Smith v. State

• Citation: 125 N.E. 841,227 N.Y. 405
• Parties: SMITH v. STATE.
• Decision Date: 06 January 1920
• Court: New York Court of Appeals

227 N.Y. 405

125 N.E. 841

SMITH

v.STATE.

Court of Appeals of New York.

Jan. 6, 1920.

Action by William H. Smith against the State of New York. From a judgment (185 App. Div. 918,171 N. Y. Supp. 1100) affirming a judgment of the Court of Claims for plaintiff, the defendant appeals.

Reversed, and claim dismissed.

Hogan and Crane, JJ., dissenting.

Appeal from Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third department.

Charles D. Newton, Atty. Gen. (J. L. Cheney, of Syracuse, of counsel), for the State.

John B. Corcoran, of Buffalo, for respondent.

McLAUGHLIN, J.

The State of New York, under chapter 336, Laws of 1883, acquired the property known as the state reservation at Niagara. It is controlled and managed by the state through a board of five commissioners appointed by the Governor. The commissioners are required by statute to pay into the state treasury, on the 1st day of each month, all receipts and earnings received from the management of the reservation and to make an annual report to the Legislature giving a detailed statement of all receipts and expenditures for the preceding year. Public Lands Law (Consol. Laws, c. 46) §§ 100-106. The state derives a small revenue from the reservation; e. g., fares paid on the ‘inclined railway,’ the little steamer known as the Maid of the Mist, and rental from a street railway company which operates a part of its line on the reservation. The purpose of the reservation is declared by statute. Public Lands Law, § 103. It is:

‘The state reservation at Niagara shall forever be reserved by the state for the purpose of restoring the scenery of Niagara Falls and preserving it in its natural condition, and kept open and free of access to all mankind without fee, charge or expense to any person for entering upon or passing to or over any part thereof.’

The claimant, shortly after 11 o'clock at night on April 25, 1915, entered the park by a cinder path, from which he undertook to pass on to the grass adjoining, when he tripped and fell over a wire strung on iron posts 12 or 18 inches high along the edge of the path, and sustained serious injuries, for which he recovered before the Court of Claims a judgment for a substantial amount, on the theory that the wire was negligently placed and maintained by the officers and agents of the state. An appeal was taken by the state to the Appellate Division, Third Department, where the same was affirmed, one of the justices dissenting, and it now appeals to this court.

The question presented by the appeal is an important one. It is whether the immunity of the state from liability for the tortious acts of its officers and agents has been waived by section 264 of the Code of Civil Procedure. This section, or so much of it as is material to the determination of the question, reads:

‘The Court of Claims possesses all of the powers and jurisdiction of the former board of claims. It also has jurisdiction to hear and determine a private claim against the state. * * * In no case shall any liability be implied against the state, and no award shall be made on any claim against the state except upon such legal evidence as would establish liability against an individual or corporation in a court of law or equity.’

[1] The rule is well settled that the state is not liable for injuries arising from the negligence of its officers and agents unless such liability has been assumed by constitutional or legislative enactment. Locke v. State of New York, 140 N. Y. 480, 35 N. E. 1076;Sipple v. State of New York, 99 N. Y. 284, 1 N. E. 892,3 N. E. 657. This court, in Litchfield v. Pond, 186 N. Y. 66, 83,78 N. E. 719, 725, declared the general rule, and in doing so said:

‘The cases which are sometimes referred to as exceptions to this general rule are not exceptions at all, for they do not fall within the rule. When a state, by express enactment of statutes, assumes responsibility for such torts of its officers and agents as are not affected or controlled by the fundamental law, it makes a new rule for itself. Instances of that kind are to be found in Sipple v. State of N. Y., 99 N. Y. 284, 1 N. E. 892,3 N. E. 657, where the Legislature enacted a statute making the state liable for the negligent operation of its canal locks, upon proof that would create a legal liability against an individual or a private corporation, and in Woodman v. State of New York, 127 N. Y. 397, 28 N. E. 20, where negligence in the maintenance of a defective canal bridge was attributed to the state under a similar statute.’

[2] The exemption of the state from liability for the torts of its officers and agents does not depend upon its immunity from action without its consent, but rests upon grounds of public policy that no obligation arises therefrom. Burroughs v. Commonwealth, 224 Mass. 28, 112 N. E. 491, Ann. Cas. 1917A, 38;Murdock Parlor Grate Co. v. Commonwealth, 152 Mass. 28, 24 N. E. 854,8 L. R. A. 399;Riddoch v. State, 68 Wash. 329, 123 Pac. 450,42 L. R. A. (N. S.) 251, Ann. Cas. 1913E, 1033;Davis v. State, 30 Idaho, 137, 163 Pac. 373, Ann. Cas. 1918D, 911.

[3] It is contended by the respondent, and he has been sustained by the Court of Claims and Appellate Division, that the state has assumed this obligation by the enactment of the section of the Code of Civil Procedure to which reference has been made. I am of the opinion the section does not bear such construction. It was not enacted, as it seems to me, for the purpose of extending or enlarging the liability of the state, but solely for the purpose of declaring the...