, Jr.; Daniel E. Johnson; David Wilson; Carlton Medley; David Mildred; James Robinson, Defendants-Appellees Akeem Muhammad, Amicus Supporting Appellant.

No. 07-6558.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Argued: May 14, 2009.

Decided: July 31, 2009.

ARGUED:

Cecily Elizabeth Baskir, Georgetown University Law Center, Washington, D.C., for Appellant. Andrew Lindemann, Davidson & Lindemann, PA, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellees.

ON BRIEF:

Steven H. Goldblatt, Director, Kelly A. Anderson, Student Counsel, Zheyao Li, Student Counsel, Daniel E. Shuey, Student Counsel, Kimberly Witherspoon, Student Counsel, Georgetown University Law Center, Washington, D.C., for Appellant. Akeem Muhammad, Raiford, Florida, Amicus Supporting Appellant.

Before MICHAEL, KING, and GREGORY, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded by published opinion. Judge Michael wrote the opinion, in which Judge King and Judge Gregory joined.

OPINION

MICHAEL, Circuit Judge:

Kevin Smith,^* a South Carolina prisoner, appeals the district court's award of summary judgment to twenty-six South Carolina Department of Corrections officials and employees (collectively, the SCDC) on (1) his claim asserted under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) and (2) his claims alleging constitutional violations relating to excessive force and conditions of confinement. Smith contends that the SCDC violated his RLUIPA rights when, in contravention of his religious beliefs, it forcibly shaved his head under the Maximum Security Unit (MSU) grooming policy. Because the SCDC failed to meet its burden to show that the MSU policy of forcible grooming is the least restrictive means to further a compelling governmental interest, we vacate the summary judgment granted to the SCDC on Smith's RLUIPA claim. The SCDC failed in its proffer because it relied on an affidavit, which was filed in another case and which did not address administrative burdens and security requirements in the MSU, where the grooming policy at issue was enforced. The RLUIPA claim requires a remand for further consideration. We affirm the district court's award of summary judgment to the SCDC on Smith's constitutional claims.

I.

Smith is an inmate in the MSU at Kirkland Correctional Institution in South Carolina. SCDC maintains two specialized housing units, the MSU and the Special Management Unit (SMU), for prisoners requiring greater monitoring and supervision than the general prison population. The MSU provides the higher level of security and is designed for inmates who "have demonstrated an unwillingness to conform to the rules and regulations of [the SMU], who have been charged with violent criminal behavior committed while in the general [prison] population, and/or for whom emergency placement has been ordered." J.A. 651. Common reasons for placement in the MSU include "violent participation in a riot or other institutional disorder," "violent escapes or escape attempts with force," and "seizing and holding a hostage." J.A. 651-52. MSU inmates are essentially confined to their cells except for an hour of exercise per day, five days a week. When MSU inmates are permitted to leave their cells, they are "restrained with leg irons, security cuffs, and/or belly chains." J.A. 663.

The MSU has a grooming policy (MSU grooming policy or MSU policy) that requires inmates "to wear close-cropped haircuts for security reasons." J.A. 658. It also provides that "[i]nmates may ... be given forced haircuts or shaves if they refuse to comply with the haircut and shave schedule." J.A. 664. The MSU grooming policy, including its provision authorizing the use of force, has been in effect since at least January 1, 2002. Smith, who is a practicing Rastafarian, refused to comply with the grooming policy because of his religious beliefs. As a result, MSU employees forcibly shaved Smith's head with clippers on at least two occasions: on November 9, 2002, and on August 13, 2003.

The SCDC also has a grooming policy (SCDC grooming policy or SCDC policy) applicable throughout the Department of Corrections that requires male inmates to keep their hair "neatly cut (not to exceed one [1"] inch in length) and [it] must remain above the shirt collar and above the ear (not touching the ear)." J.A. 388. A May 1, 2004, amendment to the SCDC grooming policy authorizes prison employees to forcibly administer haircuts to inmates who refuse to comply. Prior to that change, inmates in the general population who refused to comply with the SCDC grooming policy were not forcibly shorn, but were reclassified and transferred to the SMU, where security arrangements are more restrictive. The current SCDC policy is essentially identical to the MSU policy: both require short haircuts and authorize prison employees to forcibly groom inmates. Smith, however, was forcibly shorn under the MSU policy, which permitted the use of force at the time of the 2002 and 2003 incidents challenged by him. The SCDC policy was only amended to permit the use of force effective May 1, 2004.

The first challenged incident occurred on November 9, 2002, when about five correctional officers wearing protective gear entered Smith's MSU isolation cell and subdued him by forcing him to the floor and then attaching leg and arm restraints. In the first thirty seconds after the officers entered Smith's cell, the officers used physical force against him, including pushing, pulling, and (possibly) hitting. The officers were in Smith's cell for approximately two minutes and fifty seconds before leaving the cell with Smith in full restraints. Thereafter, the officers forcibly moved Smith to a different room and shaved his head.

Correctional officers again enforced the MSU grooming policy against Smith on August 13, 2003. Smith was in a recreation yard wearing handcuffs when the officers entered the yard and sprayed mace in his face. At the outset Smith reminded the officers that he was wearing handcuffs, but the SCDC says that an "inmate[ ] must be treated as if [he is] not restrained until the restraints can be verified by correctional officers." J.A. 367. Thus, according to the SCDC, its officers used mace to subdue Smith as a part of the effort to make sure that he was adequately restrained. The chemicals burned Smith's eyes and skin and caused him difficulty in breathing. The officers removed Smith to a separate room and helped him wash and clean his face. His head was then shaved. Smith complained of injuries and received medical care at the correctional facility after both the November 9, 2002, and August 13, 2003, incidents. Correctional officers filmed both incidents, and the video recordings are in the record.

After exhausting administrative remedies, Smith filed a pro se complaint alleging that the SCDC violated his rights under RLUIPA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc to 2000cc-5. Smith further alleges that excessive force was used against him during the November 9, 2002, and August 13, 2003, incidents in violation of his constitutional rights and that conditions of confinement within the MSU violate the Constitution in several respects. The district court granted summary judgment to the SCDC on all of Smith's claims, and he appeals.

II.

We review the district court's grant of summary judgment de novo. Hill v. Lockheed Martin Logistics Mgmt., Inc., 354 F.3d 277, 283 (4th Cir.2004). Summary judgment is appropriate if "the pleadings ... and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(c). We construe the evidence in the light most favorable to Smith, the non-moving party, and draw all reasonable inferences in his favor. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).

III.

RLUIPA, in relevant part, provides that:

No government shall impose a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a person residing in or confined to an institution ... even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability, unless the government demonstrates that imposition of the burden on that person—

(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and

(2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.

42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a). "Government" includes any official of "a State ... or other governmental entity created under the authority of a State" and "any other person acting under color of State law." Id. § 2000cc-5(4)(A). The defendants here, who are officials or employees of the SCDC and whom we refer to collectively as the "SCDC," fit within that definition.

"If a plaintiff produces prima facie evidence" of an RLUIPA violation, "the government shall bear the burden of persuasion on any element of the claim, except that the plaintiff shall bear the burden of persuasion on whether the [policy] or government practice that is challenged by the claim substantially burdens the plaintiff's exercise of religion." Id. § 2000cc-2(b). In particular, the government must prove that the burden in question is the least restrictive means of furthering a compelling governmental interest. Id. § 2000cc-1(a). As to those elements on which it bears the burden of proof, a government is only entitled to summary...