Smith v. State

• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals
• Writing for the Court: Submitted before HARRELL and THIEME, JJ., and THEODORE G. BLOOM; HARRELL
• Citation: Smith v. State, 695 A.2d 575, 116 Md.App. 43 (Md. App. 1996)
• Decision Date: 01 September 1996
• Docket Number: No. 1011,1011
• Parties: Latina Rose SMITH v. STATE of Maryland. ,

Page 43

116 Md.App. 43

695 A.2d 575

Latina Rose SMITH v. STATE of Maryland.

No. 1011, Sept. Term, 1996.

Court of Special Appeals of Maryland.

June 25, 1997.

Sherrie B. Glaser, Asst. Public Defender (Stephen E. Harris, Public Defender, on the brief), Baltimore, for appellant.

Celia Anderson Davis, Asst. Atty. Gen., Baltimore (J. Joseph Curran, Jr., Baltimore and Sandra A. O'Connor, State's Atty. for Baltimore County, Towson, on the brief), for appellee.

Submitted before HARRELL and THIEME, JJ., and THEODORE G. BLOOM, Judge (retired), Specially Assigned.

HARRELL, Judge.

Appellant, Latina Rose Smith, seeks reversal of her first-degree murder and robbery convictions rendered by a Baltimore County jury. The same jury acquitted her of robbery with a deadly or dangerous weapon. Her appeal is dependent on our review of the propriety of the trial court's denial of her Motion to Transfer Venue ¹. We shall affirm.

ISSUES

In reflecting on appellant's single appellate contention ², we discern that she actually presented this panel with a more complex set of sequential questions that we have restructured below for purposes of analysis:

I. What was the proper allocation of the burden of production of evidence at the venue hearing?

II. What was the proper allocation of the burden of proof at the venue hearing?

III. What standard of proof was applicable at the venue hearing?

IV. What discrete facts were required to be demonstrated in order to establish the proper venue for appellant's murder trial pursuant to Md. Ann.Code art. 27, § 586A?

V. What discrete facts were required to be demonstrated in order to establish proper venue for appellant's murder trial pursuant to Md. Ann.Code art. 27, § 590?

VI. Did appellant produce evidence sufficient to generate the issue of venue for the murder charges?

VII. Did the State sufficiently prove proper venue at the venue hearing for the murder charges?

VIII. Was venue proper in Baltimore County for appellant's robbery trial?

FACTS

We repeat here only those facts deemed either relevant to the trial judge's venue determination or contextually supportive. Appellants' Motion to Transfer Venue requested, in pertinent part, that

this Honorable Court pursuant to [Md. Ann.Code art. 27, § 586A] transfer this case to its proper jurisdiction and in support thereof states the following:

1. That the Defendant has been charged with first degree murder and other related offenses resulting from an event that occurred on [10 February] 1995.

2. The Defendant was a back seat passenger in a [car].

3. The State alleges that the Defendant feloniously murdered the victim, Myra Harrison.

4. This was brought to the attention of the authorities by an eyewitness who allegedly observed the Defendant placing the [victim's] body at or near Carroll Road, one-fourth mile south of Sparks Road [in] Baltimore County.

5. That the State further alleges that the Defendant and Co-Defendant, Bronwynn Byers, picked up the alleged victim, Myra Harrison, from her employment at Johns Hopkins Hospital [in] Baltimore City.

6. The parties then proceeded to drive on the [Jones Falls Expressway or] JFX. The alleged felonious blows occurred on the JFX at or near Cold Spring Lane.

7. That this location is clearly within the Baltimore City limits....

At the venue hearing, appellant offered the testimony of William Matthews, a Survey Computations Supervisor with the Department of Transportation. He testified that the Cold Spring Lane interchange on the JFX is approximately two to two and one-half miles south of the Baltimore County-Baltimore City boundary and within the city limits. He further testified that the Northern Parkway exit is closer to the boundary than the Cold Spring Lane exit, yet within the confines of the city.

Appellant then testified regarding the location of the occurrences of 10 February 1994. She stated that, at approximately 7:15 a.m., she and Ms. Byers drove to the Johns Hopkins Hospital to meet the victim, Myra Harrison. Appellant sat in the back seat, while the victim was a passenger in the front seat. Ms. Byers drove the vehicle. Soon thereafter, the vehicle entered the northbound lanes of the JFX. A fight quickly ensued between Harrison and appellant. Appellant admitted that, during the altercation, she struck the victim but never admitted to using a knife. Apparently, Ms. Byers pulled the car to the side of the JFX, "a little past" the Northern Parkway exit after Harrison complained that she could not breathe. During the interlude, appellant noticed that the victim was "slumped" over and had blood on her chest. Appellant, despite her lack of medical training or experience, checked Harrison's wrist and found no pulse. After waiting a few minutes, the women continued north on the JFX into Baltimore County.

