Smith v. Smith

• Decision Date: 15 June 1999
• Citation: 752 A.2d 1023,249 Conn. 265
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: (Conn. 2000) PRENTICE K. SMITH, JR. v. SHEILAH T. SMITH SC 15978

752 A.2d 1023 (Conn. 2000)

PRENTICE K. SMITH, JR. v. SHEILAH T. SMITH

SC 15978

Connecticut Supreme Court

Argued March 25

June 15, 1999

Richard L. Albrecht, for the appellant-appellee (defendant).

Thomas M. Cassone, with whom, on the brief, were Lawrence M. Lapine, Robert S. Bello and Christopher T. Coburn, for the appellee-appellant (plaintiff).

OPINION

Callahan, C. J., and Borden, Berdon, Katz and Palmer, Js.

Katz, J.

The defendant, Sheilah T. Smith, appeals and the plaintiff, Prentice K. Smith, Jr., cross appeals ¹ from the judgment of the trial court dissolving the parties' marriage, ordering child support, ordering dual alimony pursuant to General Statutes § 46b-82, ² and ordering a property distribution pursuant to General Statutes § 46b-81. ³ The issues to be decided on appeal are whether: (1) the trial court, pursuant to § 46b-81, properly retained continuing jurisdiction over the present case in order to have the authority to divide the plaintiff's interest in any family trust (Smith family trust), if ever he is found to hold such an interest; (2) the trial court properly awarded dual alimony pursuant to § 46b-82; ⁴ (3) the terms and conditions of the alimony ordered by the trial court constitute an abuse of discretion; and (4) the trial court abused its discretion in awarding the plaintiff $75,000 of the defendant's $275,000 settlement award that she had received from a former employer. ⁵ We affirm in part and reverse in part the judgment of the trial court.

The trial court's findings may be summarized as follows. The parties were married on October 20, 1984. That same year they jointly bought a house on Grahampton Lane in Greenwich. The marriage was the plaintiff's second and the defendant's first. The parties have two children: a daughter, born July 25, 1986; and a son, born December 12, 1987. ⁶ At the time of the dissolution, the plaintiff was forty-seven years old and the defendant was forty-six years old. They are both in good health. The plaintiff holds a bachelor of arts degree from the University of Denver. The defendant, in addition to having attended two years of graduate school at Columbia University, holds a bachelor of arts degree from Northwestern University.

The plaintiff has held numerous positions in the field of finance during the last twenty years. At the time of the parties' marriage, he was selling securities in New York City. In 1986, he left that position to become a partner in an investment firm. Two years later, in the wake of the 1987 stock market crash, he was discharged from the firm. Between 1983 and 1988, the defendant worked at Willow Development (Willow), a real estate development business. She, too, was laid off as a result of the post-October, 1987 economic downturn. While both were unemployed, the parties sold their Grahampton Lane house, realizing a net profit of $800,000, which they divided evenly. The trial court found that this distribution equally divided their then marital estate.

In the spring of 1990, after being unemployed for more than one year, the plaintiff moved with his family to Philadelphia to start his own financial company. Within two years, however, the company had failed and the defendant and the two children moved back to Greenwich. The plaintiff soon rejoined them in Connecticut. Upon returning to Greenwich with the two children, the defendant rented a home pursuant to a two year lease. In 1994, she bought land on Fairfield Road in Greenwich and began to build a house on it. The defendant and the two children eventually moved into their new house, where they were still residing at the time of trial. Although upon his return to Connecticut the plaintiff lived with his wife and children in the leased house, he has never resided in the house on Fairfield Road.

In 1992, the defendant began working as a mortgage broker at Columbia Equities. Within a short period of time she moved from Columbia Equities to People's Bank, where she became a mortgage broker working on a commission basis. The defendant's income has increased greatly since she first began as a broker. Her 1997 W-2 forms indicated gross earnings of more than $270,000. In contrast, since returning to Connecticut in 1992, the plaintiff has worked sporadically at numerous financial jobs. Consequently, his income has varied dramatically. His most recent positions were located in Eastern Europe.

