Smith v. Seaport Marine, Inc., Civil Action No. 12–0501–WS–B.

• Citation: 981 F.Supp.2d 1188
• Decision Date: 04 November 2013
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 12–0501–WS–B.
• Parties: Wilbur SMITH, Plaintiff, v. SEAPORT MARINE, INC., et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Alabama

981 F.Supp.2d 1188

Wilbur SMITH, Plaintiff,

v.SEAPORT MARINE, INC., et al., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 12–0501–WS–B.

United States District Court,

S.D. Alabama,

Southern Division.

Nov. 4, 2013.

Dennis Michael O'Bryan, O'Bryan Baun Cohen, Kirk E. Karamanian, O'Bryan Baun Karamanian, Birmingham, MI, for Plaintiff.

Alex F. Lankford, III, Douglas W. Fink, Hand Arendall, L.L.C., Mobile, AL, Jannea S. Rogers, Nicholas F. Morisani, Neal C. Townsend, Adams & Reese, LLP, Mobile, AL, for Defendants.

ORDER

WILLIAM H. STEELE, Chief Judge.

This matter comes before the Court on a trio of Rule 56 motions styled Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment (doc. 46), Seaport Marine Inc.'s Motion for Summary Judgment (doc. 48), and Odyssea Marine Inc.'s Motion for Summary Judgment (doc. 68). These cross-motions, all of which turn on the same narrow question, have been extensively briefed and are now ripe for disposition.

I. Nature of the Case.

Plaintiff, Wilbur Smith, initiated this putative class action against defendants, Seaport Marine, Inc. and Odyssea Marine, Inc., predicating subject matter jurisdiction on the general maritime law pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1333(1). The case arises from Smith's contractual relationship with Seaport Marine, pursuant to which the latter provided him job placement services in exchange for Smith agreeing to remit a recruitment fee to Seaport Marine in a series of installment payments via an assignment of wages. Seaport Marine successfully found work for Smith with Odyssea Marine, which then honored Smith's assignment of wages. Through that assignment, Seaport Marine received the entire agreed-upon fee of $3,640, and Smith received the balance of his earned wages for each subject paycheck. Smith now brings what he terms a “Seaman's Claim for Wages” under the general maritime law against Seaport Marine and Odyssea Marine. Plaintiff contends that the wage assignment was “unauthorized and unlawful,” and demands “the balance of [his] wages allotted and forwarded to and retained by Seaport Marine.” (Doc. 1, ¶ 18.) ¹

All three parties now move for summary judgment as to the Seaman's Claim for Wages. Although the litigants have collectively devoted more than 120 pages of briefing to the dueling Rule 56 motions, the issue presented is actually quite narrow, to-wit: On a set of undisputed material facts, does general maritime law entitle Smith to recover agreed placement fees paid out by his employer pursuant to a written wage assignment that contains the word “irrevocable”?

II. Relevant Facts.²

Seaport Marine is a Mobile, Alabama-based company that provides employment placement services for seamen. (Bender Aff. (doc. 49–1), at 1.) Being a for-profit business, Seaport Marine naturally does not provide these services gratis, but charges its clients a placement fee. ( Id. at 2, 4.) In late 2010, Wilbur Smith sought out Seaport Marine's help in securing a job. ( Id. at 2.) With Seaport Marine's assistance, Smith was placed at Odyssea Marine in June 2011. ( Id.) Smith was satisfied with the job assignment that Seaport Marine procured for him. (Smith Dep. (doc. 66, Exh. A), at 30.)

In exchange for these placement services, Smith executed a series of three agreements in Seaport Marine's favor in October 2010. First, Smith signed a one-page form “Employment Placement Contract” (the “Placement Contract”), in which he agreed that if he accepted a job offer referred by Seaport Marine, he would pay Seaport Marine a fee totaling “fourteen days pay based on your starting daily gross rate at time of acceptance.” (Smith Decl. (doc. 47–1), Exh. 1.) The Placement Contract specified that “[p]ayments will be made in installments until the fee is paid in its entirety,” with payments spread across six equal installments of wages paid on a biweekly basis. ( Id.) In this agreement, Smith expressly “acknowledge[d] that payroll checks from employer shall be sent to SEAPORT MARINE, INC. until all advancements and fee are paid in full.” ( Id. (emphasis omitted).) Second, Smith executed a one-page “Special Power of Attorney” (the “POA”) in which he authorized Seaport Marine “[t]o endorse and deposit into the account of SEAPORT MARINE, INC. at the Wachovia Bank[,] a banking institution, the proceeds of my check from my employer.” (Smith Decl., Exh. 2.) Third, Smith signed a one-page “Paycheck Mailing Agreement” (the “PMA”) authorizing his employer to mail his payroll checks directly to Seaport Marine until the total agreed fee had been collected. (Smith Decl., Exh. 3.) Of particular note for this litigation, the PMA specified, “This agreement is irrevocable until installment payments totaling $________ have been paid to said employment service” ( id. (emphasis added)), after which time the employer was to mail payroll checks directly to Smith's home address in Gretna, Louisiana. Smith read these documents before submitting them to Seaport Marine. (Smith Dep., at 29.) ³

