Smith v. Parks Hotels & Resorts, Inc.

• Decision Date: 08 June 2022
• Docket Number: A22A0388, A22A0389
• Citation: 364 Ga.App. 192,874 S.E.2d 383
• Parties: Michael SMITH v. PARKS HOTELS & RESORTS, INC. et al.; and vice versa.
• Court: Georgia Court of Appeals

364 Ga.App. 192

874 S.E.2d 383

Michael SMITH

v.

PARKS HOTELS & RESORTS, INC. et al.; and vice versa.

A22A0388, A22A0389

Court of Appeals of Georgia.

June 8, 2022

Kastorf Law, Kurt G. Kastorf ; Ilardi Law, Frank A. Ilardi ; Robert W. Hughes, Jr. ; Copeland Stair Kingma & Lovell, Shannon McKenzie Sprinkle, Atlanta, Matthew Alexander Gass, for Smith.

Weinberg Wheeler Hudgins Gunn & Dial, Patrick Bryan Moore, Shubhra R. Mashelkar, George B. Green, Jr., for Parks Hotels & Resorts, Inc. et al.

Dillard, Presiding Judge.

In Case No. A22A0388, Michael Smith—as conservator of five minor children whose mother was killed during a shift working as a housekeeper for Parks Hotels & Resorts, Inc. ("Hilton")—appeals the trial court's denial of his motion to set aside a workers’ compensation award issued by the Georgia State Board of Workers’ Compensation (the "Board"), reflecting its approval of a settlement agreement and stipulation entered into by Hilton and Smith's predecessor, Claire Cottingham. In doing so, Smith argues the trial court erred by (1) finding that he invited or induced any error in the award because the settlement was executed before he was appointed as the children's conservator; (2) permitting Hilton to seek equitable relief to protect a void settlement agreement it drafted and submitted for approval; and (3) relying on principles of estoppel in denying his motion.

In Case No. A22A0389, Hilton cross-appeals, arguing that—although it correctly denied Smith's motion to set aside the workers’ compensation award—the trial court erred in finding there was a non-amendable defect on the face of the record because (1) the Board had statutory authority to approve the settlement, even with the limited powers the probate court granted to Cottingham as the initial conservator for the children; and (2) even if Cottingham needed additional powers or an additional appointment by the Board to legally compromise the children's claim arising from their mother's death, the Board had an express right to easily correct any such defect, rendering it amendable. For the reasons set forth infra , we affirm the trial court's decision in both cases.¹

Here, the undisputed record shows that in 2016, Stephanie Riddle—the mother of the five children at issue—worked as a housekeeper at a Hilton hotel. On July 7, 2016, while Riddle was at work, her boyfriend went to her workplace, and after being told by another Hilton employee where to find her, entered the room she was cleaning and shot her to death. Thereafter, Cottingham (Riddle's aunt) was appointed by the probate court to be the permanent legal guardian of four of Riddle's children and temporary guardian of the other child. Cottingham then retained attorney Leighton Deming to represent her in her capacity as the children's guardian.

On August 1, 2016, Deming and Cottingham (on behalf of the children) filed a workers’ compensation claim with the Board related to Riddle's death. Hilton responded that even though Riddle was shot at work, Cottingham's claim was "not a compensable accident" under Georgia law. Subsequently, on October 27, 2016, the Board sent a notice of mediation to the parties, ordering them to attend mediation and noting that Deming requested "mediation to resolve [Riddle's] entitlement to income benefits, medical treatment/expenses, and any other pending issues, including but not limited to settlement."

On November 21, 2016, the probate court (in five separate orders) issued letters of conservatorship, appointing Cottingham as the conservator of all five children. And after the Board-ordered mediation, Cottingham—individually and on behalf of the children—reached a settlement with Hilton, under which Hilton agreed to pay a lump sum of $150,000 to settle the claim. In exchange for this payment, Cottingham signed a settlement, release, and indemnification, which provided, in part, that she agreed to

completely release and forever discharge [Hilton] from any and all past, present, or future claims, demands, obligations, actions, causes of action, wrongful death claims , loss of consortium claims, contribution or indemnity claims, rights, damages, costs, losses of services, expenses and compensation of any nature whatsoever, whether based on workers’ compensation, a tort, [or] contract ....²

In the settlement agreement, Cottingham also executed a "warranty of capacity to execute agreement[,]" certifying that she had the sole right and exclusive authority to execute the agreement and receive the sums specified in it. Further, the settlement agreement contained a provision requiring both parties to "cooperate fully and execute any and all supplementary documents and to take all additional actions, which may be necessary or appropriate to give full force and effect to the basic terms and intent of [the] [s]ettlement [a]greement to specifically include a dismissal of [any] lawsuit in its entirety with prejudice."