The State, in its rebuttal, offered only the testimony of Baltimore County Police Lieutenant Bruce McGuire. Lt. McGuire, during a 10 February 1994 routine patrol, was driving along Carroll Road in Baltimore County. After observing several citizens along the side of that road, Lt. McGuire stopped and alighted from his vehicle at approximately 8:43 a.m. The officer then observed and inspected the body of Myra Harrison where it lay on the side of Carroll Road. He discerned the following regarding the condition of the body.

Well, it was inside a green plastic bag and the feet were sticking out. And when you couldn't--you could actually look inside. And when you look [sic] inside you could see an area of the chest; you could see some type of wound, although I couldn't tell what it was. I couldn't see her face, but there was no blood coming out of the wound and there was absolutely no movement on the body.

Subsequent to argument by counsel, the judge stated:

What I have before me today is the testimony of Mr. William Matthews, who was the expert called by the Defendant on the motion to establish where the City line-County line location is; I further have testimony from the Defendant herself, Latina Rose Smith, indicating that she and the victim were in a physical altercation at times when a vehicle you (sic) which she says was operated by Miss Byers was on the [JFX] in a northbound direction toward Baltimore County; I also have testimony from Ms. Smith that she was involved in a fistfight with the victim, and that is the only evidence of force that I have before me. I do not have before me any evidence of a stabbing; I don't have any evidence of an exact cause of death or instrumentality utilized. I'm assuming that Miss Harrison died based upon the testimony of the Police Officer who was called by the State and his description of a body that was found in Baltimore County, but I do not know what, the cause of death, what caused the death of Miss Harrison. And as, as I have indicated, the only testimony that I have regarding any blows struck by Miss Smith on the victim, Miss Harrison, is her description of a fistfight. There's never a description of any kind of weapon, such as a knife used. [Appellant's counsel], in her argument, has referred to a stabbing, but I don't know that any stabbing, in fact, ever took place from the testimony ... that I have before me.

The trial judge, faced with a dearth of evidence relevant to the determination confronting her, was constrained to make only limited factual conclusions. The trial judge apparently determined that a mobile fracas between appellant and the victim occurred on the JFX and the victim's lifeless body was found in Baltimore County. Based upon the evidence adduced at the hearing, we conclude that the court's determination of these facts was not clearly erroneous.

The court did not consider any expert evidence regarding the cause of death. ³ The trial judge received some evidence concerning the victim's death from two lay sources. First, appellant testified that the victim, while still in Baltimore City, had no apparent pulse, had blood on her chest, and assumed a "slumped" posture after the fistfight. Lt. McGuire, on the other hand, testified that he found the victim's body in Baltimore County with chest wounds.

STANDARDS OF REVIEW

As implied, supra, we review the judge's decision to determine if her factual conclusions were clearly erroneous. See Martin v. State, 113 Md.App. 190, 251, 686 A.2d 1130 (1996) (concluding that trial judge's factual determinations regarding venue were not clearly erroneous). In the instant case, we divine that the trial judge's limited factual conclusions were not clearly erroneous and were supported by the evidence adduced at the hearing. ⁴

ANALYSIS

Maryland courts have consistently drawn a distinction between venue and jurisdiction. Much of the reasoning employed in this opinion turns on that distinction. Venue is the place where the trial may properly occur. See McBurney v. State, 280 Md. 21, 31, 371 A.2d 129 (1977). Jurisdiction, on the other hand, refers to the power of the court to adjudicate the matter before it. Id. Some sovereigns' courts use the term "jurisdiction" or "territorial jurisdiction" to connote the aggregate of jurisdiction and venue. We do not.

Appellant only questioned the proper venue for her trial. Appellant does not object to the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court for Baltimore County. A circuit court of this State has full common law jurisdiction in all criminal trials for crimes committed in Maryland except when limited by statute. Md.Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 1-501. "It is assumed, necessarily, in any question as to venue, that the court of such a place has jurisdiction over the subject matter". McBurney, 280 Md. at 31 n. 8, 371 A.2d 129 (quoting 1 Wharton's Criminal Procedure (12th ed.1974) § 36). Appellant argued that venue was proper in Baltimore City, thereby conceding proper jurisdiction in Maryland. Therefore, we shall not consider any subject matter jurisdictional question. Of course, if presented with facts raising such jurisdictional issues, we would be...