Smith v. S.C. Election Comm'n

Decision Date18 June 2012
Docket NumberC.A. No. 3:12–CV–1543–CHH–CMC–JMC.
Citation874 F.Supp.2d 483
CourtU.S. District Court — District of South Carolina
PartiesAnn SMITH, Tommie Reece, John Pettigrew, Bob Shirley, Robert Tinsley, and others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. The State of SOUTH CAROLINA ELECTION COMMISSION and the State of South Carolina, Defendants.

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Candy Kern-Fuller, Upstate Law Group, Easley, SC, for Plaintiffs.

CLYDE H. HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge, CAMERON McGOWAN CURRIE, District Judge, J. MICHELLE CHILDS, District Judge.

OPINION AND ORDER

This opinion sets forth the reasoning behind the court's denial of Plaintiffs' motion for a temporary restraining order. See Dkt. No. 4 (motion); Dkt. No. 9 (docket text order denying motion). Through that motion, which was filed with the complaint on June 11, 2012, Plaintiffs sought either to have their names restored to the ballot for the June 12, 2012 primary election or to postpone the election until this court could resolve the issues raised in this action. Dkt. Nos. 1, 4. A three-judge court was empaneled, heard oral argument telephonically,and denied the motion on the afternoon of June 11, 2012. Dkt. Nos. 7–9.

BACKGROUND

The five named Plaintiffs 1 are all individuals who sought to be included on the ballot for the June 12, 2012 primary election but were allegedly denied that opportunity due to application of the following decisions of the South Carolina Supreme Court (“State Court): Anderson v. South Carolina Election Commission, 397 S.C. 551, 725 S.E.2d 704 (2012) (“ Anderson I ) rehearing denied Order No. 2012–05–03–05, 2012 S.C. LEXIS 99 (S.C. May 3, 2012) (“ Anderson Order”) (collectively Anderson ); and Florence County Democratic Party v. Florence County Republican Party, 398 S.C. 124, 727 S.E.2d 418 (2012) (Florence County). These decisions addressed application of three distinct provisions of South Carolina law: S.C.Code Ann. § 8–13–1356 (Supp.2011) (titled “Filing of statement of economic interests by candidates for public office.”); S.C.Code Ann. § 8–13–365 (Supp.2011) (titled “Electronic filing system for disclosures and reports; public accessibility.”); and S.C.Code Ann. § 7–11–15 (Supp.2011) (titled “Qualifications to run as a candidate in general elections.”). As a result of these three decisions, a large number of primary candidates were decertified because they had not filed their Statement of Economic Interest (“SEI”) with the relevant party officials at the same time they filed their Declaration of Candidacy (referred to hereinafter as “SIC”).2 Given the genesis of Plaintiffs' claims, the court begins with a summary of the State Court decisions.3

Anderson. Anderson was filed by two voters who challenged inclusion of certain candidates on the June 12, 2012 primary ballot. These voters argued that the challenged candidates were not qualified because they failed to comply with an express requirement of S.C.Code Ann. § 8–13–1356(B) that [a] candidate must file a statement of economic interests ... at the same time and with the same official with whom the candidate files a declaration of candidacy or petition for nomination.” The candidates in question had failed to file their SEIs with the same official and at the same time they filed their SICs.4

In its decision on the merits ( Anderson I ), the State Court concluded that § 8–13–1356 required precisely what it said: the SEI must be filed at the same time and with the same official as the SIC. The State Court further concluded that the separate provisions of S.C.Code Ann. § 8–13–365, which require electronic filing of various disclosure documents (including SEIs) with the Ethics Commission, did not conflict with or override the plain language of § 8–13–1356.5 As the State Court explained:

The Democratic Party additionally directs our attention to S.C.Code Ann. § 8–13–365 (Supp.2011), requiring that the SEI be filed electronically, which is done on the State Ethics Commission's website. However, this statute is not part of the process that qualifies an individual for inclusion on the ballot. Similarly, while S.C.Code Ann. § 8–13–1170(B) (Supp.2011) provides that extensions of time for electronic filing of an SEI with the State Ethics Commission may be granted, that also does not concern ballot requirements. Accordingly, we reject the argument by the Democratic Party that the requirement of § 8–13–1356(B) may be alternatively satisfied by filing an SEI electronically with the State Ethics Commission. Filing an SEI with the State Ethics Commission cannot excuse noncompliance with § 8–13–1356(B).

Anderson I, 725 S.E.2d at 707.

