Smith v. S.C. Dep't Of Motor Vehicles
Decision Date | 22 September 2022 |
Docket Number | 22-ALJ-21-0120-AP |
Parties | Lacey M. Smith, Appellant, v. South Carolina Department of Motor Vehicles and South Carolina Department of Public Safety, Respondents. |
Court | Court of Appeals of South Carolina |
This matter is before the Administrative Law Court (ALC or Court) pursuant to a Notice of Appeal filed by counsel for Lacey M Smith (Appellant). Appellant seeks review of a decision by a hearing officer with the Office of Motor Vehicle Hearings (OMVH), which found in favor of the South Carolina Department of Motor Vehicles (Department). The hearing officer determined that probable cause existed to arrest Appellant for driving under the influence (DUI). Appellant argues that the hearing officer erroneously found she was lawfully arrested for DUI, making the suspension of her driving privileges improper. The Court has jurisdiction to review this matter pursuant to South Carolina Code Section 1-23-660(D) (Supp. 2021).
On August 12, 2021, Appellant was stopped by Anderson County Sheriffs Office for erratic driving. The deputy that made the stop requested the assistance of the South Carolina Highway Patrol (SCHP) because he believed the driver was impaired. Trooper Phillip Ravan (Ravan) of SCHP was dispatched to the scene. Ravan approached Appellant and asked her what had happened, to which Appellant responded that "the deputy told her he pulled her over for driving all over the roadway." Raven noticed a strong odor of alcoholic beverage emanating from Appellant's person. Appellant told Ravan she had consumed alcohol earlier in the evening. Ravan requested Appellant submit to standardized field sobriety tests, to which Appellant refused. Ravan determined Appellant was materially and appreciably impaired based on his observations of Appellant's physical state, repeating herself, trouble standing, the odor of alcohol coming from her person, and the observance of empty alcohol bottles in her vehicle and purse. Ravan arrested Appellant for DUI at 10:23 p.m Ravan transported Appellant to the Anderson County Detention Center where he read Appellant her implied consent rights and requested a breath sample, which Appellant refused. Ravan found Appellant in violation of S.C. Code Ann. § 56-5-2950 (2021) and issued Appellant a Notice of Suspension form pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. § 56-5-2951 (2021). Appellant timely requested an administrative hearing, which was held on October 27, 2021, after notice to the parties. After reviewing the record and considering all the evidence the OMVH hearing officer issued an order affirming the suspension of Appellant's driver's license or driving privileges. This appeal followed.
Whether the hearing officer erred in upholding Appellant's suspension for violation of the motor vehicle implied consent law by finding that Appellant was lawfully arrested for DUI.
The ALC hears appeals from the OMVH under the Administrative Procedures Act (APA).[1] See S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-660(D) and § 1-23-600(E) (Supp. 2021). Consequently, the Court's review is limited to the record. S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-380(4) (Supp. 2021). The standard used by appellate bodies to review agency decisions is provided by S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-380(5) (Supp. 2021). See § 1-23-600(D) ( ). That section states:
S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-380(5).
A decision is supported by "substantial evidence" when the record as a whole allows reasonable minds to reach the same conclusion as the agency. Friends of the Earth v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of S.C., 387 S.C. 360, 366, 692 S.E.2d 910, 913 (2010). The fact that the record, when considered as a whole, presents the possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does not prevent the agency's findings from being supported by substantial evidence. Waters v. S.C. Land Res. Conservation Comm'n, 321 S.C. 219, 226, 467 S.E.2d 913, 917 (1996). In applying the substantial evidence rule, "a reviewing court will not overturn a finding of fact by an administrative agency 'unless there is no reasonable probability that the facts could be as related by a witness upon whose testimony the finding was based.'" Sea Pines Ass'n for Prot. of Wildlife, Inc. v. S.C. Dep't of Natural Res., 345 S.C. 594, 603-04, 550 S.E.2d 287, 292 (2001) (quoting Lark v. Bi-Lo, Inc., 276 S.C. 130, 136, 276 S.E.2d 304, 307 (1981)).
Appellant argues she was not lawfully arrested, making the suspension of her driving privileges based upon her refusal to submit to a breath test improper under the implied consent statute. Specifically, Appellant argues Raven did not have probable cause to arrest her. The Court disagrees.
A person who drives a motor vehicle in this State is considered to have given consent to chemical tests of the person's breath, blood, or urine for the purpose of determining the presence of alcohol, drugs, or the combination of alcohol and drugs, if arrested for an offense arising out of acts alleged to have been committed while the person was driving a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, drugs, or a combination of alcohol and drugs.
S.C. Code Ann. § 56-5-2950(A) (2018). "It is unlawful for a person to drive a motor vehicle within this State while under the influence of alcohol to the extent that the person's faculties to drive a motor vehicle are materially and appreciably impaired . . . ." S.C. Code Ann. § 56-5-2930(A) (2018). "The fundamental question in determining whether an arrest was lawful is whether there was 'probable cause' to make the arrest." Wortman v. City of Spartanburg, 310 S.C. 1, 4, 425 S.E.2d 18, 20 (1992). "Probable cause is defined as a good faith belief that a person is guilty of a crime when this belief rests upon such grounds as would induce an ordinarily prudent and cautious person, under the circumstances, to believe likewise." Id. "Probable cause for a warrantless arrest exists when the circumstances within the arresting officer's knowledge are sufficient to lead a reasonable person to believe that a crime had been committed by the person being arrested." State v. Baccus, 367 S.C. 41, 49, 625 S.E.2d 216, 220 (2006). "Whether probable cause exists depends upon the totality of the circumstances surrounding the...
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