Smith v. State
| Court | Arkansas Supreme Court |
| Writing for the Court | HAYS |
| Citation | Smith v. State, 303 Ark. 524, 798 S.W.2d 94 (Ark. 1990) |
| Decision Date | 05 November 1990 |
| Docket Number | No. CR,CR |
| Parties | Robert Junior SMITH, Appellant, v. STATE of Arkansas, Appellee. 90-8. |
Sam Pope, Crossett, for appellant.
Ann Purvis, Asst. Atty. Gen., Little Rock, for appellee.
Appellant Robert Junior Smith was convicted of first degree murder for the slaying of sixteen-year-old Evon ("Boo") Benton. On appeal Smith contends he was denied a speedy trial and the trial court erred on several evidentiary rulings. None of the points warrant reversal.
Appellant first argues the trial court erred by denying his motion to dismiss for a speedy trial violation. Appellant was arrested on April 5, 1988, and under A.R.Cr.P. Rule 28.1, should have been tried within twelve months, "excluding only such periods of necessary delay as are authorized in Rule 28.3." Appellant was not tried until June 6, 1989, some sixty-two days beyond twelve months, so unless there were excludable periods appellant was not tried within the time constraints of Rule 28.3.
The trial court found one excludable period of thirty-five days attributable to the pregnancy of the wife of appellant's attorney. Appellant does not contest this period but does contest a second period, from November 1, 1988, to November 30, 1988, which the trial court also excluded. On October 21, 1988, the trial court ordered a hearing for October 31 on a motion by the appellant to suppress evidence. Following that hearing the trial court took the motion under advisement, eventually denying it on December 29, 1988. Rule 28.3(a) permits the exclusion of time during which a pretrial motion is held under advisement, not exceeding thirty days, and on that basis the trial judge excluded thirty of the fifty-nine days the motion to suppress was under advisement.
Appellant points out that on the same date the trial court set the suppression hearing (October 21) it also granted a continuance at the request of the state to reschedule a November 1 trial date. The state's request was due to the crime lab not having completed certain tests. Appellant maintains that because the delay of the trial was attributable more to the state's motion than to his own, the thirty days his motion was under advisement should not be excluded under Rule 28.3(a). However, either was a sufficient basis for exclusion under the rule and we can find nothing in the record to sustain an inference that one was more influential than the other. Nothing in the rule expressly addresses this situation, but we note the language of the rule is mandatory: Rule 28.3 reads (before listing the excludable periods), "The following periods shall be excluded." [Our emphasis]. See McBride v. State, 297 Ark. 410, 762 S.W.2d 785 (1989) and Nelson v. State, 297 Ark. 58, 759 S.W.2d 215 (1988), where exclusions were without regard to whether the trial date was directly affected.
We believe this result is in harmony with federal cases interpreting an almost identical provision of the federal speedy trial rule. In United States v. Stafford, 697 F.2d 1368 (11th Cir.1983), the court pointed out that the language of the rule, like our own, is mandatory, adding this observation:
Moreover, a contrary reading would present extremely difficult practical questions of whether a particular motion did or did not actually delay the commencement of a trial. The virtual impossibility of making such a determination and the resulting uncertainty for defendants as to their speedy trial status require the conclusion that Congress could not have intended the statute to be read as appellees suggest.
We conclude that the trial court did not clearly err by excluding the thirty days during which the defendant's motion to suppress was under advisement.
The appellant next argues that the trial court erred in admitting hearsay statements of a three-year-old child who witnessed the murder of Evon Benton. The victim was the teenage sister of Linda Benton, who lived with the appellant. On the afternoon of April 3, 1988, a Sunday, Evon came over to their house while neither Linda nor appellant was at home. Appellant came home about 5:00 p.m. and found Evon in the house. There was an argument and appellant struck Evon repeatedly with a hammer. The medical examiner testified Evon had been struck twenty-five times about the head. When appellant was sure she was dead he moved her body in his car and placed it in a nearby field.
