Smith v. Smith

• Decision Date: 16 May 1975
• Docket Number: No. 5444,5444
• Citation: 56 Haw. 295,535 P.2d 1109
• Parties: Albert V. SMITH, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Claire Cassidy SMITH, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: Hawaii Supreme Court

Page 1109

535 P.2d 1109

56 Haw. 295

Albert V. SMITH, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Claire Cassidy SMITH, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 5444.

Supreme Court of Hawai'i.

May 16, 1975.

Syllabus by the Court

1. Where after a trial, the court enters a decree ordering that two long-term leaseholds owned by a husband and wife as tenants by the entireties shall be held by them after their divorce as tenants in common, and further ordering that such leasehold properties shall be rented and the rentals be collected by the former wife, and such decree further imposing a complex set of payment priorities out of the rental income and a reserve fund to be created by former wife, as trustee, out of surplus rental income, and further authorizing the sale of such leaseholds by mutual consent and the distribution of the net proceeds of such sale according to the priorities therein mentioned, the complex and detailed arrangements of the decree evince a careful examination of the financial situation of the parties, rather than a mechanical application of a rule of property law. The trial court thus complied with HRS § 580-47 (1974 Supp.) by considering the factors enumerated therein.

2. Where Hawaii Family Court Rule 52(a) states in directory rather than mandatory language, that the court 'may find the facts and state its conclusions of law thereon or may announce or write and file its decision and direct the entry of the appropriate decree or order,' a detailed oral decision memorialized in a written decree is sufficient for compliance with the rule.

3. The interpretation or construction of a judgment presents a question of law for the courts. A judgment or decree like any other written instrument is to be construed reasonably and as a whole so as to give effect to the intention of the court.

4. In some cases rents may represent the entire value of the reversion, and a conveyance or assignment of the future rents would be equivalent to a conveyance of the leasehold itself. Since this may well be true of the case at bar, the portion of the order of the California court declining jurisdiction over the Lahaina properties would be rendered meaningless if we should construe the California judgment to award the appellant all of the rental income from such properties.

5. Where a California divorce court explicitly declined jurisdiction over the claims of the parties in and to the leasehold properties situated in Lahaina, Maui, Hawaii, the portion of the judgment relating to the collection of rents derived from the rental of these properties was meant to be effective only pending resolution of such claims by the Hawaii courts.

6. Courts generally will not decide a constitutional issue unless necessary to the determination of the merits of the cause under consideration.

7. Where the decree of a California divorce court and a Hawaii Family (trial) Court can be harmonized, the court should not decide any full faith and credit issue which might be presented if they were not consistent.

William F. Crockett, Wailuku, Maui, (Crockett & Crockett, Wailuku, Maui, of counsel) for defendant-appellant.

John T. Vail, Wailuku, Maui, (Ueoka, Vail & Luna, Wailuku, Maui, of counsel) for plaintiff-appellee.

Before RICHARDSON, C. J., KOBAYASHI, OGATA and MENOR, JJ., and KATO, Circuit Judge, Assigned by Reason of Vacancy.

OGATA, Justice.

This case is an appeal from a decree distributing property entered by the Circuit Court of the Second Circuit sitting as Family Court.

The parties were divorced by a final judgment of the Orange County, California Superior Court (hereinafter California court). The California court which issued the divorce judgment had personal jurisdiction over the parties, both of whom were bona fide California domiciliaries at the time. The divorce judgment provided for custody of the minor children of the marriage and for a property division. For lack of jurisdiction, the California court refrained from deciding the claims in and to the two parcels of leasehold property known as 25 and 29 Kamaka Circle, in Lahaina, County of Maui, Hawaii, owned by the parties as tenants by the entireties during the marriage. These properties will hereinafter be referred to as the Lahaina or Kamaka Circle properties.

After the final California divorce judgment was filed on April 21, 1970, an action was brought in the Circuit Court of the Second Circuit on June 14, 1971, by appellee Mr. Smith for the partition of the Lahaina properties under HRS chapter 668. After the action commenced, the appellant Mrs. Smith moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the circuit court did not have jurisdiction to distribute these properties. This cause was then transferred to the Family Court for disposition pursuant to HRS § 580-47 (1974 Supp.).

