Smith v. Roger Williams Law Sch.

Decision Date22 July 2022
Docket Number21-cv-190-PJB-AKJ
PartiesISL and Jimmy Smith v. Roger Williams Law School et al.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Rhode Island

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

ANDREA K. JOHNSTONE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Plaintiff Jimmy Smith, proceeding pro se, has sued his alma mater Roger Williams University Law School (“RWU Law”) for racial discrimination. See Compl. (Doc. No. 1) Order (Doc No. 37). Presently before the court is Mr Smith's motion for leave to amend his Complaint. (Doc No. 70).[1] See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). For the reasons that follow, the undersigned Magistrate Judge recommends that the district court grant Mr. Smith's motions to amend with respect to his claims of racial discrimination asserted in Counts 1, 9 and 10, and otherwise deny the motion.

Background

In its preliminary review of Mr. Smith's original complaint (Doc. No. 1), the court summarized his claim against RWU Law as one asserting racial discrimination in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Nov. 18, 2021 Order (Doc. No. 37), at 4-5. Mr. Smith's proposed amendments seek to add claims against RWU Law and a new defendant, Roger Williams University (“RWU”), which Mr. Smith describes as a “separate entity than [RWU Law].” Pl. Corrected Am. Compl. (Doc. No. 58), at 1.

Stripped of legal conclusions, Mr. Smith's proposed amended complaint contains the following allegations.[2] Mr. Smith, who is an African American, is a 2021 graduate of RWU Law. His allegations are centered around the months preceding his graduation. He claims in this case that RWU Law retaliated against him for filing internal complaints about disciplinary board proceedings, for filing a U.S. Department of Education Office of Civil Rights (“OCR”) administrative complaint, and for filing a lawsuit naming RWU Law and others as defendants, see Smith v. Roger Williams Law Sch., No. 21-cv-133-PJB-AKJ (D.R.I.) (Smith I). Mr. Smith further alleges that after he posted information about a Rhode Island politician's family member who was a former RWU Law student, Mr. Smith was barred from an RWU Law Facebook group. Mr. Smith also alleges that his email has been “monitored,” that he has been followed by RWU Law personnel into a casino, and that he was robbed by the daughter of an unnamed RWU employee. Mr. Smith asserts that defense counsel has filed documents and taken positions in Smith I in retaliation for Mr. Smith's filing of that lawsuit.

Mr. Smith alleges that he is the target of RWU Law disciplinary board proceedings. He claims that the disciplinary proceedings are not fair and do not afford him due process. He alleges that the disciplinary board is comprised of biased professors, including a professor who told him she graded him lower because of his handwriting (which he ascribes to his status as an amputee), and a professor who was the subject of a discrimination complaint that Mr. Smith filed several months before. Mr. Smith also states that the RWU Law disciplinary process does provide him with a lawyer or an opportunity to question the complainant. Mr. Smith further alleges that the “defense advisor” assigned to advise him in the disciplinary proceedings of a named defendant in Smith I - a professor who has had contact with the complainant in the pending disciplinary proceeding. Mr. Smith believes that the appointment of that individual as his advisor was intended to intimidate Mr. Smith.

Mr. Smith also claims that, in addition to the RWU Law disciplinary proceedings, he is the target of RWU Honor Board proceedings. Mr. Smith further alleges that the complainant in the aforementioned disciplinary proceedings against him sits on the Honor Board.” Mr. Smith has alleged that the Honor Board proceedings were initiated by the complaint of a student “cherry-picked” by RWU Law to help RWU Law obtain evidence it can use in defending RWU Law in Smith I.

Legal Standards

Under Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a), [t]he court should freely give leave [to amend a complaint] when justice so requires.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a)(2). A request to amend requires the court “to exercise its informed discretion in constructing a balance of pertinent considerations.” Palmer v Champion Mortg., 465 F.3d 24, 30-31 (1st Cir. 2006); see also Nikitine v. Wilmington Tr. Co., 715 F.3d 388, 390 (1st Cir. 2013) (court must examine totality of circumstances in ruling on motions to amend). Leave to amend may be denied “when the request is characterized by ‘undue delay, bad faith, futility, [or] the absence of due diligence on the movant's part.' Nikitine, 715 F.3d at 390 (quoting Palmer, 465 F.3d at 30). To assess whether the proposed amendment states actionable claims, this court applies the standard for preliminary review set forth in its November 18, 2021, Order (Doc. No. 37), which the court does not repeat here. Fed.R.Civ.P. 20, concerning the permissive joinder of defendants, is implicated by Mr. Smith's attempt to add RWU as a defendant in this action. That rule allows multiple defendants to be joined together in one action if the plaintiff asserts a claim against them jointly or severally, arising from the same transaction or series of transactions, and if a common question of fact or law will arise in the action. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 20(a)(2).

