Smith v. Sec'y, Dep't of Corrs.
| Decision Date | 21 March 2022 |
| Docket Number | 8:18-cv-2597-CEH-AAS |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida |
| Parties | TROY SMITH Petitioner, v. SECRETARY, Department of Corrections, Respondent. |
This cause comes before the Court on Troy Smith's petition for the writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (Doc 1) Smith challenges his state convictions for capital sexual battery and lewd or lascivious molestation. The Respondent concedes the petition's timeliness. Upon consideration of the petition (Doc. 1), the response (Doc. 7), and the reply (Doc. 11), and in accordance with the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts the petition will be DENIED.
Facts[1] The minor victim lived with her mother, her siblings, and Smith. On multiple occasions when the victim was between seven and nine years old, Smith touched the victim with his hands, penis, and mouth and both orally and anally penetrated the victim with his penis. Smith told the victim to not tell her mother about the abuse. The victim kept a journal that was discovered by a teacher at school in which the victim alleged that her “dad raped her.” The teacher called the police who went to the victim's home to speak to her about the allegations. The victim did not disclose to the police what Smith had done to her because she did not want her mother to know. The victim subsequently wrote a note to her mother and told her what happened. When the mother confronted Smith with the note, Smith admitted to sexually abusing the victim.
Detective Scott Gore investigated the victim's allegations. Smith went to the police station and admitted in a recorded interview that he inappropriately touched the victim and that there was “anal penetration” and “some oral activity.” Smith also wrote a note at the police station in which he admitted to anal penetration and oral sex with the victim. Smith was arrested and charged in a second amended Information with capital sexual battery and lewd or lascivious molestation. A jury convicted Smith of both crimes and he was sentenced to concurrent terms of life imprisonment. The state appellate court affirmed both Smith's convictions and sentences and the denial of his state Rule 3.850 motion for post-conviction relief. (Respondent's Exhibits 9 and 13)
The Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) governs this proceeding. Wilcox v. Florida Dep't of Corr., 158 F.3d 1209, 1210 (11th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 840 (2000). Section 2254(d), which creates a highly deferential standard for federal court review of a state court adjudication, states in pertinent part:
In Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-13 (2000), the Supreme Court interpreted this deferential standard:
In sum, § 2254(d)(1) places a new constraint on the power of a federal habeas court to grant a state prisoner's application for a writ of habeas corpus with respect to claims adjudicated on the merits in state court. Under § 2254(d)(1), the writ may issue only if one of the following two conditions is satisfied - -the state-court adjudication resulted in a decision that (1) “was contrary to . . . clearly established Federal Law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States” or (2) “involved an unreasonable application of . . . clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.” Under the “contrary to” clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by this Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than this Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. Under the “unreasonable application” clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from this Court's decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case.
“The focus . . . is on whether the state court's application of clearly established federal law is objectively unreasonable, . . . an unreasonable application is different from an incorrect one.” Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 694 (2002). “As a condition for obtaining habeas corpus from a federal court, a state prisoner must show that the state court's ruling on the claim being presented in federal court was so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 103 (2011). Accord Brown v. Head, 272 F.3d 1308, 1313 (11th Cir. 2001) (). The phrase “clearly established Federal law” encompasses only the holdings of the United States Supreme Court “as of the time of the relevant state-court decision.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 412.
The purpose of federal review is not to re-try the state case. “The [AEDPA] modified a federal habeas court's role in reviewing state prisoner applications in order to prevent federal habeas ‘retrials' and to ensure that state-court convictions are given effect to the extent possible under law.” Cone, 535 U.S. at 693. A federal court must afford due deference to a state court's decision. “AEDPA prevents defendants-and federal courts-from using federal habeas corpus review as a vehicle to second-guess the reasonable decisions of state courts.” Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. 766, 779 (2010). See also Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 181 (2011) () (citations omitted).
In a per curiam decision without a written opinion, the state appellate court on direct appeal affirmed Smith's convictions and sentences. (Respondent's Exhibit 9) In another per curiam decision the state appellate court affirmed the denial of Smith's Rule 3.850 motion.[2] The state appellate court's affirmance warrants deference under Section 2254(d)(1) because “the summary nature of a state court's decision does not lessen the deference that it is due.” Wright v. Moore, 278 F.3d 1245, 1254 (11th Cir.), reh'g and reh'g en banc denied, 278 F.3d 1245 (2002), cert. denied sub nom Wright v. Crosby, 538 U.S. 906 (2003). See also Richter, 562 U.S. at 99 ().
Review of the state court decision is limited to the record that was before the state court.
We hold that review under § 2254(d)(1) is limited to the record that was before the state court that adjudicated the claim on the merits. Section 2254(d)(1) refers, in the past tense, to a state-court adjudication that “resulted in” a decision that was contrary to, or “involved” an unreasonable application of, established law. This backward-looking language requires an examination of the state-court decision at the time it was made. It follows that the record under review is limited to the record in existence at that same time, i.e., the record before the state court.
Pinholster, 563 U.S. at 181-82. Smith bears the burden of overcoming by clear and convincing evidence a state court factual determination. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). This presumption of correctness applies to a finding of fact but not to a mixed determination of law and fact. Parker v. Head, 244 F.3d 831, 836 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1046 (2001).
Smith claims ineffective assistance of counsel, a difficult claim to sustain. “[T]he cases in which habeas petitioners can properly prevail on the ground of ineffective assistance of counsel are few and far between.” Waters v Thomas, 46 F.3d 1506, 1511 (11th Cir. 1995) (en banc) (quoting Rogers v. Zant, 13 F.3d 384, 386 (11th Cir. 1994)). Sims v. Singletary, 155 F.3d 1297, 1305 (11th Cir. 1998), explains that Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), governs an ineffective assistance of counsel claim:
The law regarding ineffective assistance of counsel claims is well settled and well documented. In Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), the Supreme Court set forth a two-part test for analyzing ineffective assistance of counsel claims. According to Strickland, first, the defendant must show that counsel's performance was deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the “counsel” guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense....
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