Odyssea Marine is a marine transportation and vessel operating company in the offshore oil and gas industry. (Fontenot Aff. (doc. 67, Exh. A), ¶ 2.) Smith was employed by Odyssea Marine as a Qualified Member of the Engine Department from June 20, 2011 through March 1, 2012. ( Id., ¶ 3.) Odyssea Marine neither drafted nor presented to Smith the Placement Contract, POA, or PMA that he executed in Seaport Marine's favor. ( Id., ¶ 5.) Odyssea Marine had no direct involvement in Smith's execution of those documents or his contractual relationship with Seaport Marine. ( Id.) Odyssea Marine did not provide legal advice to Smith regarding the agreements he executed with Seaport Marine, nor did it endeavor to interfere with those agreements. (O'Bryan Decl. (doc. 47–7), at Exh. 1.) Instead, Odyssea Marine accommodated the stated preferences of its employee (Smith) with respect to assignment of his wages to the placement company that had found him a job.

For a time, Odyssea Marine sent Smith's paychecks to Seaport Marine. (Smith Dep., at 29.) This practice continued until Smith had paid Seaport Marine the agreed fee of two weeks' pay, after which Odyssea Marine no longer forwarded Smith's checks to Seaport Marine. ( Id.) Through this process, Odyssea Marine simply followed the clear instructions in the PMA that Smith had executed. (Fontenot Aff., ¶¶ 6–7.) At no time did Smith voice any complaints to Seaport Marine about the agreed-upon manner in which it collected the agreed-upon fee. (Smith Dep., at 29–30.) Nor did he ever object to Odyssea Marine forwarding his paycheck to Seaport Marine. (Fontenot Aff., ¶ 6.) At no time did Smith request or demand that Odyssea Marine stop sending his paychecks to Seaport Marine, or that Seaport Marine stop receiving his checks. (Smith Dep., at 30–31.) Odyssea Marine did not retain any funds owed to Smith, but paid out all compensation he earned in accordance with his instructions. (Fontenot Aff., ¶ 7.) ⁴

Record materials confirm that the mechanics of Seaport Marine's recoupment of its placement fee were as follows: For six consecutive biweekly pay periods ranging from July 2011 through September 2011, Odyssea Marine sent Smith's entire check to Seaport Marine. That defendant deposited Smith's check in its bank account, then sent Smith a separate check in the amount of the difference between his net pay from Odyssea Marine and the installment payment owed to Seaport Marine. (Smith Decl., Exhs. 4 & 5.) For example, on August 10, 2013, Odyssea Marine sent Smith's paycheck for $2,430.10 to Seaport Marine. The next day, Seaport Marine issued a check to Smith in the amount of $1,823.44, after deducting the remaining $606.66 as an installment payment for employment placement services. ( Id.)

Smith now asserts a general maritime claim for seaman's wages against both Seaport Marine and Odyssea Marine. He does not attack the sufficiency, quality or value of Seaport Marine's placement services. He does not suggest that the charged placement fee was unearned by Seaport Marine, was never voluntarily agreed to by him, was somehow different than the parties' agreement, or was excessive, unreasonable, unfair or unconscionable. He does not argue that Odyssea Marine underpaid him or deviated from the payment instructions in the PMA that he signed. Rather, the legal theory undergirding Smith's seaman's claim for wages is that the PMA was unlawful and illegal pursuant to 46 U.S.C. § 11109(b), and that such invalidity, without more, entitles Smith to recover “the balance of [his] wages allotted and forwarded to and retained by Seaport Marine as unauthorized and unlawful allotments.” (Doc. 1, ¶ 18.) Simply put, Smith demands that defendants repay him the $3,640 placement fee because he contends that the assignment of wages he signed for Seaport Marine's benefit, the manner in which Seaport Marine collected that fee, and Odyssea Marine's unquestioning acquiescence in that agreed-upon methodology were improper and illegal. Even though the placement fee was rightfully earned and payable to Seaport Marine for the services it provided him, plaintiff's contention is that Seaport Marine forfeited it by utilizing an unlawful method of collection.⁵

III. Summary Judgment Standard.

Summary judgment should be granted only “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Rule 56(a), Fed.R.Civ.P. The party seeking summary judgment bears “the initial burden to show the district court, by reference to materials on file, that there are no genuine issues of material fact that should be decided at trial.” Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 929 F.2d 604, 608 (11th Cir.1991). Once the moving party has satisfied its responsibility, the burden shifts to the non-movant to show the existence of a genuine issue of material fact. Id. “If the nonmoving party fails to make ‘a sufficient showing on an essential element of her case with respect to which she has the burden of proof,’ the moving par...