Smith v. State
Decision Date | 05 July 1909 |
Docket Number | 13,863 |
Citation | 95 Miss. 786,49 So. 945 |
Court | Mississippi Supreme Court |
Parties | CHARLES R. SMITH v. STATE OF MISSISSIPPI |
FROM the circuit court of Lowndes county, HON. JOHN L. BUCKLEY Judge.
Smith appellant, was indicted, tried and convicted of murder sentenced to the penitentiary for life and appealed to the supreme court. The judges were not unanimous in their conclusions touching the facts. The opinion in chief sufficiently states the facts as ascertained from the record by a majority of the court to render a further statement by the reporter unnecessary to a comprehension of the principles decided. The chief justice dissented from some of the findings of fact by the other judges, as shown by his dissenting opinion.
Judgment affirmed.
Defendant was convicted in the court below of murder, sentenced to life imprisonment in the state penitentiary, and appeals to this court. His defense was delusional insanity; the particular delusion being that his daughter had been debauched by Laurent, the man whom he killed. One of the assignments of error is that the verdict was not warranted by the evidence. The testimony in this case is so voluminous that an intelligent review of the same would require a volume in itself and would serve no good purpose; suffice it to say that on the evidence the question of defendant's criminal responsibility was for the jury, and, unless some error of law was committed prejudicial to the defendant, the verdict, of course, must stand.
On the cross-examination of the defendant he was asked, and permitted to testify over his objection, to his conduct in several fights which he had had with various parties at various times, when there was no pretense of his not being sane. Other witnesses testified, over defendant's objection, to this conduct also. This action of the court is also assigned as error. This evidence was relevant to the issue and perfectly competent. Where the defense is insanity, general or partial, the door is thrown wide open for the admission of evidence; every act of the party's life is relevant to the issue and admissible in evidence. 1 Wigmore on Evidence, § 228, and authorities there cited; State v. Jones, 50 N.H. 369, 9 Am. Rep. 242.
The twentieth instruction asked by the defendant was as follows: "If from the evidence the jury believe that, at the time of the killing, the defendant honestly and in good faith believed that deceased had seduced and ruined his only daughter, and that such belief on the part of the defendant had no foundation in truth and fact, and that on the occasion of the killing the defendant, on meeting the deceased, was seized with an insane and irresistible impulse to kill him because he believed that the deceased had seduced and ruined his only daughter, and that the defendant's act in killing deceased was the direct result of said uncontrollable impulse, springing from a mental disease, existing to so high a degree that for the time being it overwhelmed the reason, judgment, and conscience of the defendant, then he is not guilty, and the jury will acquit." This instruction was modified by adding after the word "defendant" and before the word "then" in the last line the words "that he was unable to distinguish moral right from wrong." And this action of the court is assigned as error.
Where the defense is insanity, total or partial, the test of the defendant's criminal responsibility is his ability, at the time he committed the act, to realize and appreciate the nature and quality thereof--his ability to distinguish right and wrong. Grissom v. State, 62 Miss. 167. And the test is the same where the defense is that the act was the result of an uncontrollable impulse caused by any species of insanity. This is distinctly held in Commonwealth v. Rogers, 7 Metc. 500, 41 Am. Dec. 458, and Cunningham v. State, 56 Miss. 269, 21 Am. Rep. 360, so much relied upon by the appellant, and the reasons therefor clearly set forth.
Uncontrollable impulse as a defense when the defendant is able to distinguish right from wrong was in the Cunningham case repudiated in the following language: " It is true that in that case it was also held that an uncontrollable impulse springing from mental disease existing to so high a degree that for the time it overwhelmed the reason, judgment, and conscience would excuse the commission of crime. Where a person's reason, judgment, and conscience is overwhelmed, it is utterly impossible, of course, for him to distinguish the right and wrong of a matter.
In Commonwealth v. Rogers, supra, Shaw, C. J., said:
Our interpretation of these cases is sustained by many high authorities, among whom are Mr. Bishop. In his work on Criminal Law (8th ed.) vol. 1, § 383b, Mr. Bishop says: "But many seem to maintain that if one is so disordered mentally as, while intellectually comprehending right and wrong, and knowing an act to be forbidden and punishable by the law, to be still unable to adjust his conduct to the law and avoid doing the forbidden thing, he is to be punished if he does it, the same as though he was same," citing in support thereof, among other authorities, the Cunningham case. And again, in section 384, he says: In support thereof he cites many authorities, among them being Commonwealth v. Rogers, supra, and Grissom v. State, 62 Miss. 167.
In this last-cited case CHALMERS, J., author of the opinion in the Cunningham case, said: "The test with us in this class of cases is the capacity to distinguish between right and wrong, and we know no difference in this regard between total and partial insanity." In People v Hubert, 119 Cal. 216, 51 P. 329, 63 Am. St. Rep. 77, it is said: ...
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