In conjunction with the settlement agreement, the parties submitted a so-called "throw away memorandum" to the Board, explaining that the $150,000 lump sum payment included (1) $37,500 for Cottingham's attorney fees; (2) $2,639 for reimbursement of expenses; and (3) $109,861 to be paid to Cottingham for the benefit of the Riddle children. The memorandum also stated that the parties "specifically agree[d] that the conservatorships for all minor children will be funded as required by law and specifically approved by the [p]robate [c]ourt."

Thereafter, on March 2, 2017, the probate court appointed Ann Herrera as the administrator of Riddle's estate, which authorized her to receive the settlement funds, and she later obtained the bond necessary to do so. The next day, one of Hilton's representatives sent a revised settlement agreement and throw away memorandum to Herrera, indicating that the primary change was that the funds owed to the children would now be paid to her as the administrator of the estate. Herrera agreed to this revision. Then, on March 4, 2017, Cottingham and Hilton filed a "stipulation and agreement" with the Board. In the stipulation, Hilton denied liability for Riddle's death, and the parties agreed that it did not arise in the course of her employment. The parties requested that the Board adopt the stipulation as its findings of fact and "enter its [a]ward in terms of law based upon the [s]tipulations adjudicating the absence of liability on the part of Hilton ...." Cottingham signed the stipulation as both the guardian and conservator of Riddle's children.

Subsequently, on March 29, 2017, the Board adopted the parties’ stipulation and approved the settlement agreement. And approximately one year later, on March 27, 2018, Herrera filed a notice in the probate court, detailing the dates and amounts for when Hilton paid her different portions of the settlement funds. Then, after deducting various fees and expenses, Herrera received $98,740.67 from Hilton, which is approximately $20,000 for the benefit of each child.

In early 2018, Herrera filed a petition to remove Cottingham as the children's conservator and appoint a county conservator to replace her, contending that Cottingham had been unable to post the bond necessary to receive the proceeds of the workers’ compensation settlement from Herrera. According to Herrera, those proceeds would not be available to the Riddle children unless Cottingham was replaced with a bondable successor. At some point during the pendency of the probate proceedings, Deming passed away, and Cottingham retained attorney Laura Bryant to represent her in this matter. On April 9, 2018, Bryant e-mailed Herrera, indicating that Cottingham was willing to resign as conservator for the children, and she wanted Michael Smith to replace her. Herrera agreed that Smith would be Cottingham's replacement.

Thereafter, on April 12, 2018, Smith and Bryant—on behalf of Herrera and Cottingham—entered a consent agreement as to each child, under which they agreed that Cottingham would resign as conservator and Smith would replace her. To this effect, the parties attached to the agreement a resignation letter signed by Cottingham and a consent to serve as conservator signed by Smith. Further, each of the five consent agreements provided that Smith would post a $20,000 bond for each child before the letters of conservatorship were issued. Ultimately, on June 13, 2018, the probate court approved the consent agreements and appointed Smith as the new conservator. In its orders, the probate court directed Smith to post a $20,000 bond for each child.

On November 4, 2019, Smith filed a motion in the trial court to set aside the workers’ compensation award. In doing so, Smith argued that the settlement approved by the Board was void because there was a non-amendable defect on the face of the record, and the Board's approval of the settlement was the result of fraud, accident, or mistake. Hilton responded, opposing the motion and contending that the workers’ compensation award cannot be set aside because any defect on the face of the record was amendable, and even if not, the equitable doctrines of invited error, unclean hands, and judicial estoppel barred Smith's motion. Following a hearing, the trial court denied Smith's motion to set aside the workers’ compensation award. Smith then filed a motion for reconsideration, which the trial court also denied. These cross-appeals follow our grant of Smith's application for a discretionary appeal.

A trial court's decision regarding a motion to set aside a judgment will not be reversed "absent a showing of manifest abuse of discretion."³ And a trial court's ruling on a motion to set aside a judgment will be affirmed "if there is any evidence to support it."⁴ With this standard of review in mind, we turn to the parties’ specific claims of error.

Case No. A22A0389

1. We address Hilton's cross-appeal first because it involves threshold issues, which are dispositive of Smith's main appeal. Hilton essentially argues the...