Smith v. Serv. Emps. Int'l Union
| Decision Date | 12 October 2021 |
| Docket Number | 1:20-cv-02316 |
| Citation | 566 F.Supp.3d 251 |
| Parties | Sandra SMITH, Plaintiff v. SERVICE EMPLOYEES INTERNATIONAL UNION, LOCAL 668, et al., Defendants |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Pennsylvania |
Curtis M. Schube, Justin Thomas Miller, Nathan J. McGrath, Danielle RA Susanj, The Fairness Center, Harrisburg, PA, for Plaintiff.
Jeffrey B. Demain, Scott A. Kronland, P. Casey Pitts, Altshuler Berzon LLP, San Francisco, CA, Lauren M. Hoye, Willig, Williams & Davidson, Philadelphia, PA, for Defendant Service Employees International Union, Local 668.
Nancy A. Walker, Ryan B. Smith, Pennsylvania Office of Attorney General, Philadelphia, PA, Caleb Curtis Enerson, PA Office of Attorney General, Harrisburg, PA, for Defendants Michael Newsome, Brian T. Lyman.
Plaintiff Sandra Smith ("Plaintiff") is a state employee and former member of Defendant Service Employees International Union, Local 668 ("Local 668"). (Doc. No. 1.) She resigned from Local 668 membership in June 2020, but the terms of her membership permitted her to revoke her dues deduction authorization only during an annual window period that had lapsed just over one month prior. Plaintiff commenced this action in December 2020, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, asserting that she was forced to pay union dues as a nonmember in violation of her constitutional rights under Janus v. AFSCME, ––– U.S. ––––, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 201 L.Ed.2d 924 (2018). Local 668 and Defendants Michael Newsome and Brian T. Lyman (the "Commonwealth Defendants," and with Local 668, "Defendants"), sued in their official capacities, move to dismiss Plaintiff's claims and for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and (c). (Doc. Nos. 31, 36.) For the reasons that follow, the Court will grant Defendants’ motions.
Plaintiff began working for the Pennsylvania Department of Human Services ("DHS") in 2014 and around the same time joined Local 668 as a member. (Doc. No. 1 ¶ 21.) Plaintiff is a public and Commonwealth employee—and Local 668 is an employee organization and representative—as defined in the Public Employee Relations Act ("PERA"). (Id. ¶¶ 10-11) (citing 43 P.S. § 1101.301(2) - (4), (15) ). Local 668 represents Commonwealth employees for collective bargaining purposes and is the exclusive collective bargaining representative for Plaintiff's unit. (Id. ¶ 11.) Defendant Newsome is the Secretary of the Office of Administration, and Defendant Lyman is the Chief Accounting Officer and Deputy Secretary for the Office of Comptroller. (Id. ¶¶ 12-13.) Newsome "negotiated, entered into, and is the signatory to, on behalf of the Commonwealth," the collective bargaining agreement ("CBA") governing the terms and conditions of Plaintiff's employment. (Id. ¶ 12.) Lyman is responsible for issuing employee wages and oversees the Commonwealth's payroll system, including the processing of union dues and other payroll deductions. (Id. ¶ 13.)
PERA authorizes public employers and employee organizations and representatives to engage in bargaining over membership dues deductions. (Id. ¶ 16) (citing 43 P.S. § 1101.705 ). "PERA defines ‘membership dues deduction’ as ‘the practice of a public employer to deduct from the wages of a public employe, with her written consent, an amount for the payment of her membership dues in an employe organization, which deduction is transmitted by the public employer to the employe organization.’ " (Id. ¶ 17) (quoting 43 P.S. § 1101.301(11) ). The CBA that currently governs Plaintiff's employment is in effect from July 1, 2019, to June 30, 2023. (Id. ¶ 15.) The CBA reflects the Commonwealth's agreement to deduct union membership dues and other fees from the wages of an employee who requests in writing that such deductions be made. (Id. ¶¶ 18-19.) The Commonwealth then remits those dues and fees to Local 668. (Id. )
In June 2020, Plaintiff notified Local 668 of her resignation from union membership and directed the union to immediately cease deducting dues from her wages. (Id. ¶ 23.) She provided the same notice to the Commonwealth, i.e., her employer. (Id. ¶ 24.) Local 668 responded by letter dated June 4, 2020, signed by Kaitlyn Gutshall of Local 668, stating: "the [M]embership [A]pplication you signed on May 9, 2018[,] constitutes a valid contract between you[ ] and [ ] Local 668."2 (Doc. No. 1-2 at 13.) The letter further stated:
While we will process your request to withdraw from [u]nion membership, you remain obligated to pay an amount equal to your regular [u]nion dues payments until the annual window period specified in the [attached] [M]embership [A]pplication.... This will stop immediately upon the commencement of the window period unless you notify us in advance that you wish to rescind your request to withdraw.
