Smith v. State

• Decision Date: 20 September 1991
• Docket Number: CR-89-1290
• Citation: 588 So.2d 561
• Parties: Kenneth Eugene SMITH v. STATE.
• Court: Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals

Page 561

588 So.2d 561

Kenneth Eugene SMITH v. STATE.

CR-89-1290.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama.

Sept. 20, 1991.

David K. Howard and John M. Kennemer, Tuscumbia, for appellant.

James H. Evans, Atty. Gen., and J. Thomas Leverette and Sandra J. Stewart, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.

McMILLAN, Judge.

The appellant was convicted of the capital murder for pecuniary gain of Elizabeth Dorlene Sennett. The appellant's motion for change of venue was granted, transferring the case from Colbert County, Alabama, to Jefferson County, Alabama, for trial. Following the jury's verdict of guilt, a sentencing hearing was held before the jury, which resulted in an advisory sentence of death. A separate sentencing hearing was thereafter conducted before the trial court, following which the appellant was sentenced to death.

The record indicates that the victim, Elizabeth Dorlene Sennett, was married to Charles Sennett, a Church of Christ minister. Charles Sennett had suffered from mental problems in the past, and, at the time of the offense, was having an extramarital affair and was having financial difficulties. The evidence at trial indicated that Charles Sennett solicited Billy Gray Williams to kill his wife or to arrange to have his wife killed, in return for pecuniary consideration. Thereafter, Billy Williams approached the appellant concerning the matter. Although it is unclear whether the appellant initially believed that the proposition was merely to beat and to scare the victim, evidence revealed that, at least three days prior to the offense, the appellant was aware that he was expected to kill the victim. The appellant attempted to solicit a third party to participate in the offense; however, the party declined. The appellant then approached John Forrest Parker, who agreed to participate in the offense. Although he did not know the Sennetts' names, the appellant met with Charles Sennett and Billy Williams prior to the offense.

On the day of the offense, the appellant and John Parker drove to the Sennetts' residence. The victim, Elizabeth Sennett, was home alone. The two men knocked on the door and informed Elizabeth Sennett that they had been told by her husband that they could explore the Sennetts' property, because they wanted to hunt on the land. Elizabeth Sennett had the two men wait while she called her husband to verify their story. Charles Sennett apparently told his wife to allow them to walk around the property. Elizabeth Sennett remained inside the house while the two men walked around behind the property and, according to the appellant's statement, drove down the road and then returned. The men again knocked on the door and asked Elizabeth Sennett if they could use the bathroom and get some water. Elizabeth Sennett allowed them into the house and, while John Parker was in the bathroom, the appellant talked to Mrs. Sennett. John Parker approached Elizabeth Sennett from the rear and "blind-sided her." A beating then ensued, in which the victim apparently struggled for her life. The evidence indicated that during the beating any item within reach was used as a weapon. The men apparently used every piece of a fireplace set, a walking cane, and a piece of galvanized pipe and, after beating her, stabbed her eight times with a survival knife. Several of these weapons, or pieces thereof, including the survival knife, were later found in a pond located behind the Sennetts' residence. Although it is unclear whether both or only one of the men participated in the beating and subsequent stabbings, it is clear that both men were present and aiding in the offense.

In the appellant's statement, he indicated that they were told to make the offense look like a burglary "gone bad," and that therefore the men took a videocassette recorder and a stereo. Shortly after the killing, Charles Sennett returned to the house and telephoned the sheriff's office to report that someone had broken into his house and had killed his wife. A week later, when the investigation began centering around him, Charles Sennett killed himself. Billy Williams, John Parker, and the appellant were each paid $1000 by Charles Sennett for their participation in the offense.

I

The appellant argues that the State failed to present sufficient evidence to sustain his conviction of capital murder. Specifically, the appellant argues that the State failed to meet its burden of proof with respect to the element of pecuniary gain. The appellant admitted in his statement that he was to receive $1000 for the commission of the offense and that he was paid $200 in advance and that following the offense he received the remainder. However, the appellant argues that there was no independent proof of this element sufficient to allow this statement into evidence. See Bracewell v. State, 506 So.2d 354 (Ala.Cr.App.1986).

