Smith v. State

• Docket Number: 14-23-00048-CR
• Decision Date: 27 February 2024
• Citation: 693 S.W.3d 781
• Parties: Champagne SMITH, Appellant v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

693 S.W.3d 781

Champagne SMITH, Appellant

v.The STATE of Texas, Appellee

NO. 14-23-00048-CR

Court of Appeals of Texas, Houston (14th Dist.).

Opinion filed February 27, 2024

On Appeal from the 338th District Court, Harris County, Texas, Trial Court CauseNo. 1699492

Ryan Carlyle Kent, Houston, Jessica Alane Caird, Kim K. Ogg, Houston, for Appellee.

Sophie Bossart, Jani J. Maselli Wood, Scott Christopher Pope, for Appellant.

Panel consists of Chief Justice Christopher and Justices Wise and Jewell.

OPINION

Kevin Jewell, Justice

A Harris County grand jury indicted appellant Champagne Smith for the second-degree felony offense of aggravated assault.At her January 2023 trial, the court required all persons, including witnesses, to wear facial coverings while in the courtroom unless in-court identification was needed.The jury found appellant guilty.The dispositive question in this appeal is whether the trial court’s witness masking policy complied with the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee that, in all criminal prosecutions "the accused shall enjoy the right … to be confronted with the witnesses against him."Because we conclude that the trial court’s policy did not comport with this guarantee, we reverse and remand for a new trial.

Background

The indictment alleged that appellant unlawfully, intentionally, and knowingly caused bodily injury to Tajada Lewis by striking Tajada with a deadly weapon, a wrench.This charge arose out of a physical confrontation involving appellant and her sisters, Keitrick Kellup and Kenyetta Smith, who together allegedly assaulted Tajada and Ariell Kellup(the "Complainants").

The following was Ariell’s version of events.Tajada and Ariell were temporarily staying with Ariell’s brother, Edward, and his wife, Keitrick.Keitrick and Adell did not "get along," and Keitrick wanted Tajada and Ariell to leave.On the day in question, Keitrick and Ariell "exchanged words."Appellant was not present during this verbal exchange.Soon after, and in part to avoid any physical confrontation, Tajada and Ariell left the house and drove with another person, Mitchell, to a parking lot nearby, where they discussed plans to stay with another relative.

About ten minutes later, Keitrick and her sisters drove into the lot and blocked Complainants’ car from leaving.Appellant and Keitrick approached Complainants’ car.Appellant was yelling.Then Keitrick broke the passenger window with a socket wrench.Ariell jumped from the car and ran around the lot while verbally taunting appellant and her sisters.Appellant caught up and tried to kick Ariell, but missed; Ariell then hit appellant, who fell to the ground.Joining the fray, Kenyetta attempted to spray Ariell with pepper spray, but instead sprayed herself.

Things quickly escalated when Keitrick used the wrench to hit Ariell in the head at least three times.Meanwhile, appellant and Kenyetta focused their attention on Tajada, who came to Ariell’s aid.Ariell saw appellant and Kenyetta stomping on Tajada.Ariell could not recall how the fight ended but remembered picking up Tajada and putting her in the car.Tajada was bleeding significantly from her back, which Ariell tried to stop by applying pressure.Ariell and Tajada were driven to the hospital.Both suffered injuries, but Tajada’s were more significant.Her lung collapsed and she had several cuts that needed stitches or staples.While Ariell was released from the hospital after one day, Tajada remained for almost a week.

Tajada’s testimony largely aligned with Ariell’s.After seeing Keitrick hit Ariell with the wrench, Tajada came to help.Tajada tried to take the wrench from Keitrick, but as she did, appellant hit her in the back and then Keitrick continued "strik[ing her] in the back."According to Tajada, appellant was the first person to hit both Tajada and Ariell.While Ariell was on the ground bleeding from the head, appellant and Kenyetta held down Tajada while Keitrick hit Tajada with the wrench.Like Ariell, Tajada did not remember how the fight ended.Tajada "blacked out" while in the car and woke up at the hospital.

Houston Police Department OfficerNicolas Holt was dispatched to the hospital in response to the assault.He interviewed Tajada and Ariell and completed a report.Officer Holt testified that the wrench used in the attack was a deadly weapon.

Tajada and Ariell filed a report with Detective Kelli Yeamans of the Houston Police Department Family Violence Division.Detective Yeamans attempted several times to contact appellant, Keitrick, and Kenyetta, as well as Edward and Mitchell, leaving her contact information.None of the suspects or witnesses ever responded.She determined that Ariell and appellant engaged in "mutual combat," but Tajada was not involved in the initial altercation.Detective Yeamans testified that the wrench used in the attack was a deadly weapon.

