Smith v. Smith

Citation180 P. 231,104 Kan. 629
Decision Date12 April 1919
Docket Number22,051
PartiesJOHN SMITH, Appellee, v. DORA SMITH et al., Appellants
CourtKansas Supreme Court

Decided January, 1919.

Appeal from Miami district court; JABEZ O. RANKIN, judge.

Judgment affirmed.

SYLLABUS

SYLLABUS BY THE COURT.

1. DECREE OF DIVORCE--Provision for Support of Minor Children--Provision Continues During Minority Only--Ejectment. In an action by a father to recover from his children the possession of real estate, the rents and profits of which under a decree of divorce had been set aside for the support of the minor children, the provisions of the former decree are considered, and held, that the children's rights to the rents and profits ceased when the youngest child attained majority, and that the father is now entitled to the possession of the land.

2. SAME -- Period of Minority of Females -- Statute Not Retroactive. Chapter 184, Laws of 1917 extending "the period of minority . . . in males and females to the age of twenty-one years," did not change the status of one who had already reached the age of majority under the former law.

S. J Shively, and W. L. Joyce, both of Paola, for the appellants.

B. J. Carver, of Paola, for the appellee.

OPINION

PORTER, J.:

John Smith sued to recover possession of 27.65 acres of land in Miami county. The defendants are his former wife and their children. His interest in the land was acquired by a deed from his parents executed in 1895, which gave him only a life estate, with remainder to his children. In 1902 his wife, Dora Smith, obtained a divorce from him in the district court of Miami county. The decree awarded the custody of the minor children to the wife and, after setting aside to her a smaller tract of land, gave the rents and profits of the lands now in controversy for the support and education of the minor children, with a provision that the wife should have the care, management, and control of the lands, to use or rent for and in behalf of the minor children until the youngest should become of age, and in case of the death of the wife during the minority of the children, then the guardian should control the lands for them. This action was brought shortly after the youngest child attained her majority, and the controversy turns upon the proper interpretation of that portion of the decree in the divorce action relating to the children's interest in the rents and profits of the land belonging to John Smith.

The court sustained the contention of the plaintiff and held that the children's right to the rents and profits ceased when the youngest child attained majority, and that the father is now entitled to the possession of the land during the remainder of his life. The defendants bring the case here for review.

The provision for the children in the decree of divorce, reads:

"The court further orders and decrees that the minor children . . . shall during the life of the defendant have all rents and profits of (describing the land) not heretofore given to the plaintiff, and that plaintiff shall have the care, management and control of said lands with power to use or rent the same for and in behalf of said minor children until the youngest of said children shall become of age."

The district court was correct in construing the provisions of the decree. The only interest John Smith had in the land was during his life, and we think it is obvious that the words "during the life of the defendant," were not intended as fixing the time the rents and profits should be used for the support of the children, and that, on the other hand, the words "until the youngest of said children shall become of age" were intended to limit the time during which the court intended to give them the rents and profits. The words "during the life of the...

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12 cases
  • Monticello v. Monticello
    • United States
    • Maryland Court of Appeals
    • February 26, 1974
    ...was 18, held to have expired when child reached 18 despite prior passage of statute raising age of majority to 21); Smith v. Smith, 104 Kan. 629, 180 P. 231 (1919) (statute raising age of majority from 18 to 21 not given retroactive effect). Contra, Parker v. Parker, Tenn., 497 S.W.2d 572 (......
  • Bluff City v. Western Light & Power Corporation
    • United States
    • Kansas Supreme Court
    • March 11, 1933
    ... ... of limitations; following Black v. Black, 64 Kan ... 689, 704, 68 P. 662, and Pinkerton v. Pinkerton, 122 ... Kan. 131, 251 P. 416." Smith v. Rector, 135 Kan. 326, ... syl. par. 2, 10 P.2d 1077. See, also, Black v ... Black, 64 Kan. 689, 68 P. 662, and Pinkerton v ... Pinkerton, ... ...
  • Jungjohann v. Jungjohann
    • United States
    • Kansas Supreme Court
    • December 8, 1973
    ...made.' Appellant advances several arguments which she claims support her position. She first asserts that our decision in Smith v. Smith, 104 Kan. 629, 180 P. 231, is sufficient authority to decide the issue here. Appellant's interpretation of the Smith decision, as we understand it, is tha......
  • In re Davidson's Will
    • United States
    • Minnesota Supreme Court
    • February 21, 1947
    ...at 598; Pickering v. Peskind, 43 Ohio App. 401, 183 N.E. 301; State ex rel. Brown v. Lyons, 104 Kan. 702, 180 P. 802; Smith v. Smith, 104 Kan. 629, 180 P. 231; Nahorski v. St. Louis Elec. Terminal Ry. Co., 310 Mo. 227, 274 S.W. 1025; 27 Am.Jur., Infants, § 5; see, Wilson v. Greer, 50 Okl. 3......
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