Smith v. Smith
| Decision Date | 08 June 2004 |
| Docket Number | Record No. 2403-03-3. |
| Court | Virginia Court of Appeals |
| Parties | Leonard Monroe SMITH, Jr. v. Tonya Fenn Young SMITH. |
Neil E. McNally (Thomas N. Key; Key, Tatel & McNally, P.C., Roanoke, on brief), for appellant.
Ellen S. Weinman, Salem, for appellee.
Present: BENTON, ELDER and KELSEY, JJ.
In this equitable distribution case, Leonard Monroe Smith, Jr. argues that the trial court (a) erroneously failed to award him a 50% interest in the marital home, (b) disregarded a prenuptial agreement when distributing personalty acquired during the marriage, and (c) abused its discretion by ordering him to pay wife $2,500 in attorney's fees. We agree that the court erred in refusing to enforce the prenuptial agreement, but find no fault with the court's distribution of the marital home or award of fees. We thus reverse in part, affirm in part, and remand for the court to reconsider its allocation of the personalty consistent with the prenuptial agreement.
"When reviewing a trial court's decision on appeal, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, granting it the benefit of any reasonable inferences." Congdon v. Congdon, 40 Va.App. 255, 258, 578 S.E.2d 833, 835 (2003). Shortly before their marriage in 1997, Leonard and Tonya Smith entered into a prenuptial agreement. On the issue of property acquired during the marriage, the agreement provides:
Future Property: Except as otherwise set forth in this agreement, all property — real, personal and mixed — which each party may hereafter acquire in his or her own name or possession shall remain the separate property of that person, along with all future appreciation, increases and other changes in value of that property and irrespective of any contributions either party may make to the property of the marriage, directly or indirectly.
(Emphasis added). Wife's attorney drafted the agreement, and both parties signed it.
During their marriage, the Smiths maintained separate checking accounts and two separate credit card accounts. They each purchased various items of personal property and scrupulously retained receipts for each purchase. Their parents contributed equal sums for the couple to build and furnish a new home. A post-separation appraisal, paid for by husband's mother, Betty Smith, valued the home at $183,000. The parties lived together in the home until November 2, 2001, when wife moved out. A few days later, wife filed a bill of complaint for divorce alleging adultery and constructive desertion. Husband counterclaimed, alleging actual desertion.
In the trial court, the parties agreed to resolve their dispute over ownership of the marital home by means of a judicial auction. Under their agreed protocol, each party would make bids for the home in $1,000 increments in an amount that party would pay the other for his or her equity interest. Husband won the auction, agreeing to pay wife $84,000. The trial court's decree required husband to refinance the home and pay off the existing mortgage. In reliance on this agreement, wife incurred moving and storage expenses.
Husband, however, failed either to pay wife or to refinance the home. When challenged on this, husband assured the trial court that he could obtain financing and that, in fact, he had already submitted loan applications to four banks. He agreed to give wife copies of these applications after the hearing. He never did. Nor did he ever refinance the property or pay wife the $84,000 auction price.
With regard to their personal property, both parties filed copies of the prenuptial agreement with the trial court. The court heard extensive ore tenus testimony regarding various items of personal property acquired during the marriage. Going item by item down a five-page list of property that husband declared to be his separate property, each party produced receipts or testified regarding the separate or marital nature of each item. Neither party challenged the validity of the prenuptial agreement or any of its provisions. During cross-examination, wife concurred that "the prenuptial agreement that everybody concedes is valid" was in fact "prepared by [her] lawyer." The trial judge clarified wife's understanding of the "future property" portion of the prenuptial agreement:
Husband understood the prenuptial agreement to mean the same thing:
Neither party argued that the prenuptial agreement should be declared void for indefiniteness or set aside as insufficient to overcome the presumption of marital property under Code § 20-107.3.
