Smith v. Smith
| Citation | 109 N.E. 830,222 Mass. 102 |
| Parties | SMITH et al. v. SMITH. |
| Decision Date | 14 October 1915 |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Appeal from Superior Court, Franklin County.
Suit by Ansel C. Smith and wife, by next friend, against Katherine A. Smith. From a decree for plaintiffs, defendant appeals. Reversed.
Wm. A. Davenport, of Greenfield, for appellant.
Dana Malone, of Boston, and Charles N. Stoddard, of Greenfield, for appellees.
This is a suit in equity, brought in the name of Ansel C. Smith and his wife, Sophia J., by their daughter as next friend against the widow of their deceased son, to set aside a conveyance of real estate and transfer of personal property executed by them to her on January 1, 1914. After a hearing in the superior court, a finding of facts was made in which was incorporated some of the evidence and the decree.
This was irregular. The finding of facts, whether made voluntarily or under the requirement of R. L. c. 159, § 23, is a well-recognized step in equity practice. Cohen v. Nagle, 190 Mass. 4, 76 N. E. 276,2 L. R. A. (N. S.) 964,5 Ann. Cas. 553. It constitutes the substance of the conclusions made by the trial court from the evidence and is the foundation upon which the decree rests. The decree is a subsequent step. It is the final adjudication of the court upon the issues raised. In some jurisdictions and in some instances in this commonwealth it may contain a more or less lengthy recital of the facts. But that is not usual. Equity rule 37. Mason v. Daly, 117 Mass. 403. It is not the form of the present record. The decree will be treated as separate from the findings of fact.
Under the familiar rule, since the evidence is not fully reported, the findings of fact so far as not inconsistent with each other must be accepted as true.
Undisputed facts are that the plaintiffs, aged respectively about 97 and 87 years, had occupied for several years a house with their son and the defendant, his wife, each family living alone. The father, in May, 1913, had conveyed to his son certain real estate. The son died intestate and childless in December, 1913. The father, mother and widow supposed that the latter inherited all the estate of the deceased. Upon applying for appointment as administratrix, the widow learned that this was not so, because the estate of the deceased above debts (as has been found) amounted to about $17,000 and the interest of the father and mother as his next of kin under the law as to the descent and distribution of interest estates was worth about $6,000. Thereupon the widow consulted an attorney, who prepared three documents appropriate in form (1) to convey to the widow the entire interest of the parents in the son's real estate, and (2) to transfer their interest in his personal property to the widow, and (3) an agreement by the widow to pay to the parents and the survivor during their respective lives $240 annually, and ‘to nurse and care for them in sickness and in health during their respective lives.’ These instruments were executed and delivered. This suit is brought to set them aside on the ground that they were executed by mistake and ‘through the fraud and undue influence of the defendant.’ No facts are found showing any mistake, and the case hinges on fraud and undue influence.
The evidence is not reported. Therefore the only point presented is whether the facts warranted the decree in the form ordered.
The decree proceeds upon the theory that the defendant occupied a fiduciary relation to the plaintiffs and that the validity of dealings between them relating to property must be decided on that basis. This is apparent from the paragraph immediately preceding the form of decree, viz.:
‘The widow was in a position of trust by reason of her prospective office as administratrix; she also was in a position of confidence because of the regard and affection the two old people had for her as the widow of their son.’
We construe this as a ruling of law upon the facts found. In this connection certain recitals of the decree are significant. These recitals are:
‘It not appearing that the transaction was for the manifest and full advantage of the plaintiffs and it not appearing that the transaction was entered into by them or either of them with a full comprehension of its nature, extent and effect.’
These recitals are negative in form and appear to constitute a ruling that the burden of proof was upon the defendant, as one occupying a fiduciary relation to the plaintiffs, to show that the transaction was open and fair and for their benefit, and that the plaintiffs were not bound to make out the averments of their petition as in the ordinary case. They are quite different from definite recitals to the effect that the transaction was not for the advantage of the plaintiffs and was not entered into by them with an understanding of its nature, extent and effect. Such recitals would indicate a finding of positive facts. The one in the decree merely shows a negative failure to prove these facts. The defendant occupied no trust relation to the plaintiffs. She had not been appointed administratrix of her husband's estate at the time, and hence owed no duty arising out of that relation. The ruling that she was ‘in a position of trust by reason of her prospective office as administrator’ was not sound in any other sense than that the fact that they had signed her petition for appointment as administratrix showed that the possessed their confidence to such an extent that they did not care to oppose her appointment. Although St. 1914, cc. 356, 702, giving the widow, if competent and willing, the right to the appointment as administratrix of her husband's estate, had not then been enacted, she nevertheless was named in R. L. c. 137, § 1, together with next of kin, as entitled to a preference in such appointment. There are no facts found disclosing a dependence by the old folks upon her judgment in any business affairs or property matters. Manifestly the relation of the defendant to the plaintiffs was fiduciary only in its general informal and popular sense. The facts found are that she had attended the plaintiff Ansel as nurse in 1910, and in the following year had become his son's wife. During her married life occupying the same house with the old folks, the relations of the two households were those of ‘confidence and affection,’ and after the death of her husband the widow continued to live in the same house and her relations remained friendly with her husband's parents. Though they appear to have been exceptionally strong and well, she performed for them to the full the attentions which her skill and kindness of heart dictated as appropriate to the infirmities incident to their advanced age. They felt toward her the regard and affection which her intelligent care as the widow of their son naturally elicited.
[4] Fiduciary relationship has been defined as:
‘One in which, if a wrong arise, the same remedy exists against the wrongdoer on behalf of the principal as would exist against a trustee on behalf of a cestui que trust.’ National Bank v....
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