Smith v. Parish of Washington

• Decision Date: 26 March 2004
• Docket Number: No. Civ.A. 02-3385.,No. Civ.A. 02-3392.,Civ.A. 02-3385.,Civ.A. 02-3392.
• Citation: 318 F.Supp.2d 366
• Parties: Rachel SMITH, et al. v. PARISH OF WASHINGTON, et al.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Louisiana

318 F.Supp.2d 366

Rachel SMITH, et al. v. PARISH OF WASHINGTON, et al.

No. Civ.A. 02-3385.

No. Civ.A. 02-3392.

United States District Court, E.D. Louisiana.

March 26, 2004.

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Dale Edward Williams, Attorney at Law, Metairie, LA, for Plaintiffs.

Eavelyn Terry Brooks, Bastian & Brooks, Lloyd Frederick Schroeder, II, Usry, Weeks & Matthews, New Orleans LA, Dale E. Branch, District Attorney's Office, Franklinton, LA, Charles M. Hughes, Jr., Talley, Anthony, Hughes & Knight, LLC, Mandeville, LA, for Defendants.

ORDER & REASONS

FALLON, District Judge.

The Plaintiffs in these consolidated actions are six former deputies of the Washington Parish Sheriff's Office: Rachel Smith, William Jones, William Stogner, Michael Dufrene, Michael Thomas, and Michael Daniel. All six Plaintiffs bring suit against the sheriff of Washington Parish, Aubrey Jones, and the deputy sheriff, Charles Brumfield, alleging retaliatory discharge. (Civil Action No. 02-3385). One of the six Plaintiffs, Michael Dufrene, also filed a separate suit against the Town of Franklinton and the chief of the Franklinton Police Department, Lynn Armand, alleging unlawful failure to re-hire. (02-3392). The Court consolidated these matters for discovery purposes because they involve similar facts. (Rec.Doc. Nos.5, 36).

Plaintiffs in the main suit (hereinafter "Smith suit") allege that the Defendants unlawfully terminated them in violation of their First Amendment rights to free speech, to petition the government for redress of grievances, and their constitutional property right to enjoy public employment. They brought their action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and La. R.S. § 51:2256. Plaintiff in the consolidated suit (hereinafter "Dufrene suit") claims that he was unlawfully denied re-employment by the Franklinton Police Department. He brought his action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Fair Labor Standards Act, and La. R.S. § 51:2256.

On March 2, 2004, the Defendants filed respective motions for summary judgment against all six Plaintiffs in both actions. The parties came before the Court for oral argument on the Defendants motions on March 19, 2004. The Court took the matter under submission and now issues its rulings.

I. BACKGROUND

This matter stems from an earlier lawsuit filed in this Court on July 10, 2000, by Rachel Smith against the Town of Franklinton, Lynn Armand, and Charles Brumfield. (Hereinafter "2000 lawsuit"). In that suit, Smith claimed that, as a matter of policy, female officers in the Franklinton Police Department (FPD) were restricted to performing clerical work and/or dispatching duties. Smith was the first female hired for duty as a regular police officer or "road deputy" with the FPD in May 1998. After she was hired, Smith alleged that she began to suffer harassment in her employment at the hands of Deputy Sheriff Brumfield. Smith eventually claimed damages for emotional distress, mental anxiety, loss of reputation, and humiliation, as well as remedies under § 1983 and wage claims under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). In the course of litigating the matter, Smith obtained sworn statements from W. Jones and Dufrene.

Furthermore, W. Jones, Dufrene, and Stogner became additional party plaintiffs in Smith's FLSA claim, alleging that they worked more than 40 hours per week but were not adequately compensated as provided by the FLSA, 29 USC § 206(a)(1). W. Jones, Dufrene, and Stogner were also listed as witnesses who would support all of Smith's claims.

In May 2001, Smith, W. Jones, Dufrene, and Stogner entered into a settlement with Franklinton, Chief Armand, and Assistant Chief Brumfield, which disposed of all the issues. Soon after the settlement, the Plaintiffs claim that Brumfield was demoted and thereafter resigned employment from the FPD. Plaintiffs were re-employed by the Washington Parish Sheriff's Office either by Duane Blair, at the time Sheriff of Washington Parish, or by Acting Sheriff Scott Blair, who replaced him.

In November 2001, Washington Parish held an election for a new Sheriff. It is undisputed that the election was very heated, with negative campaigning on both sides. The Plaintiffs all publicly supported and participated in the election efforts of the incumbent, acting Sheriff Scott Blair. However, Blair was defeated by the challenger, Aubrey Jones. Jones' election was considered an upset as a "Blair" had been sheriff in Washington Parish for at least a generation.