A. Joining RWU

As noted above, Mr. Smith has alleged that RWU and RWU Law are separate entities. His proposed amended complaint and other submissions contain no indication that RWU, as distinct from RWU Law, was involved in any of the transactions or interactions with Mr. Smith that led to this lawsuit, or that there is a claim for joint or several liability within Mr. Smith's claims against RWU Law. Accordingly, the district judge should deny Mr. Smith's motion to amend, to the extent that it seeks to add RWU to this case as a defendant.

B. Plaintiff's Claims 1. Racial Discrimination

Mr. Smith claims that RWU Law discriminated against him on the basis of his race, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (Count 1), Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (Count 9), and the Rhode Island Civil Rights Act (“RICRA”), R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 42-112-1 et seq. (Count 10). Section 1981 provides, in relevant part, that [a]ll persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right ... to make and enforce contracts ... and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings ... as is enjoyed by white citizens ....” 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a). Title VI provides that [n]o person...shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000d. RICRA similarly protects against discrimination based on one's “race, color, religion, sex, disability, age, or country of ancestral origin.” R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-112-1. Much of the factual narrative in Mr. Smith's submissions rehashes claims of racial discrimination that the court has already allowed to proceed under section 1981. See Nov. 18, 2021 Order (Doc. No. 37). As the two additional racial discrimination counts in Mr. Smith's proposed amended complaint apply similar legal standards as his claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, see Doe v. Brown Univ., 505 F.Supp.3d 65, 79 n.10 and 81 (D.R.I. 2020), the motion to amend should be granted as to Mr. Smith's claims for racial discrimination as set forth in Counts 1, 9 and 10.

2. Criminal claims

Counts 12, 13 and 16 of Mr. Smith's proposed amended complaint assert violations of federal criminal law under Title 18 of the United States Code, which are not actionable in this civil action. See Cok v. Cosentino, 876 F.2d 1, 2 (1st Cir. 1989) (per curiam) (stating that only the United States as prosecutor can bring a complaint under 18 U.S.C. §§ 241-242); Stone v. Warfield, 184 F.R.D. 553, 555 (D. Md. 1999) (stating that individual citizens have no private right of action to institute federal criminal prosecutions); cf. Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973) (a private citizen lacks a judicially cognizable interest in the prosecution or nonprosecution of another); 28 U.S.C. § 516 (conduct of litigation in which the United States is a party is reserved to officers of the Department of Justice, under the direction of the Attorney General). Accordingly, the district judge should deny plaintiff's motion to amend to the extent it alleges violation of criminal laws as set forth in Counts 12, 13, and 16. 3. Massachusetts law

In Count 11, Mr. Smith seeks to add a claim based on alleged violations of the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 12, §11H. There are no allegations in any of Mr. Smith's submissions, however, to suggest that Massachusetts law would apply to this case. RWU Law is a Rhode Island entity and the acts Mr. Smith complains of took place in Rhode Island in connection with his attendance at RWU Law. Plaintiff's motion to amend should therefore be denied with respect to the claims asserted in Count 11.

4. Federal Constitutional claims

In Count 3, Mr. Smith alleges violations of his civil rights, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. It is well-settled, however, that such a claim cannot be asserted against private entities, such as RWU Law. See Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 53 (1992) (citing Polk Cty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312 (1981)).

A private party is deemed to be a state actor for purposes of § 1983 only under limited circumstances, which are not present here. See generally Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004-05 (1982) (describing circumstances under which a private actor can be deemed to be a state actor for purposes of § 1983).

Accordingly the district judge should deny plaintiff's motion to amend as to the claims asserted in Count 3. 5. Rhode...

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