Smith v. Peterson
| Decision Date | 02 March 1955 |
| Citation | 280 P.2d 522,131 Cal.App.2d 241,49 A.L.R.2d 1194 |
| Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
| Parties | , 49 A.L.R.2d 1194 Robert D. SMITH, transacting business under the firm name and style of Advance Muffler Company, and Forrest W. Ricks, Plaintiffs and Respondents, v. Clifford E. PETERSON, Commissioner of California Highway Patrol, E. Raymond Cato, Chief thereof, C. C. Tibbs and J. N. Cullen, Highway Patrol Officers, Defendants and Appellants. Civ. 4696. |
Edmund G. Brown, Atty. Gen., G. A. Strader, Deputy Atty. Gen., for appellants.
Matt Goldstein, William A. Quinlan, Fresno, for respondents.
This proceeding involves the constitutionality of sections 673 and 681 of the Vehicle Code in reference to the prevention of excessive or unusual noises from mufflers on automobiles. These sections read in part as follows:
Plaintiffs, Robert D. Smith, transacting business as Advance Muffler Company, and Forrest W. Ricks, its agent operating in Fresno, allege that the California Highway Patrol Commissioner, and other officers, periodically and frequently arrested them and their customers for installing, selling and replacing mufflers upon various motor vehicles in violation of these sections; that plaintiffs were so arrested on a complaint filed in Fresno Municipal Court on December 18, 1952, charging them with the 'sale or installation of unlawful equipment * * * mufflers'; that they have suffered great detriment and expense in defending said actions, posting bail, etc.; and that the trial of the above mentioned action was continued for trial at a later date. A restraining order was sought restraining the officers from enforcing or attempting to enforce the provisions of these sections.
It is also alleged that plaintiffs, for approximately 13 years, have been engaged in the business of manufacturing and installing mufflers, etc., particularly their 'Advance Steel Pack muffler', and that they have been manufactured, sold and installed on cars throughout the state. It is then claimed that these mufflers do not make any excessive or unusual noise, do not annoy the public, and that it is impossible for plaintiffs to know whether these exhaust pipes will amplify or increase the noise emitted by the motors of the vehicles upon which they are installed above that emitted by the mufflers originally installed thereon, and that accordingly these sections violate the Constitution of the United States and of California in the following particulars, i. e., that these sections are discriminatory and violate plaintiffs' right of equal protection of the laws and deprive them of their property and their liberty without due process of law, and their right to follow a lawful occupation; that these sections are uncertain, indefinite and vague in that no reasonable standard is set up; that they interfere with the rights of plaintiffs to dispose of their property in a lawful manner and to make a lawful contract; that they tend to create a monopoly for the benefit of the manufacturer of mufflers originally installed on vehicles; that they are arbitrary, capricious, unreasonable and confiscatory; that the acts alleged in these sections are made criminal acts of the plaintiffs although such acts are performed by other persons; and that under the provisions of said sections, if plaintiffs installed such mufflers in compliance with said sections they could be held guilty even though the operator of said vehicle otherwise created excessive or unusual noises by the operation of said vehicle, citing such authority as United States Constitution, 14th Amendment; California Constitution, art. III, sec. 1; art. IV, sec. 1; Art. I, secs. 11, 13 and 21; State Board of Dry Cleaners v. Thrift-D-Lux Cleaners, 40 Cal.2d 436, 254 P.2d 29; Pacific Palisades Association v. City of Huntington Beach, 196 Cal. 211, 237 P. 538, 40 A.L.R. 782; Schaezlein v. Cabaniss, 135 Cal. 466, 67 P. 755, 56 L.R.A. 733; Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385, 46 S.Ct. 126, 70 L.Ed. 322; People v. Forbath, 5 Cal.App.2d, Supp., 767, 42 P.2d 108; Franchise Motor Freight Ass'n v. Seavey, 196 Cal. 77, 235 P. 1000; State v. Lantz, 90 W.Va. 738, 111 S.E. 766, 26 A.L.R. 894; Barker Bros., Inc., v. City of Los Angeles, 10 Cal.2d 603, 76 P.2d 97; and People v. International Steel Corp., 102 Cal.App.2d, Supp., 935, 226 P.2d 587.