The trial court concluded that the plaintiff's financial actions and inactions, along with his failure to recognize that the defendant had taken on the yoke of the family's financial burdens since 1988, caused the irretrievable breakdown of the marriage. The court further found that the plaintiff had not been forthcoming concerning his financial affairs and earning capacity during the pendente lite proceedings. Nevertheless, the court determined that the plaintiff had an annual earning capacity of $100,000. The trial court further found that the plaintiff's financial affidavit showed a zero net worth, while the defendant's affidavit reflected assets worth $781,000, and liabilities of $48,250. The court concluded that the defendant had acquired all of her assets through her own efforts and investments, with the exception of $275,000 that she received in settlement of a lawsuit against Willow. ⁷

The trial court awarded custody of the minor children to the defendant, and granted reasonable visitation rights to the plaintiff. Additionally, the court ordered the plaintiff to pay the defendant $240 per week in child support, and $1 per year in alimony until September 30, 2007, or until the defendant's remarriage, whichever occurs first. The court also ordered the defendant to pay the plaintiff $400 per month in alimony until December 31, 2005.

The court further ordered the defendant to pay the plaintiff $75,000, ⁸ which the court found to be the plaintiff's equitable share of the $275,000 settlement, on an after tax basis. Having determined that the $275,000 was a marital asset as of 1990, when the parties equally divided their assets, the court reasoned that the plaintiff had acquired the right to an equitable share of approximately four fifths of this sum because the defendant's claim had arisen from her employment from 1984 through 1988, and the parties had been married for four of those five years. ⁹ Lastly, the court retained continuing jurisdiction until September 30, 2007, over any interest the plaintiff may be determined to have in any Smith family trust, so that the court would be able to divide that asset as property should such an interest ever materialize. ¹⁰

In their appeals, both parties raise the following issues: (1) whether the trial court, pursuant to § 46b-81, ¹¹ properly retained continuing jurisdiction over the present case in order to have the authority to divide the plaintiff's interest in any Smith family trust if ever he is found to hold such an interest; and (2) if the court did not properly retain jurisdiction, whether the court's improper order requires a new trial. The defendant raises three additional issues: (1) whether the trial court had statutory authority to order dual alimony pursuant to § 46b-82; ¹² (2) whether the terms and conditions of the alimony orders constitute an abuse of discretion by the trial court; and (3) whether the trial court abused its discretion in awarding the plaintiff $75,000 of the defendant's $275,000 settlement award from Willow.

I.

Courts generally resolve issues concerning subject matter jurisdiction before considering the merits of the parties' claims. See, e.g., W.v.W., 248 Conn. 487, 493, ___ A.2d ___ (1999). In the present case, we must determine whether the trial court properly retained continuing jurisdiction in order to have the authority to divide the plaintiff's interest in any Smith family trust if ever he is found to hold such an interest. Furthermore, if we find that the court did not have jurisdiction over said trust, then we must determine the appropriate remedy, that is, whether we should order a new trial or, instead, simply reverse the judgment in part and keep the remaining orders intact. After consideration of the issues, we agree with both parties that the trial court did not properly retain jurisdiction. Nevertheless, we hold that the court's determination regarding the trust is severable. Therefore, we reverse the judgment of the trial court solely as it pertains to this issue.

A.

Although it is well established that trial courts have broad equitable remedial powers regarding marital dissolutions; Doe v. Doe, 244 Conn. 403, 423, 710 A.2d 1297 (1998); it is equally well settled that "[c]courts have no inherent power to transfer property from one spouse to another; instead, that power must rest upon an enabling statute." Passamano v. Passamano, 228 Conn. 85, 88 n.4, 634 A.2d 891 (1993). Thus, the court's authority to transfer property appurtenant to a dissolution proceeding requires an interpretation of the relevant statutes. Statutory construction, in turn, presents a question of law over which our review is plenary. Morton Buildings, Inc. v. Bannon, 222 Conn. 49, 53, 607 A.2d 424 (1992).

According to our long-standing principles of statutory construction, our fundamental objective is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature. Conway v. Wilton, 238 Conn. 653, 663, 680 A.2d 242 (1996). In determining the intent of a statute, "we look to the words of the statute itself, to the legislative history and circumstances surrounding its enactment, to the legislative policy it was designed to implement, and to its relationship to existing legislation and common law principles governing the same general subject matter." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Bornemann v. Bornemann, 245 Conn. 508, 515, ___ A.2d ___ (1998).

On its face, the statutory scheme regarding financial orders appurtenant to dissolution proceedings prohibits the retention of jurisdiction over orders regarding lump sum...