The court below (Family Court which will also sometimes hereinafter be referred to as trial court) ordered in the decree distributing property that the Kamaka Circle properties located in Lahaina, County of Maui, be held by the parties as tenants in common, each being declared to be the owner of one-half (1/2) undivided interest in these properties. The court ordered that neither party shall assign, sell or transfer his or her interest except as provided in the decree or by order of the court. The trial court further decreed that: Each of these residential lots shall be rented and the rents derived therefrom shall be collected by the appellant, as trustee; the appellant, as such trustee, shall also manage the properties; from the rentals collected by appellant, she shall pay all necessary expenses and costs involved in the management of the properties, including lease rents, taxes, real estate mortgage loans, collateral loan No. 27-2372 at the First Hawaiian Bank, insurance and other necessary maintenance costs.

The court further decreed the balance, if any, of the rental income shall be credited in equal shares to appellant and appellee. The decree permitted appellant to withdraw from the amount credited to appellee the sum of $100.00 per month for child support as required under the divorce judgment. Because appellee is presently $925.00 in arrears for the support of the minor children, the court ordered that this amount shall be deducted by appellant from appellee's share of the rental income. However, before deducting this amount, appellant shall pay from appellee's share the sum of $50.00 per month for four consecutive months beginning November 1, 1972, to John T. Vail for costs incurred by him in these proceedings. The decree also authorized appellant, as trustee, to retain a reserve savings account not to exceed $2,000, consisting of equal shares of appellant's and appellee's funds. It specified that any amount in excess of $2,000 in the reserve account as of December 31st shall be distributed equally to the parties not later than the following February 28th. The decree further required appellant, as trustee, to render to appellee on or before February 28th of each year an accounting showing all receipts and disbursements for the previous year.

Finally in the last paragraph of the decree the trial court allowed the parties to sell the leases by mutual agreement. Upon the sale of the leases, it ordered that the net proceeds shall be applied first to the payment of $7,039 to appellant to reimburse her for money previously advanced by her; the remainder to be distributed equally to the parties, with the proviso that if appellee is still under an obligation to pay for the support of any children, then an estimated amount of his future support obligations shall be retained by appellant out of appellee's share.

In the course of the trial in the court below, each of the parties presented relevant evidence concerning the source of the money used to pay for the qualifying premiums demanded by the lessor and to build the houses. Evidence of the efforts contributed by the respective parties in negotiating for the properties and for mortgage loans, as well as the efforts of the respective parties in arranging for and supervising the construction of the two houses, was also presented.

Appellant alleges in this appeal that the trial court erred by (1) failing to indicate how the factors, which URS § 580-47 (1974 Supp.) mandates the court to consider, were weighed; (2) failing to comply with Rule 52(a) of the Hawaii Family Court Rules; and (3) failing to grant full faith and credit to the California judgment, as mandated by Article IV, Section 1 of the United States Constitution, as implemented by 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738. ¹

I.

Appellant's contention that the trial court failed to consider the factors enumerated in HRS § 580-47 (1974 Supp.) and mandated by Carson v. Carson, 50 Haw. 182, 436 P.2d 7 (1967), is without merit. The trial court did not merely decree that the Lahaina properties be held by the parties as tenants in common and that the rents be divided equally between them. Rather, the court below imposed a complex set of payment priorities and mandated the establishment of a reserve fund to insure the payment of the taxes and carrying charges which are or will become due on the leasehold properties. The trial judge required that the rental income must be applied to these expenses before either party may retain any portion of the rentals. He further permitted the appellant to deduct and retain out of appellee's share of the rental income $100.00 per month, per child to be expended for each of the minor children in her custody and to also deduct a similar amount per month from her share of the rental income for herself. The trial court also required the consent of both parties to any future sale of the leasehold properties. These complex and detailed arrangements evince a careful examination of the financial situation of the parties, rather than a mechanical application of a rule of property law.

The trial court did not fail to comply with Rule 52(a) of the Hawaii Family Court Rules, as contended by a...