Smith v. State
Decision Date | 23 August 2022 |
Docket Number | Court of Appeals Case No. 21A-CR-2493 |
Citation | 194 N.E.3d 118 |
Parties | Robert Eugene SMITH, Jr., Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff |
Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
194 N.E.3d 118
Robert Eugene SMITH, Jr., Appellant-Defendant,
v.
STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff
Court of Appeals Case No. 21A-CR-2493
Court of Appeals of Indiana.
FILED August 23, 2022
Attorney for Appellant: Lisa Diane Manning, Plainfield, Indiana
Attorneys for Appellee: Theodore E. Rokita, Attorney General of Indiana, J.T. Whitehead, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, Indiana
May, Judge.
1. Whether Smith's motion to dismiss was timely filed;
2. Whether Smith was under a legal obligation to register as a sex offender at the time of the alleged offenses; and
3. If Smith was under an obligation to register, whether the obligation was constitutional.
We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] On April 15, 2004, Smith committed Class D felony sexual battery3 and Class A felony domestic battery4 against an adult victim. At the time of those offenses, the Indiana Code imposed a lifetime registration obligation on offenders convicted of sexual battery when the offense included
[194 N.E.3d 122
the use of force or threat of force. See Ind. Code § 5-2-12-4(a)(10) (2003) & Ind. Code § 5-2-12-13 (2003). Effective July 1, 2007, the General Assembly amended the Indiana Code to require offenders convicted of sexual battery as a Class D felony to register for only ten years. See Ind. Code § 11-8-8-19 (2007).
[4] On June 22, 2018, Smith contacted the Johnson County Sheriff's Office to register his address in Johnson County. On June 26, 2018, Sergeant Bill Pfifer of the Johnson County Sheriff's Office composed the following memorandum, informing Smith that his registration obligation was only ten years and notifying him of a change in his registration status:
[194 N.E.3d 123
(App. Vol. II at 100.)
[194 N.E.3d 124
Don Donaldson, also of the Hendricks County Sheriff's Department, that she received information Smith no longer resided at his registered address. Detective Donaldson confirmed Smith vacated his registered address in mid-August, and the trial court issued a warrant for Smith's arrest.
Based on our records, Mr. Smith was convicted [of] Sexual Battery as a Class D felony in 2005. Both the charging information and probable cause affidavit state that force was used in the offense. Mr. Smith is required to register as a sex offender for life, with the use of force being the lifetime qualifier ( Indiana Code 11-8-8-19 ).
(Id. at 102.)
[7] The State filed a "motion to dismiss defendant's motion to dismiss" on the basis Smith's motion was untimely. (Id. at 108.) The State also argued Smith failed to put forth a compelling reason justifying retroactive application of the 2007 amendment shortening the registration period for those convicted of Class D felony sexual battery. On September 13, 2021, the trial court summarily denied Smith's motion to dismiss without conducting a hearing on the motion. The trial court subsequently certified its ruling for interlocutory appeal, and we accepted jurisdiction.
Discussion and Decision
1. Timeliness
[8] Before entertaining Smith's argument, we first address the State's argument that Smith's motion to dismiss was untimely filed and subject to denial on that basis. The trial court may summarily reject an untimely filed motion to dismiss a criminal information, and an untimely filed motion ordinarily results in waiver of the issue on appeal unless the defendant can demonstrate fundamental error. Chavez v. State , 988 N.E.2d 1226, 1230 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied. Indiana Code section 35-34-1-4, in relevant part, states:
(a) The court may, upon motion of the defendant, dismiss the indictment or information upon any of the following grounds:
(1) The indictment or information, or any count thereof, is defective under section 6 of this chapter.[9 ]
[194 N.E.3d 125
* * * * *...
(11) Any other ground that is a basis for dismissal as a matter of law.
(b) Except as otherwise provided, a motion under this section shall be made no later than:
(1) twenty (20) days if the defendant is charged with a felony; or
(2) ten (10) days if the defendant is charged only with one (1) or more misdemeanors;
prior to the omnibus date. A motion made thereafter may be summarily denied if based upon a ground specified in subdivision (a)(1), (a)(2), (a)(3), (a)(4), or (a)(5) of this section. A motion to dismiss based upon a
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