Smith v. Quality Const. Co.

• Decision Date: 22 June 1993
• Docket Number: Docket No. 142324
• Citation: 503 N.W.2d 753,200 Mich.App. 297
• Parties: Kisha SMITH, Next Friend of Derrick Smith, a Minor, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. QUALITY CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

Page 753

503 N.W.2d 753

200 Mich.App. 297

Kisha SMITH, Next Friend of Derrick Smith, a Minor, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. QUALITY CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee.

Docket No. 142324.

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Submitted March 3, 1993, at Detroit.

Decided June 22, 1993, at 9:10 a.m.

Released for Publication Aug. 24, 1993.

Keller & Avadenka, P.C. by Barry F. Keller and Thomas C. Bromell, Bloomfield Hills, for plaintiff-appellant.

Plunkett & Cooney, P.C. by Christine D. Oldani and Nicholas D. Corden, Detroit, for defendant-appellee.

Before MARK J. CAVANAGH, P.J., and RICHARD ALLEN GRIFFIN and JANSEN, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Plaintiff appeals as of right the trial court's order granting defendant's motion for summary disposition brought under MCR 2.116(C)(7). We affirm.

In 1979, defendant Quality Construction Company was hired to perform repair work on a building owned by Sarah Stewart. A city ordinance required installation of smoke detectors as part of the repairs. Defendant completed the repairs on April 28, 1980, apparently without installing the smoke detectors. On October 12, 1987, plaintiff's minor son was severely injured when the Stewart building caught fire.

Plaintiff filed a complaint alleging that defendant was negligent to failing to install smoke detectors as required by city ordinance. Defendant moved for summary disposition, arguing that the complaint was time-barred under M.C.L. § 600.5839(1); M.S.A. § 27A.5839(1), because more than six years had passed between the date of the repairs and the date of the fire. In response, plaintiff argued that a cause of action accrued to her son during the ten-year period provided by the statute and that, because her son was a minor, the limitation period was tolled under M.C.L. § 600.5851(1); M.S.A. § 27A.5851(1) until he reached the age of majority. The trial court granted defendant's motion. Reluctantly, we find no reason to disturb the decision made by the trial court.

When reviewing a motion for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(7), this Court must accept the plaintiff's well-pleaded allegations as true and construe them in favor of the plaintiff. Beauregard-Bezou v. Pierce, 194 Mich.App. 388, 390-391, 487 N.W.2d 792 (1992). If there are no facts in dispute, the issue whether the claim is statutorily barred is a question of law for the court. Id.

Section 5839(1) of the Revised Judicature Act, M.C.L. § 600.5839(1); M.S.A. § 27A.5839(1), provides in part:

No person may maintain any action to recover damages for ... bodily injury or wrongful death, arising out of the defective or unsafe condition of an improvement to real property ... against any contractor making the improvement, more than 6 years after the time of occupancy of the completed improvement, use, or acceptance of the improvement, or 1 year after the defect is discovered or should have been discovered, provided that the defect constitutes the proximate cause of the injury or damage for which the action is brought and is the result of gross negligence on the part of the contractor.... However, no such action may be maintained more than 10 years after the time of occupancy of the completed improvement, use, or acceptance of the improvement.

According to the statute, ordinary negligence claims against contractors are subject to a six-year period of limitation, while claims of gross negligence are subject to a one-year period following discovery. Michigan Millers Mutual Ins. Co. v. West Detroit Building Co., Inc., 196 Mich.App. 367, 371, 494 N.W.2d 1 (1992). In this case, because plaintiff's claim is one of ordinary negligence, the six-year period of limitation is applicable and prevents her lawsuit from going forward.

In a second argument, plaintiff claims that the period of limitation was tolled because of her son's infancy. Section 5851(1) of the Revised Judicature Act, M.C.L. § 600.5851(1); M.S.A. § 27A.5851(1), provides in pertinent part:

[I]f the person first entitled to make an entry or bring an action is under 18 years of age ... at the time the claim accrues, the person or those claiming under the person shall have 1 year after the disability is removed ... to make the entry or bring the action although the period of limitations has run.

When construing a statute, courts should presume that every word has some meaning and...