In a final decree entered in August 2003, the trial court awarded a no-fault divorce to wife. The court awarded the marital home to wife, but ordered her to pay husband $26,250, an amount "representing 35% of the equity in the property." The court valued the home at $183,000 and determined the mortgage indebtedness to be $108,000. The court also found that the stove, refrigerator and a dining room chandelier should be "deemed part of, and included with, the marital residence."1
When distributing the personalty, the court disregarded the prenuptial agreement altogether on the ground that it was "less than clear" and "imprecise and conflicting." The court characterized the parties' consensus interpretation of the agreement as a "whoever paid for it" basis for separate ownership. That interpretation, the court held, conflicted with the "in possession" language of the agreement. As a result, the court reasoned, the agreement did not overcome the marital property presumption of Code § 20-107.3. Having found the agreement ineffectual, the court held that all items of personal property would be "hereby deemed marital property" and divided among the parties pursuant to the discretionary factors of Code § 20-107.3(E).
Finally, the trial court found husband in contempt for his "deliberate misrepresentations to the Court" and his "willful failure to abide by the orders of this Court." Characterizing husband's conduct during the litigation as "obstructive and in bad faith," the court ordered him to pay wife $2,500 towards wife's attorney's fees and costs.
On appeal, husband argues that the trial court (a) abused its discretion in failing to award him 50% of the equity in the home, (b) erroneously found the prenuptial agreement too indefinite to be enforced, and (c) awarded "excessive" attorney's fees to wife.
Husband's first argument — that the trial court erred in awarding the marital home to wife and making her pay him 35% of its equity value — has no merit. Husband made an in-court stipulation to submit the home to a judicial auction. At that auction, husband bought the property and agreed to pay wife $84,000. Husband defaulted on his agreement, leaving the trial court with a broad range of options to cure the default. The trial court chose to relieve husband of his contractual obligation and to order that wife pay him $26,500 (35% of the home's $75,000 equity). The net effect of the court's decision was to improve husband's financial position from what it would have been had he complied with the contractual duties he assumed under the judicial auction. The trial court's decision, therefore, was considerably more equitable to husband than he had a right to expect.
That so, we cannot perceive any principled legal basis for husband's assertion that this benefit prejudiced his rights under the equitable distribution statute. See generally Code § 20-107.3(E)(7) (); Code § 20-107.3(E)(10) (). "A decision involving the equitable distribution of marital property `rests within the sound discretion of the trial court,' and can be overturned only by a showing of an abuse of that discretion." Owens v. Owens, 41 Va.App. 844, 853, 589 S.E.2d 488, 493 (2003) (citing Mir v. Mir, 39 Va.App. 119, 125, 571 S.E.2d 299, 302 (2002)) (citation omitted). No such showing has been made on this issue.
Husband next contends that the trial court erred by refusing to enforce the prenuptial agreement when distributing the personal property of the parties. We agree.
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Williams v. Williams, Record No. 1176-08-2 (Va. App. 7/21/2009)
...`We deny wife's request for attorney's fees on appeal given husband's position as prevailing party....' Smith v. Smith, 43 Va. App. 279, 291 n.6, 597 S.E.2d 250, 256 n.6 (2004)." Rogers v. Rogers, 51 Va. App. 261, 274, 656 S.E.2d 436, 442 (2008). Therefore, we deny attorney's fees and costs......
-
Cirrito v. Cirrito
...evidence that the husband's conduct compounded the cost of litigation requiring him to reimburse her fees. Cf. Smith v. Smith, 43 Va.App. 279, 290, 597 S.E.2d 250, 256 (2004) ("The award of [attorney's] fees seems to us particularly appropriate given the effort required to litigate the issu......
-
Courtney v. Courtney, Record No. 2124-05-1 (Va. App. 6/20/2006)
...ambiguous provision. See Vilseck v. Vilseck, 45 Va. App. 581, 588-89, 612 S.E.2d 746, 749-50 (2005); Smith v. Smith, 43 Va. App. 279, 287-88, 597 S.E.2d 250, 254-55 (2004). As footnote 1 of the majority opinion alludes, husband's attempt at proffering a "reasonable" interpretation was to sa......
-
Sfreddo v. Sfreddo
...attorney fees for costs on appeal. As both parties have partially prevailed, we deny any award of fees. See Smith v. Smith, 43 Va.App. 279, 291 n. 6, 597 S.E.2d 250, 256 n. 6 (2004).IV. CONCLUSION The trial court erred in holding husband's acquisition of half the stock of Triple S was not a......