On the afternoon of the murder, Evon was babysitting Tarri, the three-year-old son of another sister, Dorothy Benton. Tarri was in the house and apparently witnessed the murder of Evon. On Sunday night Tarri was returned to Dorothy's house by appellant. The next morning Dorothy asked Tarri where Evon was and Tarri told her that "Robert Smith hit Boo in the head with a hammer, hunch her, throw her in some weeds and took her to a doctor." Tarri repeated this to the police on two more occasions on that same day. The police found the body shortly thereafter and arrested appellant.
A hearing was held on the admission of the statements made by Tarri. The trial court first found that Tarri was incompetent as a witness and then ruled that the statements would be admissible as hearsay under both the "excited utterance" exception, A.R.E. Rule 803(2) and, the "residual hearsay" exception, A.R.E. Rule 803(24). Appellant argues the trial court erred in this ruling and that the admission violated his confrontation right under the Sixth Amendment.
Tarri's hearsay statements were introduced at trial through the testimony of three witnesses. The first was his mother, Dorothy Benton, who testified that Tarri had made his statement to her first thing Monday morning after the murder. The second and third were the Eudora police chief, Lawrence Webster, and deputy sheriff Samuel Smith, Jr., who both testified that Tarri made the same statement to them, later that day. As we hold the statements were admissible under the excited utterance exception, we find it unnecessary to consider the residual hearsay exception.
In Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 110 S.Ct. 3139, 111 L.Ed.2d 638 (1990), the United States Supreme Court discussed the requirements of the Confrontation Clause with respect to hearsay in a criminal trial:
Although we have recognized that hearsay rules and the Confrontation Clause are generally designed to protect similar values, we have also been careful not to equate the Confrontation Clause's prohibitions with the general rule prohibiting the admission of hearsay statements. The Confrontation Clause, in other words, bars the admission of some evidence that would otherwise be admissible under an exception to the hearsay rule.
In Ohio v. Roberts, we set forth a general approach for determining when incriminating statements admissible under an exception to the hearsay rule also meet the requirements of the Confrontation Clause. We noted that the Confrontation Clause operates in two separate ways to restrict the range of admissible hearsay. First, in conformance with the Framers' preference for face-to-face accusation, the Sixth Amendment establishes a rule of necessity. In the usual case, the prosecution must either produce or demonstrate the unavailability of the declarant whose statement it wishes to use against the defendant. Second, once a witness is shown to be unavailable, his statement is admissible only if it bears adequate 'indicia of reliability.' Reliability can be inferred without more in a case where the evidence falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception. [Citations omitted.]
The first factor--a showing by the state that the child witness was unavailable at trial--was met in the finding of the trial court that the child witness, being two and one-half years old, was incapable of communicating with the jury, and, hence, tantamount to being unavailable. See Wright 110 S.Ct. at 3147. ("For purposes of deciding this case, we assume without deciding that, to the extent the unavailability requirement applies in this case, the younger daughter was an unavailable witness within the meaning of the Confrontation Clause.")
The second requirement, "indicia of reliability," derives from the "firmly rooted hearsay exception," i.e., the "excited utterance." See Wright, supra, which specifically refers to the excited utterance as an example of such an exception:
The basis for the 'excited utterance' exception, for example, is that such statements are given under circumstances that eliminate the possibility of fabrication, coaching or confabulation, and that therefore, the circumstances surrounding the making of the statement provide sufficient assurance that the statement is trustworthy and that cross-examination would be superfluous.
Appellant contends that Tarri's statements would not fall within this exception because of the lapse of time between the occurrence and the statement. We disagree. We first note the basic requirements of the excited utterance exception:
First there must be an occasion which excites the declarant. Second, the Statement must be uttered during the period of excitement and must express the declarant's reaction to the occasion. In practice, these tend to merge together. If there was a sudden event which startled the declarant, his ensuing utterance will be assumed to be his reaction to the stimulus; if the statement appears to be excited, it will be assumed that the occasion was exciting.
4 D. Louisell, Federal Evidence § 439 (1980).
The interval between a statement and an event is governed by the particular circumstances of each case. D. Binder, Hearsay Handbook § 2.03 (1983). "The general rule is that an utterance following an exciting event must be made soon enough thereafter that it can reasonably be considered a product of the stress of the excitement, rather than of intervening reflection or deliberation." Id. "The trend is toward expansion of the time interval after an exciting event and some courts are more...
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