Smith v. Pedigo
Decision Date | 15 March 1893 |
Docket Number | 16,477 |
Parties | Smith et al. v. Pedigo et al |
Court | Indiana Supreme Court |
Rehearing Denied June 17, 1896, Reported at: 145 Ind. 361 at 392.
From the Boone Circuit Court.
Reversed.
W. E Niblack, C. S. Wesner, T. W. Lockhart, and A. C. Harris, for appellants.
Terhune & Higgins, for appellees.
This was an action for the recovery of the possession of real estate, in the ordinary form under the code, brought by appellants against the appellees. A change was taken from the court, and the special judge called to try the case first, the Hon. Ralph Hill, made a special finding of the facts and stated conclusions of law, upon which judgment of recovery of the possession in favor of appellants followed. A new trial, as a matter of right under the statute, was granted to the appellees. That special judge declining to hear the case again, the Hon. William M. Franklin was called and tried the case again without a jury. He found generally for the defendants, the appellees, and, over a motion for a new trial, rendered judgment for appellees, the defendants below. The only error assigned here is the overruling the motion for a new trial. The grounds of that motion are, that the finding of the court is not supported by, and is contrary to the evidence and the law.
The real estate sought to be recovered in the action, is a church building, erected on the land described in the complaint for, and was used as a house of worship unitedly by the Mount Tabor Regular Baptist Church, of Boone county, Indiana, from a time when the building was erected, shortly after the date of the deed conveying the land to her trustees named, and their successors in office, for the use of said church, on June 30, 1857, until the summer of 1889, when a division took place in the congregation, on account of a difference in belief between the two factions on points of doctrine and practice. Ever since the last named date, each of these factions has been claiming to be the only Mount Tabor Regular Baptist Church; the appellants being the trustees lawfully elected by the minority faction, and the appellees being the trustees elected by the majority. This state of affairs renders it incumbent on the court to ascertain from the evidence, if we can, which one of these factions represents, and is the real and true Mount Tabor Regular Baptist Church, if either one is. This involves an inquiry into certain religious doctrines and practices of that church, as a religious society or body. Not because the law which we are to declare recognizes any particular form of doctrine or faith and practice as the true one, nor because the law requires any form of doctrine or religious belief from anyone, or from any society or church whatever; but because, in a case of a divided congregation of a church or religious society on account of a difference of religious belief, faith, and practice between the disagreeing divisions, it may become necessary, where there is a dispute as to the title to the church property, to inquire which faction, or division, still adheres to the original faith and doctrine, rules and laws upon which the church was founded, if either does, and which one has departed therefrom, if either has; these religious doctrines, faith, and practices, rules and laws, on which the particular church was founded, and the present faith and beliefs of the contending factions, are listened to by the court, not for the purpose of arriving at fundamental or ultimate religious truth, or for the purpose of learning about our true relation to the supposed author of our being, or what our state is to be after this life; but these religious doctrines and practices are listened to by the court solely as facts, upon which civil rights, and rights to property are made to depend, regardless of the ultimate truth or soundness of such doctrines, practices, and beliefs. Indeed, ever since the complete separation of church and state, in the crowning glory of civil government among men, by the constitution of the United States, declaring that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof," which was followed by similar provisions in most of the state constitutions, and especially our own, the law has known no religious creed, no religious opinion, no religious doctrine, no standard of belief, in matters pertaining to religion. Our State Constitution, framed by wise men, and adopted by the people, has still more securely placed us out of the reach of those fierce and bloody struggles arising out of a difference in religious opinion in former times, by declaring that "All men shall be secured in their natural right to worship Almighty God according to the dictates of their own consciences," and that "No law shall in any case whatever control the free exercise and enjoyment of religious opinions, or interfere with the rights of conscience," and that "No preference shall be given by law to any creed, religious society or mode of worship; and no man shall be compelled to attend, erect, or support any place of worship, or to maintain any ministry, against his consent," and that "No religious test shall be required as a qualification for any office of trust or profit."
These provisions of the fundamental law not only take away all power of the State to interfere with religious beliefs, but they leave the citizen perfectly free to repudiate the faith and belief he once professed, and adhere to and adopt a new creed and faith differing from that of the church to which he belongs, or he may repudiate his old belief and faith without adopting any new one, and these changes he may adopt as often as to him may seem proper, and the law will protect him in it. In other words, the law allows every one to believe as he pleases, and practice that belief so long as that practice does not interfere with the equal rights of others.
But that is a very different thing from the claim of a right of a church member to repudiate the faith and doctrine upon which his church was founded, and at the same time insist on his right to exercise and enjoy the benefits and privileges of a member of such church, contrary to the rules and laws upon which such church is established.
The main contention of the appellees is that they represent the majority of the members of the church that belonged thereto at the time that the division took place, and that the acts, rules and orders adopted by them in the regular course of church business are the acts of Mount Tabor Regular Baptist Church, and therefore binding on all members, both majority and minority, whether those acts were in accord with the laws, usages, practice, faith, and belief upon which the church was originally founded or not.
In other words, their contention substantially amounts to this: that the acts of the majority, done in the regular course of church business, is the law of the church, no matter how great the departure from the original faith and law upon which the church is founded.
While the appellants contend that the acts of the majority, though done in the regular course of church business, but in violation of the laws, usages, faith, and principles upon which the church was founded, and over the protest and objection of the minority, are not binding on anybody, and are not the acts of the church.
We have read the evidence, which is very voluminous, consisting of over six hundred printed pages, and find that there is no substantial conflict on any material point in the case.
This church was organized on the third Saturday of July, 1835, and it then adopted articles of faith, which read as follows, to-wit:
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Bentle v. Ulay
...is relied upon as a link in a chain of title, it becomes a matter for the civil courts exactly as was the case in Smith v. Pedigo, 145 Ind. 361, 33 N. E. 777, 44 N. E. 363, 19 L. R. A. 433, 32 L. R. A. 838, and in White Lick, etc., v. White Lick, etc., 89 Ind. 136, and in all other cases wh......
- Smith v. Pedigo
-
Bentle v. Ulay
...members of the Supreme Court participated in that decision. The decision last made is also in conflict with the following cases: Smith v. Pedigo, supra, White Lick Quarterly Meeting, etc., v. Lick Quarterly Meeting, etc., supra, and Gaff v. Greer (1882), 88 Ind. 122, 45 Am. Rep. 449. These ......