Smith v. Smith
Decision Date | 01 August 2008 |
Docket Number | 2070335. |
Citation | 6 So.3d 534 |
Parties | Constance J. SMITH v. Gregory L. SMITH, Jr., and Flowerwood Nursery, Inc. |
Court | Alabama Court of Civil Appeals |
David A. Simon of Wills & Simon, Bay Minette, for appellant.
Daniel G. Blackburn and Mark H. Taupeka of Blackburn & Conner, P.C., Bay Minette, for appellees.
Constance J. Smith ("the former wife") appeals from a judgment imposing a resulting trust in favor of Flowerwood Nursery, Inc. ("Flowerwood"), on property in which she claims an interest. We affirm.
The former wife and Gregory L. Smith ("the former husband") were divorced in 2001. This is the second time they have been before this court. For an understanding of the facts and procedural history underlying this appeal, we quote from this court's decision in Smith v. Smith, 892 So.2d 384 (Ala.Civ.App.2003) ( ):
892 So.2d at 389. After this court issued its opinion in Smith I, the former husband filed a petition for a writ of certiorari with the Alabama Supreme Court. That court initially granted the petition, but, on May 28, 2004, it quashed the writ.
On September 7, 2004, Flowerwood filed a complaint in intervention in the former wife's 2002 Baldwin Circuit Court action in which she had requested an accounting and a sale for division of the 19-acre parcel. Flowerwood's complaint alleged that it had supplied the purchase money for the Smiths' 1988 purchase of the 19-acre parcel, that it had thereafter listed the property as a capital asset on its books, that it had made substantial capital improvements to the property, and that the property was essential to its nursery operations. Accordingly, Flowerwood requested the following alternative relief: that the court construe the parties' August 18, 1988, deed-correction instrument as a real-estate purchase contract and order the property to be sold to Flowerwood pursuant to the terms of that instrument, or that the court construe the deed-correction instrument as an equitable mortgage, or that the court impose a constructive trust on the 19-acre parcel in favor of Flowerwood. On January 24, 2006, Flowerwood amended its complaint to request that the court impose a resulting trust in its favor.
On March 30, 2005, the former wife answered Flowerwood's complaint in intervention, seeking reasonable rents and an accounting and alleging that Flowerwood was guilty of conversion and conspiracy. On June 6, 2007, the circuit court conducted a bench trial. The former husband testified that he and the former wife had obtained the disputed 19-acre parcel by deed from Charles W. Barnhill and Virginia P. Barnhill on August 17, 1988. He said that the transaction was a tax-free exchange, pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 1031, whereby he and the former wife received the 19-acre parcel in exchange for convenience-store property on Dauphin Island Parkway plus $70,129.50. The former husband stated that he had put up $1,000 of that sum as earnest money and that the balance had come from a money-market account owned by Flowerwood. He introduced a personal check for $1,000 drawn on an account in his name only and a cashier's check for $69,129.50 from the Flowerwood account. He also introduced the Flowerwood general ledger containing a journal entry for August 17, 1988, showing a debt receivable from the former husband for $69,129.50. The former husband explained that he had intended the grantee named in the deed to the 19-acre parcel to be Flowerwood, but, he said, the title company had informed him that, because the transaction was a § 1031 exchange, the grantees had to be the former wife and him. Accordingly, he said, he had drafted the deed-correction instrument the day after the closing in order to protect Flowerwood. The former husband stated that, at the end of the 1988 tax year, the Flowerwood ledgers were changed to reflect that the...
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