Smith v. Smith
| Decision Date | 03 July 1934 |
| Docket Number | No. 7516.,7516. |
| Citation | 173 A. 539 |
| Parties | SMITH et al. v. SMITH et al. |
| Court | Rhode Island Supreme Court |
Exceptions from Superior Court, Providence and Bristol Counties; Leonidas Pouliot, Jr., Judge.
Will contest between Harold I. Smith and another, contestants, and Leonard E. Smith and another, proponents, on appeal from a decree of the Probate Court admitting to probate the alleged will of Edward K. Smith, deceased. There was a verdict in favor of contestants, breaking the will, and proponents' motion for a new trial was granted, and proponents bring exceptions to the denial of their motion for a directed verdict.
Exceptions overruled, and case remitted to the Superior Court for a new trial.
Emile H. Euch, of Providence, for appellants.
Voigt, Wright & Munroe, Ernst T. Voigt, and Clifton I. Munroe, all of Providence, for appellees.
This case was heard by a jury in the superior court upon appeal of Harold I. Smith and Joseph E. Smith—hereinafter called the contestants—from a decree of a probate court admitting to probate the will of Edward K. Smith. The motion for a direction of a verdict in favor of Leonard E. Smith and Leah Godfrey—hereinafter called the proponents—was denied and a verdict was rendered breaking the will. Thereafter, the trial justice granted the proponents' motion for a new trial. The case is before this court on the exceptions of the proponents to the denial of their motion for a directed verdict.
The will was contested on two grounds: (1) That the testator was mentally incapable of making a will, and (2) that the proponents exerted undue influence upon him.
On the question of mental capacity, the trial court in its rescript granting a new trial stated as follows:
An examination of the record before us discloses no evidence upon which a jury would be justified in finding that the testator did not have testamentary capacity. However, as no motion was made to instruct the jury that the proponents had sustained the burden in this respect, the case went to the jury on this issue as well as on the issue of undue influence.
Upon the latter issue, proponents contend that much of the testimony for the contestants is self-serving and...
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...evidence is unlikely and circumstantial evidence is more often used. Apollonio, 101 R.I. at 593, 225 A.2d at 787 (citing Smith v. Smith, 54 R.I. 402, 173 A. 539 (1934)). Thus, undue influence may be inferred from an unexplained and unnatural disposition of property in combination with other......
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Apollonio v. Kenyon
...a manner that as a consequence proof of the existence of undue influence must often be proven by circumstantial evidence. Smith v. Smith, 54 R.I. 402, 173 A. 539. Facts and inferences which when considered singly are of slight and different degrees of evidentiary weight may often, when cons......
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Bettez v. Bettez, C.A. No.: PP 12-4239
...will look to circumstantial evidence, if any exists, in its analysis. Apollonio, 101 R.I. at 593, 225 A.2d at 787 (citing Smith v. Smith, 54 R.I. 402, 173 A. 539 (1934)). Moreover, the Court may infer undue influence from an unexplained or unnatural disposition of property through a testame......
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Marcinko v. D'Antuono
...a manner that as a consequence proof of the existnece of undue influence must often be proven by circumstantial evidence. Smith v. Smith, 54 R.I. 402, 173 A. 539. Facts and inferences which when considered singly are of slight and different degrees of evidentiary weight may often, when cons......