Smith v. Pierce Cnty.
| Citation | 218 F.Supp.3d 1220 |
| Decision Date | 04 November 2016 |
| Docket Number | CASE NO. C16–5667 BHS |
| Parties | Ben SMITH as the Personal Representative for the Estate of Matthew S. Smith ; and Ben Smith and Nona Smith, individually, as the parents of Matthew S. Smith, Plaintiffs, v. PIERCE COUNTY; NaphCare, Inc.; Tae Kim, R.N.; and Nandi Brumidge, N.P., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Washington |
Ashton Keith Dennis, Washington Law Center, PLLC, Tacoma, WA, Edwin S. Budge, Erik J. Heipt, Budge & Heipt, Seattle, WA, for Plaintiffs.
Brent J. Hyer, Sean–Michael V. Davis, Civil Division, Tacoma, WA, Heidi L. Mandt, Bullivant Houser Bailey PC, Portland, OR, for Defendants.
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS
This matter comes before the Court on Defendant Pierce County's (the "County") motion to dismiss (Dkt. 17). The Court has considered the pleadings filed in support of and in opposition to the motion and the remainder of the file and hereby denies the motion for the reasons stated herein.
On July 29, 2016, the Estate of Matthew S. Smith (the "Estate"), Ben Smith ("Mr. Smith") and Nona Smith ("Mrs. Smith") (collectively "Plaintiffs") filed their complaint. Dkt. 1. On August 29, 2016, the County filed a motion to dismiss. Dkt. 17. On September 19, 2016, Plaintiffs responded. Dkt. 18 On September 23, 2016, the County replied. Dkt. 19.
On August 27, 2015, Matthew Smith ("Smith") was arrested and booked into Pierce County Jail. Dkt. 1 at 6. Smith was 47 years old. Id. When Smith was booked into Jail, the County Jail's medical providers knew Smith suffered from Crohn's, a potentially dangerous disease. Id. at 7.
After his arrival, Smith began to experience symptoms of his disease. Id. As the symptoms worsened, Smith made multiple requests for medical treatment. Id. at 7–8. After approximately four weeks of worsening symptoms, Smith was eventually transported to a hospital for emergency care. Id. Smith was eventually discharged and the County was given instructions that he must have a follow-up appointment with a specialist at the University of Washington. Id. at 9. The County was also instructed that if Smith Id.
After Smith was discharged from the hospital, his symptoms continued to worsen. Id. at 9–10. On October 2, 2015, Smith notified the jail staff that he was suffering from severe dehydration and symptoms of dizziness, aches, and cramps. Id. at 9. On October 3, 2015, he complained of severe worsening pain, diarrhea, and vomiting. Id. On October 5, 2015, Smith complained of increasingly worse "nausea, vomiting, cramping, abdominal pain, diarrhea, frequent belching, and vomiting more than once each hour." Id. at 9–10. He reported he had been unable to urinate in 36 hours. Id. at 10. On October 7, 2015, the jail medical staff received lab results indicating that Smith's health was in a state of emergency. Id. at 10. Despite the repeated indication that Smith's symptoms were worsening, he was not returned to the hospital emergency room or taken to any other acute care facility. Id. at 9–11.
On October 9, 2015, a corrections officer responded to an emergency call light and found Smith lying on his cell floor in severe pain, barely able to walk or stand. Id. at 11. Rather than transport Smith to a hospital, defendants ordered correctional staff to bring him to the jail's medical clinic in a wheelchair. Id. Smith died on the floor of the jail's clinic while awaiting medical treatment for over six hours. Id. at 11–12.
Motions to dismiss brought under Rule 12(b)(6) may be based on either the lack of a cognizable legal theory or the absence of sufficient facts alleged under such a theory. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't , 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). Material allegations are taken as admitted and the complaint is construed in the plaintiff's favor. Keniston v. Roberts , 717 F.2d 1295, 1301 (9th Cir. 1983). To survive a motion to dismiss, the complaint does not require detailed factual allegations but must provide the grounds for entitlement to relief and not merely a "formulaic recitation" of the elements of a cause of action. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). A plaintiff must allege "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Id. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955.
