Smith v. State

Decision Date07 November 1977
Docket NumberNo. 876S234,876S234
Citation368 N.E.2d 1154,267 Ind. 167
PartiesHarold SMITH, Appellant (Defendant below), v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Plaintiff below).
CourtIndiana Supreme Court

Patrick E. Chavis, III, Indianapolis, for appellant.

Theodore L. Sendak, Atty. Gen., Daniel Lee Pflum, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for appellee.

PRENTICE, Justice.

Defendant (Appellant) was charged with the commission of a robbery while armed, Ind.Code (Burns 1975) 35-12-1-1, and kidnapping, Ind.Code (Burns 1975) 35-1-55-1. After trial by jury, he was acquitted on the kidnapping charge but was found guilty of armed robbery, and sentenced to fifteen years imprisonment. This direct appeal presents the following issues:

(1) Whether the trial court committed error by denying the defendant's motion for discharge based upon an alleged violation of Ind.R.Crim.P. 4(B) and his constitutional right to a speedy trial.

(2) Whether the trial court erred in requiring the defendant, over his timely objection, to stand trial while wearing prison clothing.

(3) Whether there was sufficient evidence to sustain the guilty verdict.

ISSUE I

After being charged and arraigned, defendant was released on bond pending trial. He failed to appear in court for pre-trial conference. His bond was forfeited, and on March 21, 1973, a warrant was issued for his arrest. On October 29, 1974, while being held in Mississippi to answer federal criminal charges, he filed a pro se motion for a speedy trial, pursuant to Ind.R.Crim.P. 4(B). Defendant filed his motion in the proper court, and the court denied the motion on the ground that defendant was not in custody on the Indiana charges against him, but he failed to file a copy of the motion with the prosecutor's office. There is no indication that the State had knowledge of defendant's location prior to the receipt of his motion.

After defendant stood trial in federal court in Mississippi in December of 1974, he was returned to Indiana. He first appeared in court on January 10, 1975, which was more than seventy days following his October 29, 1974 motion for a speedy trial. Defendant claims as error the trial court's denial of his motion to be discharged for the court's failure to bring him to trial within seventy days after the filing of his request.

Although Indiana formerly made exception to the rules on discharge for delay in bringing a defendant to trial when he was in jail for another conviction, Bewley v. State, (1966) 247 Ind. 652, 220 N.E.2d 612, or in jail in another jurisdiction, State v. Hadden, (1967) 248 Ind. 422, 234 N.E.2d 499, in reliance upon Smith v. Hooey, (1969) 393 U.S. 374, 89 S.Ct. 575, 21 L.Ed.2d 607, this Court expressly overruled those prior decisions, Fossey v. State, (1970) 254 Ind. 173, 258 N.E.2d 616. Writing for the majority in Fossey, Justice Hunter stated:

" * * * the above exceptions to the speedy trial protection afforded an Indiana defendant can no longer be countenanced by this court. The fact that a defendant is in jail on a prior conviction, whether he be in jail in Indiana or another jurisdiction, does not vitiate his interest in a speedy trial on the second charge * * * . In light of the Hooey decision, such a defendant clearly has a constitutional right to a speedy trial * * * ." 254 Ind. at 180, 258 N.E.2d at 620.

But, saying that a defendant has a constitutional right to a speedy trial in Indiana when he is being held for trial in another jurisdiction does not necessitate the application of Criminal Rule 4(B) and its seventy day time limitation. As was stated in Fossey, supra :

"(T)he standard imposed on Indiana courts and prosecutors is stricter than that imposed in the federal system since any delay exceeding the specified time limit is considered a per se denial of the 'speedy trial' right." 254 Ind. at 179, 258 N.E.2d at 619.

While it may be reasonable to impose the time limit of Criminal Rule 4(B) when a criminal defendant is within the exclusive control of the State of Indiana, for purposes of certainty and ease of administration of the rule, it becomes irrational to extend its application to a defendant who is incarcerated in another jurisdiction which has an interest in retaining the defendant in its custody, either for trial or to serve a sentence.

The standards for a speedy trial when the accused is incarcerated outside the State were established in Smeltzer v. State, (1970) 254 Ind. 165, 258 N.E.2d 647, and were followed in Hart v. State, (1973) 260 Ind. 137, 292 N.E.2d 814. The factors to be considered are:

"(1) the length of time which transpires between the demand by the accused for a speedy trial, and the initiation of action by the proper authorities in this State to bring him to trial;

"(2) the procedures followed by the State of Indiana in seeking the release of the accused from the jurisdiction in which he is incarcerated; and

"(3) the compliance by the officials of the State of Indiana with the pertinent statutory provisions of the law of this state and of the incarcerating jurisdiction." Smeltzer, supra, 254 Ind. at 169-170, 258 N.E.2d at 650.

Or, more generally, "Upon * * demand, (the state has) a constitutional duty to make a diligent, good-faith effort to bring defendant before the * * * court for trial." Smith v. Hooey, supra, 393 U.S. at 383, 89 S.Ct. at 579.

Although the specific details of the method employed by the State of Indiana to obtain defendant's presence and of the time the procedure was first initiated are not contained in the record, inasmuch as the defendant did not apprise the prosecutor's office of his location and further was unavailable for removal to Indiana until after his December 1974 trial in Mississippi, his presence in court on January 10, 1975, evinces that the State exercised the due diligence required by the constitution.

ISSUE II

Defendant asserts that, over timely objection, he was compelled to appear at trial wearing identifiable prison clothing. In Estelle v. Williams, (1976) 425 U.S. 501, 96 S.Ct. 1691, 48 L.Ed.2d 126, the Supreme Court of the United States stated, "The State cannot, consistent by with the Fourteenth Amendment, compel an accused to stand trial before a jury while dressed in identifiable prison clothes, * * * ." 425 U.S. at 512, 96 S.Ct. at 1697.

The Court in Williams, supra, was chiefly concerned with the element of compulsion, noting that under some circumstances a defendant might make the tactical decision to appear in prison garb with the hope of eliciting the jury's sympathy. Accordingly, the Court held that proper objection by defendant is necessary to establish a constitutional violation. The Justices were divided upon that point, however. Obviously, the preferred procedure is for the trial judge to advise the defendant of his right not to appear before the jury in identifiable jail garb and permit him to make a timely election. It should also be noted that the Court of Appeals had held in the Williams case that "waiver of the objection cannot be inferred merely from failure to object, if trial in prison garb is customary in the jurisdiction." (5 Cir., 500 F.2d 206). The Supreme Court did not take issue with that holding. Rather, it determined that the record disclosed no finding that the practice of the trial court was to require non-bailed defendants to stand trial in prison garments, if timely objection was made and that the district court had concluded that it was the practice of the particular judge to permit any accused, who so desired, to change into civilian clothing.

In Williams, the Supreme Court made the additional observation that compelling the defendant to appear in prison clothing might be harmless error in circumstances under which the jury would learn of his incarceration in any event.

It is our opinion that the facts of the case before us do not warrant a reversal, notwithstanding that the defendant protested his being brought to trial in jail garb. First, there is nothing in the record to reflect that his garb was identifiably that of a prisoner....

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