Smith v. Rubley

• Decision Date: 25 October 2022
• Docket Number: 1:22-cv-925
• Parties: IKEIE SMITH, Plaintiff, v. RAY RUBLEY et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Michigan

IKEIE SMITH, Plaintiff, v. RAY RUBLEY et al., Defendants.

No. 1:22-cv-925

United States District Court, W.D. Michigan, Southern Division

October 25, 2022

OPINION

Paul L. Maloney United States District Judge

This is a civil rights action brought by a state prisoner under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff has been granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis. (ECF No. 5.) Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat 1321 (1996) (PLRA), the Court is required to dismiss any prisoner action brought under federal law if the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A; 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court must read Plaintiff's pro se complaint indulgently see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), and accept Plaintiff's allegations as true, unless they are clearly irrational or wholly incredible. Denton v Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992). Applying these standards, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff's complaint for failure to state a claim against Defendants Macauley Unknown Party, and Moyer. The Court will also dismiss, for failure to state a claim, the following claims against remaining Defendants Rubley and Welch: (1) Plaintiff's official capacity claims; (2) Plaintiff's First Amendment retaliation claims; (3) Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment claims alleging verbal harassment and abuse; and (4) Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment failure to protect claims premised upon the second assault by inmate Hoskins. The following claims remain in the case: (1) Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment claims against Defendants Rubley and Welch for urging the first assault by inmate Hoskins; and (2) Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment excessive force and sexual assault claims against Defendant Rubley. The Court will also deny Plaintiff's motion to appoint counsel. (ECF No. 3.)

Discussion

I. Motion to Appoint Counsel

Plaintiff has filed a motion to appoint counsel, arguing that the issues involved “are complex and will require significant research and investigation.” (ECF No. 3, PageID.14.) Plaintiff also indicates that he has limited access to the law library, and that counsel would enable him to better “present evidence and cross-examine witness[es].” (Id.) Indigent parties in civil cases have no constitutional right to a court-appointed attorney. Abdur-Rahman v. Mich. Dep't of Corr., 65 F.3d 489, 492 (6th Cir. 1995); Lavado v. Keohane, 992 F.2d 601, 604-05 (6th Cir. 1993). The Court may, however, request an attorney to serve as counsel, in the Court's discretion. AbdurRahman, 65 F.3d at 492; Lavado, 992 F.2d at 604-05; see Mallard v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 490 U.S. 296 (1989).

Appointment of counsel is a privilege that is justified only in exceptional circumstances. In determining whether to exercise its discretion, the Court should consider the complexity of the issues, the procedural posture of the case, and Plaintiff's apparent ability to prosecute the action without the help of counsel. See Lavado, 992 F.2d at 606. The Court has carefully considered these factors and determines that, at this stage of the case, the assistance of counsel does not appear necessary to the proper presentation of Plaintiff's position. The Court, therefore, will deny Plaintiff's motion to appoint counsel.

II. Factual Allegations

Plaintiff is presently incarcerated with the Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC) at the Baraga Correctional Facility (AMF) in Baraga, Baraga County, Michigan. The events about which he complains, however, occurred at the Bellamy Creek Correctional Facility (IBC) in Ionia, Ionia County, Michigan. Plaintiff sues Warden Matthew Macauley, Assistant Deputy Warden Unknown Party, Inspector Unknown Moyer, and Correctional Officers Ray Rubley and Unknown Welch. Plaintiff indicates that he is suing Defendants in both their official and personal capacities. (ECF No. 1, PageID.2.)

In Plaintiff's listing of the Defendants, he identifies the unknown party as “John Doe” an assistant deputy warden. (Id.) Plaintiff uses the same appellation for a corrections officer who allegedly opened Plaintiff's cell door from the bubble on March 26, 2020 (id., PageID.3), and a sergeant who listened to Plaintiff's report of the assault in Plaintiff's cell but simply sent Plaintiff back to his cell (id.). The Court construes Plaintiff's reference to “John Doe” in the listing of Defendants as an assistant deputy warden, not the corrections officer or the sergeant. Nonetheless, the Court will consider the sufficiency of Plaintiff's allegations against all three potential “John Does.”

Plaintiff alleges that for about two weeks prior to March 26, 2020, he was subjected to harassment and threats by Defendants Welch and Rubley. (Id., PageID.3.) Plaintiff sent kites to Defendants Moyer and Macauley, as well as Lloyd Blackman (not a party), to no avail. (Id.) In the kites, Plaintiff explained that he was “being verbally abused, harassed, and threatened by staff.” (Id.) He asked to move out of the unit away from those staff members. (Id.)

On March 26, 2020, Corrections Officer John Doe opened Plaintiff's cell door, which allowed inmate Hoskins to enter the cell. (Id.) Plaintiff asserts that inmate Hoskins was not his assigned cell mate. (Id.) Inmate Hoskins physically and sexually assaulted Plaintiff, telling him that he was sent to do so by Defendants Welch and Rubley. (Id.) After the assault, Defendant Welch came to Plaintiff's cell and opened the door. (Id.) He said, “[R]eady to lock up rapist?” (Id.) Plaintiff “hit the emergency [button] in the cell several times and was ignored.” (Id.) He tried to speak to a Sergeant John Doe about what had happened but was told to go back to his cell. (Id.)

Later, Plaintiff packed up his property to go to segregation for protection. (Id.) His cell door was opened around 6:15 p.m. (Id.) Plaintiff left his cell and saw inmate Hoskins coming toward him with an object in his hand. (Id.) Inmate Hoskins swung at Plaintiff, and Plaintiff ‘went in survival mode and defended” himself. (Id.) Several officers responded and ordered Plaintiff to get on the ground; Plaintiff did so. (Id., PageID.4.) While Plaintiff was face down and handcuffed on the ground, Defendant Rubley lifted Plaintiff's head and punched him in the face. (Id.) He also put his finger in Plaintiff's anus. (Id.) Plaintiff reported the incident to medical staff, Defendant Moyer, and others. (Id.) Inmate Hoskins received a misconduct ticket for unauthorized occupation of a cell. (Id.) Plaintiff avers that Defendants Macauley and Moyer “failed to investigate what happen[ed] while [inmate Hoskins] was in [Plaintiff's] cell.” (Id.)

Based on the foregoing, the Court liberally construes Plaintiff's complaint to assert First and Eighth Amendment violations. Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages, and asks for the officers' employment to be terminated. (Id., PageID.5.)

III. Failure to State a Claim

A complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it fails “to give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). While a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff's allegations must include more than labels and conclusions. Id.; Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”). The court must determine whether the complaint contains “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Although the plausibility standard is not equivalent to a “‘probability requirement,' . . . it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged-but it has not ‘show[n]'-that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Id. at 679 (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2)); see also Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding that the Twombly/Iqbal plausibility standard applies to dismissals of prisoner cases on initial review under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b)(1) and 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)).

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the federal Constitution or laws and must show that the deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Street v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 102 F.3d 810, 814 (6th Cir. 1996). Because § 1983 is a method for vindicating federal rights, not a source of substantive rights itself, the first step in an action under § 1983 is to identify the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994).

A. Official Capacity Claims

Plaintiff names Defendants in both their official and personal capacities. (ECF No. 1, PageID.2.) Although an action against a defendant in his or her individual capacity intends to impose liability on the specified individual, an action against the same defendant in his or her official capacity intends to impose liability only on the entity that they represent. See Alkire v. Irving, 330 F.3d 802, 810 (6th Cir. 2003) (citing Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165 (1985)).

A suit against an individual in his...