"As a general rule, a district court may not consider any material beyond the pleadings in ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion." Lee v. City of Los Angeles , 250 F.3d 668, 688 (9th Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court, however, may consider documents not attached to the complaint "if the documents' authenticity ... is not contested and the plaintiff's complaint necessarily relies on them." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Also, "under Fed. R. Evid. 201, a court may take judicial notice of matters of public record." Id. at 689 (internal quotation marks omitted).
The County appears to argue that Mr. Smith lacks standing to pursue a § 1983 claim on behalf of the Estate. State survival statutes will control the survival of § 1983 claims so long as the statutes are not "inhospitable to survival of § 1983 actions ... [and] ha[ve] no adverse effect on the policies underlying § 1983." Robertson v. Wegmann , 436 U.S. 584, 594, 98 S.Ct. 1991, 56 L.Ed.2d 554 (1978). See also Byrd v. Guess , 137 F.3d 1126, 1131 (9th Cir. 1998)abrogation on other grounds recognized by Moreland v. Las Vegas Metro. Police , 159 F.3d 365, 369–70 (9th Cir. 1998) (). Under Washington's general survival statute, "[a]ll causes of action by a person or persons against another person or persons shall survive to the personal representatives of the former and against the personal representatives of the latter." RCW 4.20.046. Therefore, acting as the personal representative, Mr. Smith has standing to pursue any cognizable § 1983 claim on behalf of the Estate.
The County nonetheless argues that the Estate's claim must fail because Washington's general and special survival statutes require that "parents be dependent for support on a deceased adult child in order to recover." Dkt. 17 at 10 (quoting Philippides v. Bernard , 151 Wash.2d 376, 388, 88 P.3d 939 (2004) ). Other courts in this district have rejected this argument. Ostling v. City of Bainbridge Island , 872 F.Supp.2d 1117, 1124–25 (W.D. Wash. 2012) ; Harms v. Lockheed Martin Corp. , C06–572JLR, 2007 WL 2875024, at *5 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 27, 2007). The County's argument misconstrues the language in RCW 4.20.046 that "the personal representative shall only be entitled to recover damages for pain and suffering, anxiety, emotional distress, or humiliation personal to and suffered by a deceased on behalf of" parents and siblings "who may be dependent upon the deceased person for support." RCW 4.20.046, .020. This language does not deprive a personal representative of standing to bring a claim on behalf of the estate; rather, it limits the availability of non-economic damages for such a claim. Harms , 2007 WL 2875024 at *5.
Moreover, this limitation on non-economic damages does not apply in survival § 1983 claims. In a well-thought decision from this district, Judge Leighton found that the "policies [underlying § 1983] compel the Court to hold that the restriction of non-economic damages in Washington's survival statute undermines the purpose of § 1983 and must therefore be disregarded." Ostling , 872 F.Supp.2d at 1126. The Court adopts Judge Leighton's reasoning in Ostling and finds that Washington's survival statute can not preclude non-economic damages in a § 1983 claim by a decedent's estate.
The County also moves to dismiss Mr. and Mrs. Smith's individual § 1983 claims on the basis that Mr. and Mrs. Smith lack standing. To support its argument, the County cites Byrd for the principle that "survival actions are permitted under § 1983 if authorized by the applicable state law." 137 F.3d at 1131. Under the County's interpretation, this means that surviving parents must possess standing under the state survival and wrongful death statutes in order assert any § 1983 claim associated with the death of a child. However, the language from Byrd upon which the County relies addressed a parent's "standing to assert the violation of [the decedent]'s Fourth Amendment rights." Byrd , 137 F.3d at 1131. This is similarly true of the language upon which the County also relies from Smith v. City of Fontana , 818 F.2d 1411, 1417 (9th Cir. 1987), overruled on other grounds by Hodgers–Durgin v. de la Vina , 199 F.3d 1037 (9th Cir. 1999) ( ) (quoting Alderman v. United States , 394 U.S. 165, 174, 89 S.Ct. 961, 22 L.Ed.2d 176 (1969) ). A complete reading of Bryd indicates that, under § 1983, Fourteenth Amendment claims for parents' individual rights are cognizable and governed by a separate standard than vicarious Fourth Amendment claims that must be brought appropriately by a decedent's estate. See 137 F.3d at 1133–34.
In contrast to the vicarious Fourth Amendment claims addressed by the authority cited above, Mr. and Mrs. Smith allege claims for the deprivation of their own Fourteenth Amendment right to the companionship and society of their...
To continue reading
Request your trial