(Id. ) (emphasis added). The letter advised Plaintiff that Local 668 would process her resignation request "within 10 days" unless she informed the union that she "wish[ed] to reconsider" her request. (Id. )
Concerning the "annual window period" (or "AWP") referenced in Local 668's June 4, 2020 letter, the Membership Application attached to the letter provided that Plaintiff's "dues deduction authorization cannot be revoked" for a "period of one year from the date of execution"—and "from year to year thereafter"—unless Plaintiff provided "notice of revocation not less than ten (10) days and not more than thirty (30) days before the end of any yearly period[.]" (Doc. No. 33 at 32.) It further provided that, if "the applicable collective [CBA] specifies a longer period before the revocation window, then only that longer period shall apply." (Id. ) Plaintiff does not allege that the CBA provided for a longer period.
In commencing this action, Plaintiff alleges that Local 668 "did not process [her] membership resignation until at least June 14, 2020" (Doc. No. 1 ¶ 26) and, further, that Defendants "continue to take and accept purported union dues or fees from [her] wages against [her] will and without her consent" (id. ¶ 38). She asserts two counts against Defendants for violations of her free speech and association rights under the First Amendment (Count I) and her due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment (Count II). (Id. ¶¶ 42-64.) These counts are based on allegations that, following Plaintiff's resignation from union membership, Defendants failed: (1) to inform her of her constitutional right to refuse to pay union dues or fees; (2) to provide her with notice and an opportunity to object to "how any nonconsensual dues or fees taken from her are used" or the "process by which the money is deducted"; (3) to request that she to pay money to Local 668 as a nonmember; and (4) to seek a waiver of her constitutional rights, such as the right to refuse to pay nonmember dues, and to obtain a waiver of those rights from her. (Id. ¶¶ 31-34, 39.) Plaintiff avers "on information and belief" that Local 668 "uses the financial support forcibly seized from [her] for purposes of political speech and activity" to which she objects. (Id. ¶ 40.) Plaintiff seeks declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief against Local 668, including a refund of any dues or fees deducted from her wages after her resignation, and declaratory and injunctive relief against the Commonwealth Defendants. (Id. at 15-17.)
On June 30, 2021, after filing answers to Plaintiff's complaint (Doc. Nos. 20, 23), Local 668—and, separately, the Commonwealth Defendants—filed the pending motions to dismiss and for judgment on the pleadings (Doc. Nos. 31, 36). Defendants assert, among other things, that Local 668 stopped deducting union dues from Plaintiff's wages as of April 19, 2021, during the AWP reflected in the Membership Application. (Doc. Nos. 32 at 19, 37 at 5.) Plaintiff filed briefs in opposition to both motions on July 30, 2021 (Doc. Nos. 40-41), and Defendants filed reply briefs on August 13, 2021 (Doc. Nos. 42-43). Having been fully briefed (Doc. Nos. 32, 37, 40-43), Defendants’ motions are ripe for disposition.3
Defendants’ motions implicate Rule 12(b)(6) and Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the applicable standards for which are set forth below.
Federal notice and pleading rules require the complaint to provide the defendant notice of the claim and the grounds upon which it rests. See Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 232 (3d Cir. 2008). When reviewing the sufficiency of a complaint pursuant to a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the Court must accept as true all material allegations in the complaint and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from them, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See In re Ins. Brokerage Antitrust Litig., 618 F.3d 300, 314 (3d Cir. 2010). However, the Court need not accept legal conclusions proffered as factual allegations. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). Rather, a civil complaint must "set out ‘sufficient factual matter’ to show that the claim is facially plausible." See Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) ).
Consistent with the Supreme Court's rulings in Twombly and Iqbal, the Third Circuit has identified three steps a district court must take when determining the sufficiency of a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) : (1) identify the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim; (2) identify any conclusory allegations contained in the complaint "not entitled" to the assumption of truth; and (3) determine whether any "well-pleaded factual allegations" contained in the complaint "plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief." See Santiago v. Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 130 (3d Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). A complaint is properly dismissed where the factual content in the...
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