The State Court also rejected an argument that S.C.Code Ann. § 7–11–15 overrode the provisions of § 8–13–1356, explaining as follows:

We reject the argument of the South Carolina Republican Party that S.C.Code Ann. § 7–11–15(3) (Supp.2011), which provides that an individual's name must appear on the ballot if the individual produces a signed and dated copy of a timely filed SIC, is irreconcilably in conflict with § 8–13–1356. Instead, we hold, as recognized by the remaining parties in this action, that these two statutes may be harmonized. Section 7–11–15(3) sets forth the requirements for an individual's name to appear on the ballot “except as otherwise provided by law.” Section 8–13–1356(E) expressly references Chapter 11 of Title 7 and prohibits a political party from accepting an SIC for filing if it is not accompanied by an SEI. Therefore, an individual who fails to provide an SEI to the political party when filing an SIC would not have a timely filed SIC. We decline to ignore the “except as otherwise provided by law” language of § 741–15(3) and the clear mandate the General Assembly imposed in § 8–13–1356(E) when the statutes are easily reconciled.

Anderson I, 725 S.E.2d at 707. On application for rehearing or clarification, the State Court held that delivering a copy of a previously electronically-filed SEI with the SIC satisfied the “filing” requirement of § 8–13–1356, but that delivery of a receipt, electronically mailing a copy, or any other alternative or later delivery of the SEI did not. See Anderson Order (S.C. May 3, 2012).

In issuing the Anderson Order, the State Court “direct[ed] the parties to file with the South Carolina Election Commission or the appropriate county election commission by noon on May 4, 2012, a list of candidates who complied with § 8–13–1356 as the statute is written and as has been interpreted by this Court.” Anderson Order at 2; see also Anderson I, 725 S.E.2d at 708 (We direct the appropriate official of the political parties to file with the State Election Commission or the appropriate county election commission, by noon on May 4, 2012, a list of only those non-exempt candidates who simultaneously filed an SEI and an SIC as required by § 8–13–1356(B).”). A large number of candidates were disqualified after a review of their filings in light of Anderson I and the Anderson Order.

Florence County.Florence County was filed by the Florence County Democratic Party and others challenging “alleged improper certification of certain candidates by the Florence County Republican Party.” Op. No. 27128 at 2. Plaintiffs argued and the State Court found that “these candidates were improperly certified because they failed to comply with the requirements for filing [an SEI] contained in S.C.Code Ann. § 8–13–1356 (Supp.2011), as interpreted by [the State Court] in Anderson [.] Id. The State Court rejected the County Republican Party's argument that the candidates in question were exempt from the filing requirement under § 8–13–1356(A), summarizing its prior decision in Anderson and the County Republican Party's position as follows:

In Anderson, this Court held § 8–13–1356 requires non-exempt candidates to file an SEI along with a Statement of Intention of Candidacy (SIC). In response to a request for rehearing and clarification, the Court clarified that filing a paper copy of an SEI simultaneously with the filing of an SIC is the only method by which a non-exempt individual can comply with § 8–13–1356.

The County Republicans admit that they certified individuals as candidates who did not comply with the filing requirements of § 8–13–1356(B), as construed by this Court in Anderson. However, they contend that, because the term “candidate” is included in the definition of “public official,” the candidates who filed their SEIs online prior to filing an SIC with the County Republicans had SEIs on file and were public officials who were exempt under § 8–13–1356(A) from filing paper copies of their SEIs with the political parties as required by § 8–13–1356(B). They argue the reasoning behind the definition of candidate in § 8–13–1300(4), which includes a person exploring whether or not to seek election, is to ban an individual from raising funds during an exploratory period without any of the statutory caps on campaign contributions or disclosure requirements. They contend the candidates they claim are exempt under § 8–13–1356(A) were public officials when they filed their SICs because they were exploring whether to seek office, and they had current SEIs on file at the time they filed their SICs.

According to the County Republicans, since Anderson only requires paper copies of an SEI to be filed by “non-exempt” individuals, and the individuals who failed to file SEIs along with their SICs were “exempt,” Anderson does not apply to them.

Florence County, 727 S.E.2d at 419–20.

Despite noting that other statutory provisions defined “public official” broadly to include “candidates for [public] office,” slip. op. at 2 (quoting S.C.Code Ann. § 8–13–1300(4), (28)), the State Court rejected the County Republicans' argument because it would have rendered § 8–13–1356 meaningless. As the State Court explained:

To construe the statutes in the manner suggested by the County Republicans would render § 8–13–1356 meaningless. The section sets forth specific...

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