Section 673, as reasonably construed, fixes a standard of all originally installed mufflers in this, that they must 'comply with all of the requirements of this section'. This section requires that they must be 'effective in reducing noise' and be 'an adequate muffler' so as to 'prevent any excessive or unusual noise', and not be equipped with a cut-out, by-pass, or similar device. It then provides that every motor vehicle operated on the highway shall, at all times, be so equipped and maintained in constant operation. It then provides that no person shall modify the exhaust system (which includes placing a muffler thereon) in a manner which will amplify or increase the noise emitted by such vehicle above that emitted by the muffler originally installed on the vehicle. In fixing the original standard it must be presumed that at the time of the original installation of the muffler there was a compliance with the law in its installation, and that the vehicle was equipped with an adequate muffler so as to prevent any 'excessive or unusual noise'. Section 1963, subd. 33, Code Civ.Proc. Section 684 then makes it unlawful for a person, either for himself or as agent for another, to sell, lease, install or replace any muffler or exhaust that is not in conformity with the provisions of that section. We see no justification for the conclusion that plaintiff might be criminally liable for the operation of a vehicle by another with a defective muffler if plaintiffs installed or replaced a muffler that complied with said section 673.
It was the conclusion of the trial court, expressed in the memorandum opinion, that by the descriptive words 'excessive' or 'unusual' noise, the noise emitting from such muffler may appear to be excessive or unusual to one and may not be excessive or unusual to another; that accordingly the only standard fixed would be the opinion of the law-enforcing officer; and that a more definite and better standard than that fixed in the section, as to noise, should be employed such as the standard of measuring sound or noise in decibels. It concluded that the provisions of section 684, supra, insofar as it attempts to provide enforcement of section 673 of the Vehicle Code, are unconstitutional and unenforceable, and accordingly restrained defendants from enforcing them against plaintiffs.
No request for a reporter's transcript was made by defendants on this appeal. However, plaintiffs thereafter made in this court an application to produce the evidence submitted to the trial judge in the lower court for the purpose of showing the unenforceability and the unconstitutionality of these acts, as applied to plaintiffs. This motion was denied, and accordingly no issue of fact is here presented.
It is defendants' position here that plaintiffs are not entitled to an injunction unless the statute in question is unconstitutional and, accordingly, unenforceable, citing section 526, subd. 4, Code Civ.Proc. The contentions are that these sections are not vague, indefinite or uncertain and that at the time of their enactment they provided for the only reasonable standard upon which they could operate fairly and without discrimination, citing Paraco, Inc. v. Department of Agriculture, 118 Cal.App.2d 348, 257 P.2d 981; Jones v. City of Los Angeles, 211 Cal. 304, 295 P. 14; and Bueneman v. City of Santa Barbara, 8 Cal.2d 405, 65 P.2d 884, 109 A.L.R. 895. Accordingly, if the standard fixed is proper and might reasonably be applied to plaintiffs, the demurrer of defendants to plaintiffs' complaint might well have been sustained without leave to amend and the evidence adduced at the trial would not be material to the issues involved but might become material in the trial of the crime charged, after the prosecution established, beyond a reasonable doubt, the fact that defendants in that action had violated said sections.
It is well settled that a criminal statute which is so indefinite, vague and uncertain that the definition of the crime or standard of conduct cannot be ascertained therefrom, is unconstitutional and void. However, there is a uniformity of opinion among the authorities that a statute will not be held void for uncertainty if any reasonable and practical construction can be given to its language. Nor does the fact that its meaning is difficult to ascertain or susceptible of different interpretations render the statute void. All presumptions and intendments favor the validity of a statute and mere doubt does not afford sufficient reason for a judicial declaration of invalidity. Statutes must...
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