Smith v. St. Paul Guardian Ins. Co., Civ. No. 85-3025.
Decision Date | 25 November 1985 |
Docket Number | Civ. No. 85-3025. |
Citation | 622 F. Supp. 867 |
Parties | William Joseph SMITH, Plaintiff, v. ST. PAUL GUARDIAN INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Arkansas |
Walter R. Niblock, Fayetteville, Ark., and Terry M. Poynter, Mountain Home, Ark., for plaintiff.
Wm. Robert Still, Jr., Fayetteville, Ark., for defendant.
This is a declaratory judgment action arising under 28 U.S.C. § 2201 to determine the duty, if any, on the part of the defendant insurer to defend the plaintiff in an alienation of affections action currently pending in Baxter County Circuit Court. Jurisdiction and venue are properly in this court.
Defendant issued policies numbered 9LA6A2286 and 503XB3898 to the plaintiff, covering him for a blanket liability of $300,000.00 and $1,000,000.00, respectively. It is admitted that the actions and conduct on the part of the plaintiff which allegedly constitute the tort of alienation of affections occurred during the policy period. A demand was made on the defendant to defend the plaintiff in the pending Baxter County tort action and the defendant has denied the existence of any duty to defend and has refused plaintiff's demand.
Both parties admit that there are no disputed questions of material fact and that the sole issue presented is one of law, i.e., the construction and interpretation of the policy provisions with reference to defendant's contractual duty to defend. Accordingly, the action is before the court pursuant to the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment.
The underlying insurance policy is a Pak II "plain language" policy. The policy provides, inter alia:
(Umbrella Policy, §§ I-II).
(Umbrella Policy, Definitions 9, 10)
Defendant argues that alienation of affections is not included within the definition of "personal injury" in the coverage sections of the policies. Defendant further contends that even if alienation of affections is included in the term "personal injury," it is nonetheless excluded from coverage under the definition of "accident" and "occurrence." Defendant additionally asserts that to allow coverage for the tort of alienation of affections would violate the public policy of the state of Arkansas.
The primary policy, the Pak II, defines "personal injury" as including (emphasis added). In the umbrella policy the term "personal injuries" includes the above as well as "sickness," "disability," "false imprisonment," "detention," "malicious prosecution," "humiliation," and "assault and battery" to protect persons or property.
Thus, if the injury sustained by the complainant in the alienation of affections action includes any injury to his feeling similar to mental anguish, shock, or humiliation, then the complainant has alleged a "personal injury" as defined by the policies. This does not necessarily resolve the issues of coverage or the duty to defend, but it does initially disclose whether the injuries sustained by the complainant fall within those against which plaintiff is insured.
The complainant seeks damages for loss of "consortium, comfort, companionship, love, affection and society of his wife."
The court notes that the term "comfort" includes things which bring ease, contentment, and enjoyment, Strite v. McGinnes, 330 F.2d 234 (3rd Cir.1964), and denotes whatever is necessary for physical, mental and spiritual fulfillment. Emmert v. Old Nat. Bank, 246 S.E.2d 236. In essence, then, the complainant seeks compensation for the loss of contentment, enjoyment and physical, mental and spiritual fulfillment he received from his wife's companionship, love and affection during the marriage. The court believes that this is merely another way of stating that the complainant has allegedly suffered a mental injury "like" mental anguish, shock and humiliation because of the plaintiff's conduct. The injury alleged is not a bodily injury, as that term is normally understood, nor a financial one, but rather is an emotional deprivation occasioned by the loss of the complainant's wife's affections. Where adultery is involved it is clear that the primary remedy is damages for emotional distress. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 685 comment g at 485. As Professor Prosser notes in his treatise: "There has been a gradual shift of emphasis away from `services' and toward a recognition of more intangible elements in the domestic relations, such as companionship and affection." Prosser, Law of Torts § 118 at 895. To maintain the alienation of affections action, Prosser, supra, at 897-98. The alienation tort is, thus, based upon an interference with the consortium of the spouse. Orlando v. Alamo, 646 F.2d 1288 (8th Cir.1981) (applying Arkansas law).
Damages caused by a loss of the consortium of a spouse are routinely "passed along" to insurers in accidental personal injury actions. The injuries suffered by the complainant are clearly injuries to his "feeling" "like" mental injury, anguish, shock and humiliation. Had the plaintiff accidently mortally wounded the complainant's wife, rather than merely "alienated" her affections, the court believes that the injuries sustained by the complainant, including loss of consortium, sex and comfort, would clearly constitute "personal injuries" within the meaning of the policies and would be compensable thereunder, assuming all other criteria are satisfied. This being the case, there is no reason why the same elements of damage standing alone would not qualify as "personal injuries" under the policies.
The "plain-language" Pak II policy lacks precision and clarity in defining the term "personal injuries," as defined by the nonexclusive list of examples included therein, and in the court's view is ambiguous. The term, as defined, is fairly capable of construction as including the injuries suffered by the complainant. The terms of this policy are to be construed against the defendant, and any doubt as to the meaning of any...
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