Smith v. Slocum
| Decision Date | 31 January 1872 |
| Citation | 62 Ill. 354,1872 WL 8050 |
| Parties | THOMAS O. SMITHv.ALICE E. SLOCUM. |
| Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
APPEAL from the Circuit Court of DeWitt County; the Hon. THOMAS F. TIPTON, Judge, presiding.
Messrs. WILLIAMS & BURR and Messrs. NELSON & ROBY, for the appellant.
Messrs. BUNN & BUNN and Messrs. CREA & EWING, for the appellee.
This was an action of trespass, to recover for personal injuries, brought by the appellee against the appellant in the circuit court of Macon County, and the venue was subsequently changed to the county of De Witt, where a trial was had, which resulted in a verdict for twelve thousand dollars in favor of the appellee. A motion was made for a new trial, and the court required the appellee to remit two thousand dollars from the verdict, and thereupon overruled the motion and entered a judgment against appellant for ten thousand dollars.
The only point made by counsel that we deem material to be considered is, whether the verdict is sustained by the evidence, or, rather, whether the verdict is not against the weight of the evidence?
The appellee is the daughter of the appellant, and has been married since 1869, but was living separate from her husband, and was at the time of the difficulty, as she says, a boarder in the family of the appellant. The case, on the part of the appellee, so far as the events that transpired at the house are concerned, rests entirely on her own evidence. There were a number of persons present, all of whom give a different version of the affair.
The controversy that led to the committing of the trespass complained of, arose with the hired girl in regard to something which appellee alleges she had been saying about her that was untrue. The girl was engaged in preparing dinner for the family, and when the disturbance commenced she told the wife of the appellant that if the appellee did not leave she would. The appellant was called, and on entering the room found the appellee and the girl engaged in an animated quarrel. He requested his daughter, the appellee, to leave the kitchen, which he says she did, but soon returned, and again renewed the controversy with the girl. The appellant was again called in to quiet the disturbance, and the respective statements of the events that there occurred are as opposite as truth and error.
It must be conceded that the appellee was in error in the first place, and that her wrongful act was the cause, to some extent at least, of the consequences that followed. Her own statement is, that she was a boarder at the house of the appellant, and it was certainly improper in her to engage in a difficulty with the hired help to the annoyance of the family. If the girl had been saying things about her that were untrue, she ought to have gone to her father with her grievances, and if, upon inquiry, it had turned out to be true it would have been his plain duty to dismiss the girl from his service.
It appears from the history of the difficulty, as given by the appellee herself, that when the appellant was called into the kitchen to quiet the disturbance, he requested her to go to her own room, but that she declined to go on two grounds: first, that she had done nothing for which she ought to be sent to her room; and, second, that she had as much right there as he had, for the reason, that the house had been purchased with money that had belonged to her mother. In the conflict that there ensued, she says, that the appellant then took hold of her, and most cruelly beat and otherwise illtreated her, in consequence of which, she suffered great bodily and mental pain, and that her health has been permanently impaired.
The appellant denies having inflicted any physical injuries on the appellee, and his account of the unhappy affair is corroborated by the evidence of Mr. and Mrs. E. O. Smith, the hired girl, Emma Flory, and, to some extent, by that of the two younger sisters, members of the family of the appellant. It appears that the mother of the appellee is dead, and that the appellant had been married a second time, and, perhaps one of the exciting causes of the conflict was a remark addressed to the appellant, in regard to her step-mother, who was present in the room. The remark was addressed to the appellant in the presence of his wife and others, and implied that she was an unchaste woman previous to her marrige with appellant. The appellee explicitly denies having used any language toward her step-mother that was not entirely respectful. It is, however, distinctly sworn to by three witnesses, the appellant, Mrs. E. O. Smith, and Emma Flory, that the improper language was used. Unless these witnesses have deliberately committed perjury, the objectionable words were addressed to the appellant in regard to his wife in her presence. This does not imply that the appellee has willfully sworn to any thing that is untrue. By no means. She was in anger and doubtless very much excited, and may have used the objectional words and may not have remembered it. There is no such excuse for the other witnesses. They could not say that they remembered the utterance of the words, when, in fact, no such words were used. Their testimony is either the truth, or it is willful and corrupt falsehood.
The language addressed to the appellant in regard to his wife was such as no husband could permit, whether by a member of his own family or a stranger. Had a stranger used such slanderous words to the appellant in his own house in regard to his wife no one would deny his right to have ejected him at once from the premises. He would have precisely the same legal right to protect his wife from such slanderous accusations by a member of his family as from a stranger. The law makes no distinction.
If we shall take the most favorable view possible of the case the appellee had no right to continue to wrangle with the hired girl after the appellant had requested her not to do so. She ought to have left the room. This she refused to do, and when the appellant undertook to assert his authority to preserve the peace of his household a struggle ensued. She resisted with all the strength she had, and if the evidence on the part of the defense can be relied on, the appellant did not use any more force than was absolutely necessary to remove her from the...
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