Plaintiffs allege that Brumfield actively supported and was politically connected to Aubrey Jones. According to Plaintiffs, Brumfield made a deal with Aubrey Jones that in return for his support, he would be installed as Chief Criminal Deputy and that Smith, W. Jones, Dufrene, and Stogner would be fired. Plaintiffs claim that Brumfield blamed Smith, W. Jones, Dufrene, and Stogner for costing him his job with the FPD. Aubrey Jones was elected on November 17, 2001. Aubrey Jones did not recommission the Plaintiffs and installed Brumfield as Deputy Sheriff in August, 2002.

I. LOUISIANA REVISED STATUTE SECTION 51:2256

Four of the Smith Plaintiffs (Smith, Stogner, Jones, and Dufrene) and Plaintiff Dufrene in his individual suit assert causes of action for retaliatory discharge under state law, La. R.S. § 51:2256. As a preliminary matter, the Court asked the parties to address whether there is still a cause of action for retaliatory discharge under La. R.S. § 51:2256 following the 1997 amendments to Chapter 51. To put this matter in perspective, a review of the Human Rights Act is appropriate.

In 1988, the Louisiana legislature enacted the Louisiana Human Rights Act (the "Act") and created the Louisiana Commission on Human Rights (the "Commission") to enforce the Act. La. R.S. § 51:2231, et seq. (2003).¹ As part of its original charge, the Commission was granted statutory authority to address allegations of unlawful discriminatory practices in employment. See La. R.S. §§ 51:2242-2245, (repealed by Acts 1997 No. 1409, § 4, effective August 1, 1997).² The legislature also included a broad anti-retaliation provision in the Act, making it unlawful,

[t]o retaliate or discriminate in any manner against a person because he has opposed a practice declared unlawful by this Chapter, or because he has made a charge, filed a complaint, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in any investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this Chapter.

§ 51:2256.

However, in 1997, the Louisiana legislature sought to create a new piece of legislation that would consolidate all of the state's employment discrimination law into one, comprehensive chapter. La. R.S. § 23:301, historical and statutory notes. Thus, pursuant to Acts 1997 No. 1409, §§ 51:2242-2245 were repealed and replaced by the new Louisiana Employment Discrimination Law. La. R.S. §§ 23:301, et seq.³

The question before the Court is whether or not the anti-retaliation provision set forth in § 51:2256 continues to apply to employment discrimination after the 1997 revisions.

The Plaintiffs argue that § 51:2256 continues to apply to employment discrimination. In support of their argument, the Plaintiffs advance three related theories based upon their interpretation of the legislature's intent in making the revisions. First, relying on Miller v. Am. Gen. Fin. Corp., 2002 WL 2022536 (EDLA 2002), the Plaintiffs observe that, in addition to repealing the substantive sections dealing with employment discrimination, the legislature added the following two definitions to the Human Rights Act as part of the 1997 amendments:

§ 2232. Definitions

As used in this Chapter:

. . . . .

(12) "Discriminatory practice in connection with employment" means an employment practice prohibited by R.S. 23:312, 323, or 332.

(13) "Unlawful practice" means a discriminatory practice in connection with employment, a discriminatory practice in connection with public accommodations, or any other practice prohibited by this Chapter.

La. R.S. § 2232(12), (13). Since the added definitions refer generally to employment discrimination and specifically to Chapter 23, Plaintiffs argue that Chapter 23 is incorporated by reference into the Human Rights Act, effectively becoming part of "this Chapter" as required under § 51:2256.

Second, Plaintiffs argue that the new Employment Discrimination Law does not contain a broad anti-retaliation provision that applies to all forms of discrimination prohibited under the law. Rather, the legislature included specific anti-retaliation provisions in the sections addressing age discrimination (§§ 23:311-314) and sickle-cell trait discrimination (§§ 23:351-354). Parallel provisions do not appear in the sections addressing disability (§§ 23:321-325.); race, color, religion, sex, and national origin (§§ 23:331-334); or pregnancy, childbirth, and related medical conditions (§§ 23:341-342). Plaintiffs note that if § 51:2256 no longer applies in the employment discrimination context, then the only Louisiana statute making it unlawful for employers to retaliate against persons who oppose discrimination in employment based on the above categories has been eliminated. Clearly, the Plaintiffs argue, the legislature did not intend to eliminate such a cause of action from state law. Had they so intended, according to the Plaintiffs, they would not have included two new definitions regarding employment discrimination in the Act.

Third, the Plaintiffs cite one of the stated purposes of the legislature in passing the Human Rights Act. Section 51:2231(A) of the act provides that one of the goals of the Act was to have Louisiana recognized as a deferral state under federal law and under the rules and regulations of the United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Plaintiffs argue that if § 51:2256 no longer prohibits retaliation against those who oppose discriminatory employment practices, then Louisiana would no...