The State presented evidence through the testimony of one of the appellant's friends, who stated that he had known the appellant since kindergarten and had visited him daily. He testified that he had gone to the appellant's house the day after the murder and had noticed that the appellant had an unusually large amount of money. He testified that he believed that the money was in $20 denominations. He testified that he had never seen the appellant with that much money previously and that the appellant had told him that the money was from an income tax refund.

Another witness for the State, who testified that he was a close friend of the appellant's, stated that prior to the offense the appellant had solicited him to participate in the offense. The appellant told him that he knew where they could make some "fast cash," because a man needed someone "to hurt his old lady or something like that."

"Independent evidence of the corpus delicti need not be of such probative strength as that such evidence, standing alone, in the opinion of the trial or appellate court, would, ought to or probably would satisfy the jury beyond a reasonable doubt of the existence of the corpus delicti." C. Gamble, McElroy's Alabama Evidence § 304.01 (4th ed. 1991). Circumstantial evidence, as well as direct evidence, may provide this independent proof. Henderson v. State, 584 So.2d 841 (Ala.Cr.App.1988).

" '[T]he corpus delicti is a fact, proof of which may be established by circumstantial evidence, and if there is a reasonable inference to prove its existence the court should submit to the jury for consideration the question of the sufficiency and weight of the evidence tending to support that inference.' Hines [v. State, 260 Ala. 668, 671, 72 So.2d 296, 298 (1954) ]. " 'Positive, direct evidence of the corpus delicti is not indispensable for the admission of confessions. Whenever facts and circumstances are proven from which a jury might legally infer that the offense has been committed, the confessions are admissible." ' Snead [v. State, 251 Ala. 624, 627, 38 So.2d 576, 579 (1948) ] (quoting Ryan v. State, 100 Ala. 94, 95, 14 So. 868 (1894)).

" 'It is a well-settled rule that a confession is not admissible until the corpus delicti is first proven. But if any facts are shown from which the jury may reasonably infer that the crime has been committed, any other evidence tending to implicate the accused is thereby rendered admissible.

" 'It is also settled that--

" ' "Inconclusive facts and circumstances tending prima facie to show the corpus delicti may be aided by the admissions or confessions of accused so as to satisfy the jury beyond a reasonable doubt, and so to support a conviction, although such facts and circumstances, standing alone, would not thus satisfy the jury of the existence of the corpus delicti." Hill v. State, 207 Ala. 444, 93 South. 460; Matthews v. State, 55 Ala. 187; Ryan v. State, 100 Ala. 94, 14 South. 868; 16 Corpus Juris, § 1514, p. 737.'

"Arthur v. State, 19 Ala.App. 311, 312, 97 So. 158, 159 (1923). See also Ratliff v. State, 212 Ala. 410, 412, 102 So. 621, 623 (1924)."

Howell v. State, 571 So.2d 396, 397 (Ala.Cr.App.1990).

In the present case, it is undisputed that the victim was brutally beaten and stabbed to death. Moreover, the appellant's involvement is undisputed, although the appellant contested the extent of his involvement. The State has presented ample evidence to tie the appellant to the offense and to show that the victim was intentionally killed pursuant to a murder for hire. See Henderson v. State, supra. Therefore, we find that the State's evidence was sufficient to sustain the appellant's conviction and to allow the appellant's confession into evidence.

II

The appellant argues that the trial court's jury instructions on reasonable doubt violated the due process clause of the constitution. The appellant cites Cage v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. 39, 111 S.Ct. 328, 112 L.Ed.2d 339 (1990), in support of his argument. In that case, the United States Supreme Court held that an instruction on reasonable doubt impermissibly suggested a higher degree of doubt than is required for acquittal under the reasonable doubt standard of In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 1072, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970). The instructions given in Cage stated, in pertinent part:

" 'If you entertain a reasonable doubt as to any fact or element necessary to constitute the defendant's guilt, it is your duty to give him the benefit of that doubt and return a verdict of not guilty. Even where the evidence demonstrates a probability of guilt, if it does not establish such guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, you must acquit the accused. This doubt, however, must be a reasonable one; that is one that is founded upon a real tangible substantial basis and not upon mere caprice and conjecture. It must be such doubt as would give rise to a grave uncertainty, raised in your mind by reasons of the unsatisfactory character of the evidence or lack thereof. A reasonable doubt is not a mere possible doubt. It is an actual substantial doubt. It is a doubt that a...