The trial court required everyone in the courtroom to wear surgical masks throughout proceedings, including during voir dire and all witness testimony, except when necessary for in-court identification.Before voir dire, appellant’s counsel objected to this requirement on Sixth Amendment grounds.Counsel complained that masking witnesses during live testimony would inhibit the jury’s ability to fully assess witness demeanor and credibility.The State offered no response to the objection, and the court overruled it.The court made no findings, and no party requested them.The record sufficiently dem- onstrates the court enforced its masking policy.¹

The State’s theory was that appellant was criminally responsible for Keitrick’s assault of Tajada under the law of parties.The trial court included the following instruction in the jury charge:

All persons are parties to an offense who are guilty of acting together in the commission of the offense.A person is criminally responsible as a party to an offense if the offense is committed by her own conduct, by the conduct of another for which she is criminally responsible, or by both.

A person is criminally responsible for an offense committed by the conduct of another if, acting with intent to promote or assist the commission of the offense, she solicits, encourages, directs, aids, or attempts to aid the other person to commit the offense.Mere presence alone will not constitute one a party to an offense.

The jury found appellant guilty of aggravated assault and assessed punishment at ten years’ confinement with a recommendation of community supervision and a $10,000 fine.The trial court signed a judgment in accordance with the jury’s verdict.Appellant did not file a motion for new trial.

Analysis

A.Evidentiary Sufficiency

In her first issue, appellant argues that the evidence is legally insufficient to support the verdict of aggravated assault under the law of parties.Appellant asserts that the State failed to prove that appellant committed an act in furtherance of Keitrick’s assault with the wrench and also failed to prove that appellant knew that Keitrick would use the wrench as a deadly weapon.We address this issue first because it would afford appellant the greatest relief if sustained.SeeFinley v. State, 529 S.W.3d 198, 202(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]2017, pet. refd).

1.Standard of Review and Applicable Law

[1, 2] In reviewing a judgment of conviction for legal sufficiency, "we consider all the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and determine whether, based on that evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom, a rational juror could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt."Hooper v. State,214 S.W.3d 9, 13(Tex. Crim. App.2007)(citingJackson v. Virginia,443 U.S. 307, 318-19, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560(1979)).We presume that the jury resolved conflicting inferences in favor of the verdict, and we defer to its determination of evidentiary weight and witness credibility.SeeBraughton v. State,569 S.W.3d 592, 607-08(Tex. Crim. App.2018);Criff v. State,438 S.W.3d 134, 136-37(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]2014, pet. ref’d).

[3]We consider both direct and circumstantial evidence, as well as any reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the evidence.SeeBalderas v. State, 517 S.W.3d 756, 766(Tex. Crim. App.2016).Circumstantial evidence is as probative as direct evidence in establishing the guilt of an actor, and circumstantial evidence alone can be sufficient to establish guilt.SeeHooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13.

[4]We measure the evidence by the elements of the offense as defined by the hypothetically correct jury charge.Braughton, 569 S.W.3d at 608.A person commits the offense of aggravated assault if the person commits assault as defined in Penal Code section 22.01 and the person uses or exhibits a deadly weapon during the commission of the assault.SeeTex. Penal Code § 22.02(a).A person commits assault if she intentionally or knowingly causes bodily injury to another.Id.§ 22.01(a)(1).Bodily injury means physical pain, illness, or any impairment of physical condition.Id.§ 1.07(a)(8);Garcia v. State, 667 S.W.3d 756, 762-63(Tex. Crim. App.2023)."Deadly weapon" includes anything that in the manner of its use or intended use is capable of causing death or serious bodily injury.Tex. Penal Code § 1.07(a)(17)(B);Rodriguez v. State, 629 S.W.3d 229, 236(Tex. Crim. App.2021).

Under the law of parties, a "person is criminally responsible as a party to an offense if the offense is committed by his own conduct, by the conduct of another for which he is criminally responsible, or by both."Tex. Penal Code § 7.01(a).Under section 7.02(a)(2), a person is criminally responsible for an offense committed by the conduct of another if, acting with intent to promote or assist the commission of the offense, he solicits, encourages, directs, aids, or attempts to aid the other person to commit the offense.Id.§ 7.02(a)(2).

[5–7] In performing a legal sufficiency analysis in a law of parties case, "we...