Smith v. State

• Decision Date: 15 April 1913
• Citation: 182 Ala. 38,62 So. 184
• Parties: SMITH v. STATE.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

62 So. 184

182 Ala. 38

SMITH v. STATE.

Supreme Court of Alabama

April 15, 1913

Appeal from City Court of Gadsden; J.A. Bilbro, Judge.

Mark Smith was convicted of murder, and appeals. Reversed and remanded.

The facts sufficiently appear from the opinion.

The following charges were refused the defendant:

(5) "You cannot convict the defendant unless the evidence be so strong and convincing as to exclude every other reasonable hypothesis except that of the guilt of defendant, and if after considering all the evidence in the case, that tends to show guilt, as well as that tending to show innocence, the jury should have a reasonable doubt as to whether the defendant is guilty or innocent, they must acquit him."

(7) Same as 5.

(13) Bases an acquittal unless the jury are convinced by the evidence of the defendant's guilt, in such a manner that they would each venture to act upon it in matters of the highest concern and importance to themselves.

(16) "The court charges the jury, if, after considering all the evidence in the case, that tending to show guilt together with the tendency to show innocence, there should spring up involuntarily in the minds of the jury from any part of the evidence a probability of the innocence of the defendant, the jury must acquit."

A1. "A person's mind is diseased when there is lack of ease, uneasiness, distress, trouble, trial, a derangement of any of the vital functions in which their natural action is interrupted or disturbed, and causing pain and weakness morbid or unhealthy condition, malady and sickness, and if after you have considered all the evidence in this case, you should become satisfied that defendant's mind at the time he fired the fatal shot was so diseased that he might know right from wrong, but his mind so afflicted and diseased as to render him incapable of refraining from doing the act, and that such mental aberration or affliction had relation to the shooting of the deceased, then I charge you the defendant would not be legally responsible, and it would be your duty to so find."

D1. "The court charges the jury the law never presumes a defendant guilty of murder when upon trial upon an indictment therefor, but presumes he is innocent of such crime, and when a defendant, as in this case, interposes the plea of not guilty, together with the plea of not guilty by reason of insanity at the time of the killing, the burden is on the defendant to reasonably satisfy the jury by the evidence that at the time of the killing of the deceased he possessed such mental aberration, disease, or affliction of mind relative to the acts charged as to either render him incapable of knowing right from wrong, or of choosing between right and wrong, and if, after you have considered all the evidence in the case, including that tending to show mental duress and unsoundness of mind, you should become reasonably satisfied that by reason of mental insanity and disease of defendant he did not at the time he fired the fatal shot possess the ability to refrain from doing the act, or that there exists in the mind of the jury a reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt of any crime charged in the indictment, then it will be your duty to so find by your verdict."

E1. "The court charges the jury that in determining whether or not the defendant was, at the time of the killing of deceased, insane or possessed such mental aberration or disease as to render him incapable of choosing between right and wrong, you have the right to consider the evidence, if any, tending to show that deceased had made the statements concerning his mother and sister, also the treatment defendant was advised his mother and sister had received at the hands of the deceased, the threats made by the deceased to kill defendant's mother and sister, the evidence, if any, tending to show that defendant on his return from the navy found his mother and sister in constant state of fear and dread, to such an extent that they refused to retire at night, and the evidence, if any, that defendant was nervous and sleepy, that he rested under a dread and constant fear of impending danger to his mother and sister from the deceased, and all other facts and circumstances which may tend to show mental disturbance of the defendant; and, after you have considered all in connection with the evidence of the state tending to show the sanity of the defendant, it will be your duty to find whether or not the defendant has reasonably satisfied you from the evidence that he was afflicted mentally as not to be able to refrain from doing the shooting of the deceased, and, if he has so reasonably satisfied you from all the evidence, it will be your duty to find by your verdict that he is not legally responsible for the crime charged."

X2. "In order to constitute a crime, the accused must have, at the time, memory and intelligence sufficient to know the act he is about to commit is wrong; to remember and understand that if he commits the act he will be punished, and, besides this, reason and will to enable him to comprehend and choose between supposed advantage at the gratification he obtained by the criminal act and the immunity from punishment, which he will secure from abstaining from it."

O3. "The failure of juries to do their duty in other trials of homicides in this county has nothing to do with this case, and should not influence your verdict. You are to try this case according to the evidence adduced from witnesses, and under the law as it is given you by the court, and render your verdict accordingly."

Y2. "If the jury believe and are reasonably satisfied from the evidence that the defendant was moved to action in shooting the deceased by an insane impulse controlling his will and his judgment, then he is not guilty of the crime charged."

W.J. Boykin, of Gadsden, for appellant.

R.C. Brickell, Atty. Gen., and W.L. Martin, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.

SOMERVILLE J.

The defendant, 20 years of age, after four years absence in the naval service, returned home and was living in the house with his mother and sister. He reached home on Friday, and on the following Thursday night he killed his brother-in-law, Turner Lewis, by shooting him to death with a pistol. He was indicted for murder and tried on pleas of "not guilty," and "not guilty by reason of insanity." He was found guilty of murder in the second degree and sentenced to imprisonment for 40 years.

Defendant's sister was the wife of deceased, but had separated from him some time previously, after which deceased had repeatedly exhibited hostility towards her and her mother and younger brother, manifested by threats to kill, and charges of unchastity and prostitution. He had also, it is claimed stolen away from his wife one of their two children, a little girl, and carried her to Atlanta and placed her with another woman in a house of ill fame, from which she was afterwards rescued by the mother. Upon his return home, defendant, who was in poor health, was informed of these grievous wrongs, and, according to the testimony of the members of his family, was profoundly affected thereby, and had brooded over them until his mind was affected and he became insane. On the night of the killing his mother had called him home and discussed with him the fact of deceased's presence near by in Alabama City, as a result of which she had gone to bed nervous and ill. After waiting there a few minutes, defendant put a pistol in his pocket, went to Alabama City, and, going to the house of one Noble, where deceased was staying, he requested of Noble an interview with deceased. The latter had retired to bed, but Noble showed defendant into his room and left him there. Defendant's account of what followed is as follows: On direct examination: "I went in there and spoke to Lewis and asked him how he was, and told him to get up and come outside; I wanted to talk to him. He said, 'What in the hell do you want?' and ran his hand under the pillow. When he did that, I asked him what he had to say for himself, and that is the last I realized what I had done. *** I did not appreciate what I was doing at...